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ABSTRACT 
The 2007 foreclosure crisis has strained the U.S. economy with high foreclosure rates and 
property loss affecting many communities. However, there is a dearth of research on how the 
crisis has impacted Asian American communities, even though they are geographically 
concentrated in metropolitan areas and states with higher foreclosure rates. This study explores 
foreclosure risk, or what factors impact homeowner vulnerability to foreclosure, and how the 
foreclosure crisis has impacted Asian Americans. It examines these effects across the nation with 
a focus on Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota. To better understand foreclosure risks, the study 
includes help-seeking behavior, highlighting how Asian American-serving community-based 
organizations (AA CBOs) mediate these risks for their clients. The study consequently includes 
interviews with AA CBO staff from across the country and focus groups with Laotian 
homeowners from Minneapolis-St. Paul.  
The results illustrate that many Asian American homeowners are geographically 
concentrated in areas with higher foreclosure risk and live in neighborhoods that expose them to 
risk factors that may lead them to eventually foreclose. The study also finds that AA CBOs have 
developed a number of strategies to mediate the impacts of the foreclosure crisis and foreclosure 
risks, but have few resources to serve immigrant, limited English-speaking homeowners. Amidst 
shifting housing policy changes, these AA CBOs have developed their own networks to expand 
their access to resources and better serve clients. In the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, there is 
increasing segmentation and devolution of services, which narrows the networks that AA CBOs 
utilize to develop foreclosure prevention resources for clients. These trends in service delivery 
also limit mainstream institutions’ understanding of Asian Americans in the region.  
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These findings have implications for planners and policy makers as to how they can 
better support smaller and marginalized populations by understanding the effects that housing 
policies have on these populations and through collaborations with CBOs. By offering assistance 
to more groups, local governments can prevent accruing further costs related to foreclosures and 
help their economic stability. The study also raises questions about the effectiveness of 
devolution as a government strategy in housing service provision when foreclosures are a 
complicated and time-consuming process. With growing segmentation in housing service 
provision between the government and CBOs in addition to among various CBOs, there is a 
growing gap between decision makers and CBOs that implement policy changes. These gaps add 
to the dearth of resources that many CBOs experience in providing services that they are 
expected to fulfill for their clients without sufficient government support.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2007 foreclosure crisis dramatically impacted families, neighborhoods, local 
governments, and financial institutions, both nationally and globally. It is critical to understand 
the economic context and market forces at play surrounding the crisis because these external 
processes can have devastating impacts on individual homeowners and the communities in which 
they live. The “interaction of state services, community-based nonprofit organizations, private 
sector companies, and voluntary and informal processes,” which is formed by external forces, 
including the private market and government policies, enable or take away the opportunity of 
homeownership (DeFilippis, Fisher, & Shragge, 2010, p. 16). This research contributes to the 
untangling of these forces that affect individual and community stability. By understanding what 
forces impacts individuals and on a community-wide level, policy makers and planners can 
better assist in foreclosure recovery efforts and the nuances of these interventions.  
With the significant impacts that foreclosures can have, it is important to understand what 
factors contribute to homeowners’ vulnerability to foreclosure, or what I refer to in this study as 
foreclosure risk factors. While others have examined how type of loan, housing discrimination, 
race, income, and geography affect foreclosure risk, there is less literature about immigration 
status, language differences, and other potential factors that disproportionately affect smaller 
racial minorities. In particular, there are few studies that have focused on Asian Americans as a 
racial group, and Asian American ethnic groups (e.g., Filipino, Chinese, Laotian).1 It is unclear !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The term, “Asian American,” is used throughout the text to refer to any persons who are of Asian descent, 
including those who are foreign-born. This pan-Asian term was first introduced in the late 1960s in opposition to 
white supremacy and imperialism. “Asian American” was introduced as a political term to assert a community-
driven identity during the campaigns to institutionalize Asian American Studies on university campuses. It was then 
used in the mid-1970s by professional and community organizations to lobby for resources dedicated to Asian 
Americans. This term was created to increase the effectiveness and political visibility of Asian Americans. For more 
on the history of the term, see Espiritu (1992). This term is not meant to diminish the diversity of identities, 
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how these groups were affected by foreclosures and what contributes to their foreclosure risk, 
which would help understand how generalized housing policies impact a growing population in 
the United States.  
Community-based organizations (CBOs) have undertaken an important role in serving 
communities at risk for foreclosure, particularly those at risk in Asian American communities. 
CBOs oftentimes serve as mediators and a primary source of social services for immigrant and/or 
minority populations that are underserved by the government.2 Although providing much needed 
services, CBOs are constrained by market pressures and a lack of government funding—both 
factors challenge their ability to provide services and advocate for clients. By studying the help-
seeking behavior of Asian American homeowners and their interactions with CBOs, CBOs can 
design interventions targeting these groups. Then, by understanding the effectiveness of CBO 
interventions, policy makers, planners, and other funders of CBOs can learn how to build 
relationships with CBOs to create more sustainable programs and systems that can maintain 
neighborhood and community stability in another crisis context.  
Overview of Chapters 
 This study focuses on answering two questions on foreclosure risk and CBO intervention 
as related to Asian Americans. Specifically, 1) how did foreclosure risk affect Asian American 
homeowners during the foreclosure crisis, and 2) How have Asian American-serving CBOs (AA 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
socioeconomic status, and immigration history among Asian American ethnic groups. It also does not include Native 
Hawaiians or other Pacific Islanders.  
2 Community-based organizations are defined broadly in this study. Rather than simply including organizations that 
are place-based, CBOs include those that are nonprofits and may be tied to either a geography and/or target a 
specific population that may live within a larger region. Oftentimes, CBOs that focus on a group have a larger 
geographic scope if their targeted population is geographically dispersed throughout a region or state. In contrast, 
mainstream CBOs are defined as those that do not focus on a particular group, but are more narrowly defined by a 
specific geography or social service that they provide. Unlike other CBOs that may target a population, mainstream 
CBOs are categorized here as organizations that primarily focus on providing services in English.  
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CBOs) mediated these foreclosure risks for their clients? 3 These questions not only help to 
understand the impacts of the foreclosure crisis as a specific point in time, but also learn more 
about factors that affect Asian American homeowners and their vulnerability to foreclosure 
overall. While the study does focus on Asian Americans, many of these risk factors overlap with 
other Americans because they reflect larger trends in the housing market and the devolution of 
social services to CBOs.  
Chapter 2 begins by describing factors that have impacted foreclosure risk, including the 
evolving housing market conditions that led to the crisis. It also explores the disparate outcomes 
that minorities and immigrants have experienced in homeownership and risk of foreclosure due 
to increasing deregulation and the changing housing market. These disparate outcomes affect 
their vulnerability to foreclosure with the rapid changes that led up to and followed the crisis. 
This chapter concludes with what already is known about the production of foreclosure risk 
specifically for Asian Americans.  
Chapter 3 introduces the origins of community interventions, including formal and 
established CBOs. As with other social services, CBOs have played an important role in housing 
through homebuyer counseling, rental assistance, and more recently foreclosure prevention 
mitigation. While providing these services, CBOs are also affected by societal influences on 
minorities and immigrants, as the perception of these groups impacts CBO funding. It also 
broadly describes not only how AA CBOs have worked directly with clients, but also mediated 
between the market and public sector, similar to other mainstream CBOs.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 While the study identifies these organizations as Asian American-serving, many are not exclusive and provide 
services to clients of other racial or ethnic backgrounds. However, they are labeled AA CBOs for the purposes of 
this study because these CBOs tend to invest more resources into providing translated materials into Asian 
languages and outreach to Asian American clients. 
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 Then, Chapter 4 provides an overview of the research questions and the methodological 
approach, which uses a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. The chapter also includes 
the conceptual framework used to answer the research questions. After, it reviews other 
methodologies that other researchers have used to answer similar questions about the foreclosure 
crisis to contextualize the methods used. To better understand these effects, these questions are 
examined on a national and local study in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota region, or the 
Twin Cities.  
Subsequently, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings from the national analysis, examining 
foreclosure risk of Asian Americans and what factors contribute to their vulnerability to 
foreclosure. It also includes how AA CBOs are intervening in different regions of the United 
States to describe the foreclosure landscape that AA CBOs are confronting and how they are 
addressing these challenges. The national scope informs broader themes of government support 
or ineffectiveness, and how AA CBOs are filling in the gaps of service. This level of analysis 
also provides insight into national housing market forces that affect AA CBOs and Asian 
American homeowners, regardless of location.  
Chapter 6 describes findings from similar measures in the Twin Cities. With its local 
focus, additional interviews were conducted with other U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) -certified CBOs to compare how AA CBOs and mainstream CBOs 
implement foreclosure prevention services and how they were impacted by the crisis. Focus 
groups with Laotian homeowners were also included who participated in housing services to 
explore individual homeowner foreclosure risk factors. By including a local analysis, this chapter 
illuminates what risk factors may specifically affect Laotian homeowners more than other 
groups.  
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 Chapter 7 revisits the research questions and illuminates implications from the study. It 
ties the findings of the national and local study together to highlight that Asian Americans are at 
greater foreclosure risk than the overall population, in particular when looking at specific Asian 
American ethnic groups due to a number of factors. Themes from the analyses are summarized, 
describing the resource limitations and strategies that AA CBOs have experienced during the 
crisis to intervene for clients. After, it explores areas of future study that can further examine 
these research questions.  
Chapter 8 then provides my thoughts on persistent issues that will affect Asian 
Americans and the stability of AA CBOs. First, it describes how generalized housing policies 
affect Asian Americans based on the findings. The chapter then offers thoughts on the 
effectiveness of devolution as a government strategy in the provision of foreclosure prevention 
assistance, particularly when this strategy segments the CBO sector and increases divisions 
between CBOs and the government. The chapter then describes the conflicting role that CBOs 
currently have in housing services and suggests potential pathways to encourage policy makers 
and planners to engage with CBOs. It ends with policy recommendations and implications for 
planning. 
The disparate impacts of the foreclosure crisis have placed much of the burden on 
minority and immigrant communities. By better understanding how it affected Asian Americans 
and Asian American ethnic groups, planners can shape policies to benefit communities and 
incorporate smaller populations who contribute to the economies of cities. If cities do not have 
the capacity to directly provide services for these smaller populations, they need to work with 
institutions to strengthen interventions because the impacts of foreclosures extend beyond the 
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individual. By becoming more inclusive, policy makers and planners can help provide for the 
larger public good that will benefit from greater economic stability. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ASIAN AMERICANS AND FORECLOSURE RISK 
Minorities and immigrants have experienced differential foreclosure risk. Some of these 
risk factors result from lack of access to mainstream financial institutions, or to lower income, 
inconsistent employment opportunities, and discrimination. However, many housing policies 
favor wealthier homeowners and have evolved over time to extend homeownership opportunities 
to riskier borrowers. In the process, lenders and brokers developed and sold exotic and subprime 
loans to minority and immigrant borrowers and neighborhoods, which exacerbated existing 
foreclosure risk factors that affected these communities. Coupled with increased deregulation 
that favors investors and lenders, these minority and immigrant homeowners’ foreclosure risk 
has grown as a result of the 2007 foreclosure crisis.  
The following describes the overall impacts of the foreclosure crisis for individual 
homeowners, neighborhoods, cities, and financial institutions. It then explains multiple risk 
factors, including changes in the housing and lending market that led to the foreclosure crisis. 
Next, the chapter identifies four risk factors that affect minorities: housing discrimination, race, 
geography, and information asymmetry. It then connects how these four areas and other risk 
factors affect Asian Americans’ foreclosure risk. While much is still unknown about how these 
groups were affected by the foreclosure crisis, the current study focuses on foreclosure risk to 
identify ways that can intervene and mediate their vulnerability to foreclosure.   
Overview of the Foreclosure Crisis 
 Researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas estimated that the economic downturn 
cost the country between 6 and 14 trillion dollars while household net worth decreased by 16 
trillion dollars (Atkinson, Luttrell, & Rosenblum, 2013). The percentage of homes that had at 
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least one foreclosure filing grew from 0.6 to 2.2 from 2006 to 2010; some states had foreclosure 
rates as high as 9.4 percent and 5.7 percent in, for example, Nevada and Arizona, respectively 
(Taylor, Kochhar, Fry, Velasco, & Motel, 2011). The United States also lost 7.5 million jobs 
between 2007 and 2009, and had an unemployment rate of 9.5 percent in 2009, which 
exacerbated the economic consequences of the recession and affected families’ ability to pay 
their mortgages (Taylor et al., 2011). 
At the individual level, families experienced many hardships because of the crisis. Not 
only did they lose their equity and wealth, but also their credit scores fell. Because of the 
growing use of credit bureau data to buy insurance, rent an apartment, or get a job, becoming 
delinquent on a mortgage or entering foreclosure can have additional long-term effects for a 
family’s stability (Immergluck, 2009). Christie (2010) found that mortgage delinquency could 
affect one’s credit score by 40 to 135 points, while a foreclosure or short sale can lower a credit 
score by 85 to 160 points. For many lower- or middle-income families, the home is particularly 
important because it is their largest asset (Denton, 2006, p. 71). After losing their largest source 
of wealth, families are left with few resources to support themselves.  
 As individuals entered foreclosure, neighborhood stability waned. Immergluck (2009) 
found that a foreclosed home reduced the values of homes within an eighth of a mile by 1 to 1.5 
percent, “even during a time of fairly strong housing prices” (p. 150). For a study in 
Philadelphia, house sale prices decreased by $3,542 when located within 300 to 449 feet of a 
vacant house; sale prices dropped by as much as $7,627 when 150 feet from vacant houses 
(Shlay & Whitman, 2004). The Center for Responsible Lending similarly estimated that nearly 
$2 trillion in property values were lost for homeowners who lived near foreclosed properties 
between 2007 and 2011; more than half of these spillover effects were in neighborhoods with 
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majority non-White residents (Bocian, Smith, & Li, 2012). Massey and Denton (1993) described 
a HUD study that found that once 3 to 6 percent of homes in a neighborhood are abandoned, “the 
process of decay quickly become[s] cumulative” (HUD, 1973). These spillover effects impact 
the individual’s wealth in addition to the neighborhood’s stability. 
As more neighborhoods faced disinvestment and abandonment, their local governments 
“were forced to become custodians of abandoned houses,” particularly for houses with unknown 
lien owners (Immergluck, 2009, p. 3). In 2013, there were more than 300,000 vacant properties 
in the country due to foreclosure (Liston, 2013). However, abandonment results in larger local 
revenue impacts. For example, Apgar and Duda (2005) found that the city of Chicago had 26 
different municipal costs related to foreclosures and vacant properties in 2003, including $5,000 
to mow lawns and remove trash, $4,307 in property tax losses from demolition, and fire 
suppression costing the most at $14,020. The city of Chicago may lose more than $46,000 per 
foreclosure and has to involve multiple city departments due to the burden that foreclosures place 
on local governments. 
As more homes entered into foreclosure, financial institutions lost an estimate of $200 
billion (Immergluck, 2009, p. 159). The U.S. Federal Reserve Bank provided several loans to 
banks and depositories, giving $20 billion in December 2007, $60 billion in January 2008, and 
incremental amounts that increased to $200 billion on March 12, 2008 (Crump et al., 2008). 
Many investment companies also had to look for capital abroad because they were having 
difficulty recovering funds domestically. For example, Morgan Stanley received $5.5 billion 
from China and Merrill Lynch received $6.6 billion from Kuwait in 2007 (Crump et al., 2008). 
When banks and lenders foreclose on the homeowner, they take over the property’s lien. 
This change in ownership continued to have spillover effects on neighborhoods. Because they 
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oftentimes had a large portfolio of properties, these lenders did little to sell or maintain these 
properties, which then further decreased property values around these vacant homes; homes that 
entered foreclosure were also more likely to be foreclosed several times (Gamino, 2013).  
These effects are particularly troubling when considering the deliberate actions of some 
lenders and banks that contributed to the large number of foreclosures. For example, banks often 
favored mass foreclosure over negotiating loan modifications, which resulted in further 
disinvestment and foreclosures. Additionally, if banks informed homeowners that they were 
going to foreclose, but ultimately did not follow-through and file for foreclosure, these 
homeowners were still held liable for their property taxes, which dropped their credit scores and 
contributed to declining property values in their neighborhoods (Liston, 2013). In other cases, 
banks and lenders reportedly misled their clients and held up their loan modification process, 
which led them into foreclosure. For instance, former Bank of America employees filed 
statements for a lawsuit again the bank, asserting that they were given incentives to deny loan 
modifications because foreclosures were more profitable than loan modifications to Bank of 
America (Weil, 2013). On a smaller scale, Minnesota homeowners reported that some lenders 
were proceeding to foreclose on homeowners while the borrowers were still negotiating a loan 
modification, or “dual tracking” (Schmickle, 2013). 
While banks and lenders became landlords and poorly managed their properties, 
investment firms have recently found ways to capitalize on formerly foreclosed properties. 
Former homeowners are now renting in higher numbers; consequently, investors see the 
potential of $84 billion more in rental properties (Lazo & Tangel, 2013). With these firms acting 
as landlords, rental prices are increasing and preventing homebuyers from purchasing new 
homes. Additionally, these investment firms are bundling rental income and securitizing 
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properties to sell to investors. For example, American Homes 4 Rent has bought 18,000 homes to 
rent out (Lazo & Tangel, 2013). However, the rental market is increasing because of the high 
risk and securitization that these investment companies pushed for, which may increase the years 
it will take for the country to recover from foreclosures. As banks, lenders, and investment firms 
find ways to profit from the foreclosure crisis, the resulting hardships from the crisis have been 
particularly acute for racial and ethnic minority groups. These disparities among minority 
borrowers and neighborhoods are the cumulative result of historical policies and disproportionate 
risks that impact minorities.  
Evolving Housing Policies and Mortgage Market  
 American housing policy has favored wealthy and white homeowners, which has led to 
an imbalance in access to the opportunities connected to homeownership. The government uses 
direct and tax subsidies for its housing programs. However, three-fourths of the federal 
government’s subsidies are tax subsidies for homeowners and investors through deductions on 
property tax and low-income tax credits, respectively (Dreier, 2006). While 150 million 
homeowners were able to deduct their mortgage interest from their taxes, less than 7 million low-
income renters received federal housing subsidies; also, mortgage-interest deductions provided 
more than $100 billion in subsidies compared to less than $32.9 billion for direct housing 
subsidies in 2004 (Schwartz, 2006, p. 5). In other words, Vale (2006) stated “government 
involvement in housing has taken the form of rewards, aiding a variety of upwardly mobile 
Americans judged to be worthy” (p. 15).  
These policies disproportionately affect minority groups because they have lower 
homeownership rates than non-Hispanic Whites. Nearly three-fourths of non-Hispanic Whites 
are homeowners and all other racial minority groups have lower homeownership rates (see 
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Figure 1). Although Asian Americans have the highest homeownership rates compared to other 
racial groups, these rates dramatically differ by ethnic group (see Figure 2). Because they have 
lower homeownership rates, many of these groups benefit less from federal housing subsidies 
since federal funding then tends to benefit those who are able to afford homes.  
Figure 1. Homeownership Rates by Race, United States (2010) 
!
Note: NHPI = Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander; AIAN = American Indian and Alaska Native; NHW = 
non-Hispanic White. Latino can be of any racial group. African American, NHPI, AIAN, and Asian American 
values include alone or in combination with another ethnic or racial category. Non-Hispanic White is the only 
category that does not include Latinos.  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Decennial Census 
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Figure 2. Homeownership Rates by Asian Ethnic Group, United States (2010) 
 
Note: Chinese does not include Taiwanese. All groups are alone or in combination to account for mixed-race 
individuals.!
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Decennial Census 
 
In addition, wealthier homeowners benefit more from mortgage interest and property tax 
deductions compared to lower-income homeowners. According to Schwartz (2006), a $1,000 
deduction provides $350 to wealthier taxpayers compared to $100 for a taxpayer with less 
income because lower-income homeowners are more likely to use standard tax deductions. 
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Dreier (2006) also found that 23 percent of homeowners who earned between $40,000 and 
$50,000 used their mortgage interest deductions, thus saving on average $859; on the other hand, 
only 5 percent of homeowners who earned between $20,000 and $30,000 used their deduction 
and saved on average $426. Oftentimes, though, these lower income homeowners received fewer 
benefits if the costs of homeownership were included. Rohe and Watson (2006) described the 
number of additional expenses after purchasing a home, including taxes, insurance, utilities, 
maintenance, and repairs in addition to the costs related to housing depreciation. Historical and 
current policies contributed to inequalities among homeownership and access to credit. The 
changes in the mortgage market simultaneously also contributed to these inequalities. 
 Over the past few decades, the scale of the mortgage market has changed from local to 
global, incorporating more sophisticated and exotic products to expand homeownership 
opportunities. The federal policy of deregulation was in full effect by the 1980s, which promoted 
riskier financial practices that contributed to the crisis and the concentration of foreclosures in 
minority and immigrant neighborhoods. Simultaneously, these changes contributed to minority 
homeowners’ increased risk of foreclosure in the recession, oftentimes because subprime lenders 
targeted these more vulnerable populations, who accumulated much greater debt than did 
wealthier and white homeowners (Del Rio, 2010; Mayer & Pence, 2008; Wyly, Atia, Foxcroft, 
Hammel, & Phillips-Watts, 2006).  
 Historically, investors did not purchase mortgages because financial institutions’ 
mortgage underwriting standards varied and involved high risk until the 1980s (Apgar & Calder, 
2005, p. 104). Homebuyers would sometimes need to pay up to half of the home price at the time 
of purchase with a balloon payment at the end of 5 years, which restricted homeownership 
opportunities to wealthier individuals (Smith, 2006b, p. 23). After the Great Depression, the 
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federal government initiated a series of programs and acts to provide jobs in the construction 
industry and increase homeownership opportunities. In 1933, the Home Owners’ Loan 
Corporation (HOLC) was created, which provided funding to refinance mortgages that were 
going to default and helped homeowners who had experienced foreclosure to obtain low-interest 
loans (Massey & Denton, 1993). As Massey and Denton (1993) described, HOLC “was the first 
government-sponsored program to introduce, on a mass scale, the use of long-term, self-
amortizing mortgages with uniform payments” (p. 51).  
The Wagner-Steagall Act, or the National Housing Act of 1934, created the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA), offering fully amortized mortgages over a 30-year period with a 
fixed-rate. This helped homebuyers borrow a higher proportion of their home value and also 
made it possible for the government to underwrite and insure mortgages (Schwartz, 2006; Smith, 
2006b). The government subsequently created the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(Fannie Mae), which established a secondary market and bought mortgages from originators to 
increase liquidity and increase the number of loans available. These policies created enormous 
demand for housing by the construction, real estate, and banking industries, which dramatically 
shifted America from “a country primarily of renters to one dominated by homeowners” (Smith, 
2006b, p. 23). Loans then originated primarily from deposit-taking institutions such as banks and 
savings and loans, which served their local depositors and kept the loans they originated. A 
smaller portion of mortgages originated from brokers and independent mortgage companies that 
would then sell their mortgages to insurance companies and Fannie Mae. With this dual 
mortgage system, financing homeownership was steady for several decades for the majority 
population.  
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However, minorities still had only limited access to neighborhoods and home loans. As 
early as 1917, banks discriminated against African Americans who applied for a mortgage as 
part of efforts to protect White neighborhoods (Immergluck, 2009). Without access to 
mainstream financial institutions, African American borrowers had to choose between 
approaching black financial institutions—which often had limited capital available—or an 
informal lender, who would provide a loan with abusive conditions (Immergluck, 2009). Helper 
(1969) also found that a majority of interviewed realtors believed that few banks would make 
loans to African Americans, but that they would also avoid lending in neighborhoods that “were 
black, turning black, or [were] threatened with the possibility of black entry” (as cited in Massey 
& Denton, 1993, p. 51). As mainstream banks refused to provide loans, more minorities had to 
rely on nontraditional loans to become homeowners, which established a risky trend.  
Many of these racist and discriminatory practices became institutionalized through 
informal and formal policies. A number of federal policies promoted racial discrimination. For 
example, the government institutionalized redlining through HOLC. Redlining developed a 
systematic rating of neighborhoods and loan risk based on the racial background of its residents; 
areas with less desirable groups were rarely approve of HOLC loans (Massey & Denton, 1993). 
The FHA also promoted and institutionalized redlining with risk-rating maps from the late 1930s 
(Immergluck, 2009). As Abrams (1955) explained, instead of easily implementing a 
nondiscrimination policy, the FHA “set itself up as the protector of all-white 
neighborhood…This official agency not only kept Negroes in their place but pointed at Chinese, 
Mexicans, American Indians, and other minorities as well” (pg. 230). Furthermore, the FHA was 
responsible for promoting other tools of planning such as subdivision controls and zoning 
ordinances that “were thought to maintain neighborhood stability and thereby guarantee property 
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values” (Pendall, Nelson, Dawkins, & Knaap, 2005, p. 222). Even in 1975, HUD defined a 
“healthy stable neighborhood” as an area that was ethnically homogenous while declining 
neighborhoods included a mixture of ethnic and racial groups (Smith, 2006a, p. 262). 
In the 1960s, thrifts—or savings and loans association—began faltering as the main 
source of mortgages when interest rates and availability of mortgage capital fluctuated. To help 
remedy the situation, the federal government limited the interest rate on savings accounts to 
prevent thrifts from declaring bankruptcy (Schwartz, 2006). In the 1970s, the government also 
began deregulating nondepository institutions, which could offer higher interest rates. Investors 
consequently turned to the secondary market because of their competitive interest rates, which 
decreased thrifts’ ability to compete; many eventually had to sell their mortgages to the 
secondary market (Schwartz, 2006).  
 The federal government later passed regulations that sought to help increase access to 
homeownership for minorities, but also disproportionately affected regulated institutions. When 
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was passed in 1977, elected officials sought to combat 
redlining and increase credit availability in central city neighborhoods (Squires & Kubrin, 2006). 
The CRA evaluated nondepository institutions’ lending, investment, and service in lower-income 
communities before these institutions were allowed to make changes in their business, such as 
purchasing or merging with other institutions (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003; Squires & Kubrin, 
2006). Community advocates could also provide input about banks’ lending practices through 
CRA (Rohe & Watson, 2006). There is evidence that CRA not only increased minority 
homeowners’ access to White neighborhoods, but that CRA loans also performed better than 
loans from lenders not covered by CRA (Bocian, Li, Reid, & Quercia, 2011; Laderman & Reid, 
2008; Squires & Kubrin, 2006).  
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However, CRA was expected to help these underserved communities because at the time, 
the majority of mortgages came from thrifts and commercial banks. More depository institutions 
began to expand their mortgage bank subsidiaries because these entities did not undergo CRA 
examinations (Schwartz, 2006). With the surge of subprime lenders during the 1990s and 2000s, 
an increasing proportion of the mortgage market was unregulated. Federal regulators do not 
consistently examine nondepository institutions, and state regulators have even fewer resources 
to do so (Immergluck, 2009). Although the CRA was a major step to increasing capital for 
minority homeowners, over time it became less effective. Consequently,  
… justifications for CRA articulated by policymakers depended partly on a social 
contract between communities and the depositories active in those communities, and not 
between communities and the broader set of suppliers of mortgage credit such as 
mortgage companies and credit unions (Immergluck, 2009, p. 65).  
 
Growth of the Subprime Market 
 With increasing deregulation, other types of products and services simultaneously 
expanded homeownership opportunities and exploited minority borrowers and communities. At 
the end of the 1980s, mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) grew with the help of low-interest rates 
and several technological advances, including geodemographic marketing that identified 
potential borrowers by income, age, home value, and race and ethnicity. Through the Internet, 
real estate data firms created targeted marketing data systems that individual brokers used to 
target homeowners, in particular those who were in the preforeclosure stage. This data would 
also help lenders charge higher fees to those who were considered riskier clients, including those 
who were minorities and of low income, while waiving fees for wealthier clients (Immergluck, 
2009). 
 Starting from the 1990s, there was a surge of subprime mortgages with higher rates and 
fees than prime loans and lower loan-to-value ratios. While thrifts comprised the majority of the 
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lending market until the mid-1970s, mortgage companies quickly overtook thrifts by 1996 as the 
largest lender (Immergluck, 2009).  From 1993 to 2000, subprime originations grew from 1.3 to 
5.3 percent of the total mortgage market (Collins, 2002). With low interest rates and mortgage 
rates, many homeowners also refinanced their loans to help pay for other expenses such as car 
loans and credit cards. For example, homeowners in 2003 took out $139 billion from their home 
equity, which comprised about 45 percent of all refinanced mortgages (Schwartz, 2006).  
Lenders and brokers encouraged this surge of subprime mortgages and refinances, 
“[relying] upon and [exploiting] the geographies of social disadvantage and isolation…for the 
benefit of mortgage brokers, lenders, and investors” (Immergluck, 2009, p. 74). For example, 
from 1993 to 1998, subprime lenders originated less than 2 percent to more than 15 percent, 
respectively, of all loans, and comprised 40 percent of all refinanced loans (Collins, 2002). 
However, Immergluck (2009) found that many of these borrowers could have qualified for 
lower-cost mortgages—37 percent of subprime borrowers in 2007 had a credit score above 660, 
which could have qualified them for a prime loan. 
 With nondepository institutions increasing, the mortgage market formed a dual regulatory 
system that offered one set of products for mainstream homebuyers and another set of products 
for low-income and minority borrowers. While the changing mortgage system did increase 
homeownership rates, lower-income and minority groups were oftentimes offered “a distinctly 
different set of organizations offering a distinctly different mix of products” and instead would 
“suffer the consequences of a broker-led ‘push marketing’ system that encourages unsuspecting 
borrowers to take on mortgage debt that they cannot afford and may not even need” (Apgar, 
Calder, & Fauth, 2004, p. 1). Sawyer and Temkin (2004) found that even when conventional 
lenders were located in low-income and minority areas in North Carolina, they still would not 
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“market to low-income and minority households, creating a vacuum that fringe bankers filled (as 
cited in Squires & Kubrin, 2006, p. 15). Squires and Kubrin (2006) also pointed out that the 
same neighborhoods that experienced redlining were experiencing a “reverse redlining” with 
financial institutions:  
… flooding these same markets with exploitative loan products that drain residents of 
their wealth... Instead of contributing to homeownership and community development, 
predatory lending practices strip the equity homeowners have struggled to build up and 
deplete the wealth of those communities for the enrichment of distant financial services 
firms (p. 56). 
 
Many of the top lenders in 2002 employed independent brokers because lenders would 
then not be held as responsible for risky mortgages sold by brokers, who were also less 
scrutinized than lenders (Immergluck, 2009). From 1991 to 1998, the number of brokers on 
average grew by 14 percent while brokered loans comprised 55 percent of all home loans in 2000 
(Kim-Sung & Hermanson, 2003). With the increasing number of brokered loans, vulnerable 
homeowners faced additional risk because brokers aggressively marketed to “divorced, female, 
and nonwhite borrowers,” selling almost half of all subprime mortgages (Immergluck, 2009, p. 
102; Kim-Sung & Hermanson, 2003).  Out of 125 interviewed subprime borrowers, the 
California Reinvestment Committee (2001) discovered that 39 percent of respondents said 
lenders and brokers initiated the idea of securing their mortgage. In Kim-Sung and Hermanson’s 
(2003) study of borrowers older than 65 years old, they found that 66 percent of Asian American 
and Pacific Islander borrowers had broker-originated loans compared to 64 percent of African 
Americans and 38 percent of white borrowers.  
In part, this higher risk came from brokers selling exotic loan products and targeting 
vulnerable populations because brokers received higher compensation for selling mortgages with 
larger principals than for the loan performance (Immergluck, 2009). Consequently, these 
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brokered loans had higher interest rates to help “compensate lenders for the higher default and 
prepayment risk associated with these broker-originated loans” (Apgar & Calder, 2005, p. 106). 
It is also alarming that borrowers with brokered loans felt they relied heavily on brokers 
compared to borrowers with lender-originated loans; those who receiving brokered loans did not 
obtain accurate information (Kim-Sung & Hermanson, 2003). 
 After the first subprime boom, housing prices dramatically increased. American 
economic expansion during the 1990s to 2000s was the largest in its history; home prices 
increased by 29 percent between 1995 and 2000 (Taylor et al., 2011). As home prices continued 
to increase, the second subprime boom in the 2000s introduced another surge of nontraditional 
terms and exotic products that continued to concentrate in low-income, minority neighborhoods. 
Many of these nontraditional loans were originally intended for wealthy borrowers and investors 
before 2002, who had high levels of net worth (Immergluck, 2009).  
However, for minority and lower income borrowers, many of these exotic products led to 
foreclosure. Exotic terms included low- or no-documentation loans, which quickly comprised the 
majority of subprime loans in 2006; interest only; negative amortization; adjustable rate 
mortgages (ARMs); and private mortgage insurance (Immergluck, 2009).  These low- or no-
down payment mortgages allowed borrowers to buy a home with almost no equity and were a 
strong predictor of mortgage default (Immergluck, 2009; Stone, 2006a). ARMs initially cost less 
for borrowers with low-interest rates for the first couple of years, but the interest rate then adjusts 
periodically. Because many of these loans were made during this second subprime surge, many 
borrowers’ interest dramatically increased in 2007 and 2008, contributing to why ARM 
borrowers were more likely than non-adjustable mortgage borrowers to default (Aalbers, 2009). 
The growth of exotic products also formed a cyclical relationship with higher home prices 
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because homebuyers could afford bigger and more expensive homes, which then increased 
demand for similar high-risk loans (Immergluck, 2009).   
The 2000s also saw the largest increase of mortgage debt for borrowers with the greater 
demand for exotic products and larger purchasing power. From 2001 to 2007, mortgage debt 
grew more than it had during the previous 200 years of American history (Kang, 2012). In part, 
with higher home values, borrowers did not need to save as much to maintain their assets and left 
them with greater debt (Heintz & Balakrishnan, 2012). In addition, 70 percent of these families 
had a total credit card debt of $972.72 trillion in 2008 (Mahmud, 2012). On a national scale, 
household debt comprised 50 percent of the Gross Domestic Product in 1980, which increased to 
98 percent in 2007 (Mahmud, 2012).  
Underwriting criteria used to incorporate local economic conditions and characteristics of 
borrowers in order to provide investors with information before they purchased mortgages 
(Swack, 2006). However, lenders began accepting greater risk and became less restrictive on the 
types of income allowed. For example, some lenders allowed “purchasers of two-family homes 
to count income from the rental of one of the units as a portion of their qualified home” 
(Schwartz, 2006, p. 260). As underwriting standards became lenient, borrowers could pay a 
smaller portion of the downpayment (Collins, 2002). However, borrowers who experienced any 
financial difficulties such as losing a job or becoming divorced were then more likely to default 
on their mortgage because they had fewer assets to provide a safety net. With higher debt from 
riskier loans, homeowners became more susceptible to foreclosures.  
Additional Factors Contributing to Foreclosure Risk 
Zoning and other land use regulations also prioritized the construction of larger single-
family homes, contributing to greater debt and demand for exotic loans. In 1980, single-family 
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homes comprised 56 percent of all housing construction, which increased to 77 percent by 2004 
(Schwartz, 2006). In particular, large-lot zoning has increased the cost of land and restricted the 
construction of multi-family housing (Schwartz, 2006). With these planning restrictions and 
based on greater demand, houses have also increased in size. Where the average owner-occupied 
house in 1973 was 1,526 square feet, in 2011 the average newly constructed home was 2,200 
square feet (American Housing Survey, 2011; Schwartz, 2006). As larger and more expensive 
housing was developed, lower-income families competed for older houses, which drove up 
prices of modest homes (Stone, 2006a).   
The mortgage industry also became more dependent on the global financial market. As 
noted earlier, MBSs rapidly grew and helped investors sell their mortgages to international 
markets (Stone, 2006a). This high demand for more product pushed lenders and brokers to sell 
more mortgages “to serve the interests of Wall Street rather than the needs of homebuyers and 
homeowners” (Immergluck, 2009, p. 121). The Internet allowed brokers to receive immediate 
approval from lenders, which helped to increase the alacrity with which lenders could sell 
mortgages (Immergluck, 2009). With increased risky lending and deregulation, homes began to 
be treated differently, no longer as “investments by those using and experiencing them” because 
of the way “capital…interacts with communities in different ways, and is interested first and 
foremost, in the commodification of social life, and conversion of what people need into profit” 
(DeFilippis et al., 2010, p. 79). 
The housing market began to fall apart when homeowners started to default on their 
mortgages between 2003 and 2006, after the U.S. Federal Reserve increased interest rates from 
1.1 to 5 percent in response to concerns about inflation (Heintz & Balakrishnan, 2012).  The first 
groups to enter foreclosure were low-income, minority, and single-women homeowners because 
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they had the largest proportion of subprime mortgages with variable interest rates and could no 
longer pay their monthly mortgages (Chakravartty & da Silva, 2012; Heintz & Balakrishnan, 
2012). However, Harvey (2010) points out that it was only when middle-class white families 
foreclosed that people began to panic and a wave of financial institutions began to declare 
bankruptcy, including Lehman Brothers in 2008 (Harvey, 2010; as cited in Chakravartty & da 
Silva, 2012). As homeowners started to default and went into foreclosure, many of these 
investment companies “lacked the firsthand knowledge and flexibility to anticipate and respond 
sensitively to local economic conditions and individual borrower characteristics” (Stone, 2006a, 
p. 92). Although mass standardization was meant to help homeowners receive mortgages 
quickly, its inflexibility made it incredibly challenging for lenders to assist borrowers when they 
could not pay their mortgages. As predicted by Stone (2006a): 
And if and when the economy turns down, the first group to be hit with lost jobs and 
unreliable wages will be the lower-income group. If the economy falters, clearly many 
households that are at the margin in terms of their abilities to meet their monthly 
mortgage obligations now will bring delinquency and foreclosure problems for mortgage 
servicers. Thus, it is the low-income families that are experiencing heavy debt burdens, 
leaving them more vulnerable to recession and meeting their mortgage obligations, while 
the higher income groups are actually reducing their debt burdens (via refinancings and 
higher wages) and lowering their mortgage obligations (p. 97). 
 
These more vulnerable communities also experienced multiple layers of risk that not only 
served as barriers to homeownership, but also “interact[ed] in a multiplicative…fashion, thereby 
greatly increasing the default risks of [their] loans” (Immergluck, 2009, p. 88). As Squires and 
Kubrin (2006) described the situation, “It is precisely this environment—growing inequality and 
the restructuring of financial institutions—that has nurtured predatory lending, particularly in 
minority neighborhoods, reinforcing the link between race and place in urban communities” (p. 
63). By tracing these layers of risk, researchers can examine power structures in the housing 
market that increase minority and immigrant vulnerability to foreclosures. The following 
 25 
describes barriers to homeownership and how race, class, opportunity, and geography interact, 
contributing to disparate effects from the crisis for minority and lower income neighborhoods 
and homeowners.  
Intersections of Race, Class, Opportunity, and Geography Contributing to Foreclosure 
Risk  
Housing contributes to a person’s exposure to opportunity. It is not only of the largest 
single purchase that families will make, but it is “the central setting for so much of one’s 
personal and family life as well as the locus of mobility opportunities, access to community 
resources and societal status” (Hartman, 2006, p. 180). However, there are a number of factors 
that affect where a family is able to live. As previously discussed, policies have explicitly set 
limits on where minorities could live through redlining and limited mortgage opportunities. Still 
today, many of these underserved groups experience multiple challenges to enter the housing 
market and homeownership, which consequently affects their livelihood and risk of foreclosure.  
A number of studies have found foreclosures concentrated in low-income, minority, and 
immigrant neighborhoods. A 2007 Woodstock Institute study discovered that census tracts with 
more than 80 percent minority populations accounted for 35 percent of all foreclosure filings in 
Chicago’s six county area, even though these areas account for less than 14 percent of all 
mortgages; in comparison, tracts with less than 10 percent minorities comprised 11 percent of all 
filings, but made up 23 percent of the region’s mortgages (Smith & Duda, 2008). Bocian et al. 
(2011) also found that almost one-fourth of African American and Latino homeowners who 
borrowed loans from 2004 to 2007 went into foreclosure or were seriously delinquent, in 
comparison to 12 percent of white borrowers. Four factors—housing discrimination, race, 
geography, and information asymmetry—come together to produce uneven access to housing 
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markets and mortgage capital. I discuss each of these four factors in turn, relating them to 
foreclosure risk. 
Housing Discrimination 
Minorities have historically experienced disparity both in treatment and impact when 
trying to become a homeowner. Examples of disparate treatment include realtors geographically 
steering minority homebuyers and showing them fewer units. As Turner and Ross (2005) 
described, geographic steering “limits the housing and neighborhood choices available to both 
minority and white homebuyers, and it may help perpetuate patterns of residential segregation” 
(p. 94). HUD formally acknowledged the severity of housing discrimination when it passed the 
Fair Housing Act in 1968, which protects homebuyers from being discriminated against because 
of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, handicap, or family status in the sale or rental of 
housing (HUD, 2014). 
HUD has also monitored racial and ethnic discrimination since the 1970s for rental and 
home sales using paired-testing studies—or when a white and minority person pose as identically 
qualified homebuyers and inquire about available homes (Turner et al., 2013). After conducting 
more than 8,000 tests in 28 metropolitan areas, researchers at the Urban Institute found that 
African American and Asian American homebuyers are informed of 17 percent and 16 percent 
fewer homes than non-Hispanic Whites, respectively; discrimination is also more likely during 
in-person visits of homebuyers who are identifiably African American, Latino, or Asian 
American by name, speech, and physical appearance (Turner et al., 2013). These disparities 
impact the neighborhoods that minorities and immigrants live in, which can contribute to lower 
home appreciation and, more recently, neighborhoods being targeted by subprime and predatory 
lenders.  
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Race 
Many minorities also experience racialized differences in benefits they gain from 
homeownership and the housing market. For example, Oliver and Shapiro’s (1995) study found 
that between 1967 and 1988, homes owned by Whites increased $21,900 in equity more than 
homes owned by African Americans. They also discovered that mortgage discrimination and 
housing appreciation cost African Americans an estimated $82 billion, mostly because their 
homes did not appreciate as much as white-owned homes (Oliver & Shapiro, 1995). A more 
recent study by the Pew Center discovered that for a majority of African Americans, Latinos, and 
Asian Americans, their only source of wealth was in their home while Whites had a variety of 
sources of wealth such as IRA accounts, stocks, and 401(k) accounts (Taylor et al., 2011). 
Because most of their wealth was in the home, Latinos, African Americans, and Asian 
Americans lost significantly more wealth than Whites between 2005 and 2009—Asian 
Americans lost the greatest median net worth (or more than $90,000; Taylor et al., 2011).   
 Not only are minority borrowers more likely than lower-income white borrowers to have 
subprime loans, but minority neighborhoods also have a higher distribution of subprime loans. 
Apgar and Calder (2005) cited a study by the Joint Center for Housing Studies that found 
borrowers living in African American and Latino neighborhoods are less likely to have prime 
mortgages. Calem, Gillen, and Wachter (2004) also demonstrated that minority neighborhoods 
and minorities living in nonminority neighborhoods have more subprime loans, which creates a 
double layer of risk. Homes in minority neighborhoods also appreciate less than homes in white 
neighborhoods (Schwartz, 2010, p. 301). Not only are homeowners in minority neighborhoods 
less likely to be offered prime mortgages, but they also tend to experience fewer gains in 
property value, which suggests greater debt for borrowers. 
 28 
Geography 
Immigrants face additional barriers to homeownership. Foreign-born Latinos and Asian 
Americans are more likely to live in segregated neighborhoods, particularly in metropolitan 
cities, than to live in suburbs (Denton, 2006). Oftentimes, these neighborhoods form ethnic 
enclaves that connect residents with critical in-language resources and social services while also 
providing cultural activities and food. However, de Souza Briggs (2005) also described the 
potential constraints of ethnic enclaves, where immigrants “limit contact with native English 
speakers, who tend to have higher incomes, greater educational attainment, and valuable social 
networks” (p. 25). These residents subsequently may not have connections to mainstream 
financial and homeownership resources. Additionally, metropolitan areas experienced the largest 
increase in home values, which also correlated with higher rates of subprime or exotic products. 
For example, in 12 California metropolitan areas, interest-only loans comprised a majority of 
loans tracked by Loan Performance (Immergluck, 2009, p. 87).  
Information Asymmetry 
Communities of minorities and immigrants demonstrate an “asymmetry of information 
between buyers and sellers, particularly with respect to the price of mortgage credit” (Apgar & 
Calder, 2005, p. 120). For example, a Fannie Mae (2001) study found that 29 percent of credit-
impaired homeowners tried to look for a lower-priced mortgage, but were unsure if they had 
received the lowest-cost mortgage; however, almost a third of these same homebuyers were 
paying more than 10 percent interest compared to 3 percent of all homeowners surveyed. This 
experience in particular affects minority and immigrant groups because they are less likely to 
have established credit. Phetchareun (2012) interviewed Southeast Asian Americans and learned 
they faced difficulties with the loan modification process, which could help prevent foreclosures, 
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because they did not understand the terms that were written only in English. Thus, borrowers like 
these Southeast Asian Americans would be at greater risk of paying more than their principal 
balance and of re-defaulting on their loan (White, 2008). These factors contribute to disparate 
experiences with homeownership and can lead to greater vulnerability to foreclosure for 
minorities and immigrant groups. 
Studies that have examine foreclosures involving minorities and immigrants have failed 
to recognize the differential impacts that foreclosures may have had on smaller populations. The 
following section explores what is known of factors that would impact Asian Americans’ 
foreclosure risk and how they were directly affected by the crisis.  
Factors affecting Asian American Foreclosure Risk 
 
Asian Americans are likely to face particular challenges as they attempt to recover from 
the foreclosure crisis for several reasons, including the impacts of racialization. Table 1 includes 
how various risk factors impact Asian Americans more than the general population. While some 
of the following risk factors use evidence from studies that may not directly relate to 
foreclosures, these factors do impact access to housing resources and loans, factors that increase 
Asian American foreclosure risk. Because many of these factors overlap, the following identifies 
a few major issues that relate to multiple foreclosure risk factors. 
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Table 1. Foreclosure Risk Factors for Asian Americans and Total Population 
 
Note:!Table compiled by author. For the total population, it is assumed that a majority of this group is White, non-
immigrant, and speaks English. These assumptions are based on national 2012 Census data.  
 
Language Differences 
 
About one-third of Asian Americans are limited English proficient (LEP; AACAJ, 2011). 
These rates vary by ethnic group, from 51 percent and 46 percent for Vietnamese and 
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Bangladeshi Americans, respectively, to 19 percent and 18 percent for Filipino and Japanese 
Americans, respectively (see Figure 3; AACAJ, 2011). Because many Asian Americans 
experience difficulty with English, it is even more difficult for them to access mainstream 
resources such as homeownership counseling, prime mortgages, and foreclosure prevention 
workshops. For example, Ratner (1996) discovered that immigrants faced language barriers with 
financial institutions except for some English-speaking Indian Americans in four American 
cities. Also, Listokin and Listokin (2001) emphasized that languages and dialects have 
complexities and important differences such as Mandarin and Cantonese, which use a different 
word for “mortgage” (p. 55). Asian American groups with higher rates of homeownership, such 
as Taiwanese, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Laotian, where 43 percent, 50 percent, 41 percent, and 
40 percent, respectively, have difficulty with English. The exceptions are Japanese and Filipino 
Americans.  
Similar to other minority and immigrant populations, Asian Americans have also 
experienced housing discrimination. For example, a group of residents launched a campaign in 
1990 against selling property to Asian Americans in Manhattan because of prejudiced views that 
their property values would fall (Listokin & Listokin, 2001). In a study commissioned by the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Turner, Ross, Bednarz, Herbig, 
and Lee (2003) found that Asian Americans experienced systematic discrimination when buying 
a home and had less access than Whites to mortgage finance assistance from real estate agents. 
Asian Americans continued to face discrimination ten years later—as previously described, 
Turner and colleagues (2013) found that homeowners who were easily identified as Asian 
American by name, speech, and physical appearance experienced discrimination. These 
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structural barriers add another layer of risk that limits Asian Americans’ access to 
homeownership in addition to other factors related to language difference. 
Figure 3. Limited-English Proficient Rates by Asian Ethnic Group, United States (2010 5-year 
Estimates) 
 
Note: All groups are alone or in combination to account for mixed race individuals.  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 
In comparison, the majority of the American population speaks English fluently. While it 
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result from lack of financial literacy. Consequently, inexperienced borrowers may need 
clarification on complicated mortgage terms and financial terms, as with Asian American 
borrowers. In many cases, financial literacy and proficiency may be offset by language barriers, 
leaving LEP households at greater risk in general.  
Income/Employment 
Another barrier Asian Americans experience is related to employment. The 2007 Survey 
of Business Owners showed that the number of Asian-owned businesses increased by 40 percent 
between 2002 and 2007, a higher percent increase than the national average (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2012). With many self-employed Asian Americans, it can be challenging to qualify for a 
low-cost loan because of an inconsistent income. Also, among the top 20 occupations in 2010, 
Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders were mostly likely to work at a range of managerial 
positions in addition to low-paying jobs, including cashiers, salespersons, cooks, and waiters and 
waitresses (Rho, Schmitt, Woo, Lin, & Wong, 2011). With cash-based jobs, employees may not 
receive any documentation of income, which may impact their ability to buy a home (Listokin & 
Listokin, 2001).  
 Other Asian Americans may not have enough assets to purchase a home with a prime 
loan. As with other immigrants, many Asian Americans also receive cash from extended family 
members to help with a down payment, which is not consistently accepted by lending institutions 
(Listokin & Listokin, 2001; Patraporn, Tran, & Ong, 2010). Some Asian Americans may reside 
in areas with local cash-based economies, especially in ethnic enclaves, and they may not have 
access to formal institutional credit (Listokin & Listokin, 2001). This greater reliance on 
nonmainstream lending institutions may put Asian Americans at risk of purchasing a loan that is 
more expensive and has riskier terms. As previously described, the majority of Asian American 
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assets are also in the home (Taylor et al., 2011). If these homeowners are at risk of foreclosure, 
they may not have other savings or assets to help prevent defaulting and losing their house.  
Some of these risk factors may also impact the total population. For example, those who 
have low credit scores or lower income may not qualify for prime loans. Similar to Asian 
Americans, these homeowners may then agree to a mortgage with riskier terms that have a 
greater chance of leading to foreclosure. However, the general population does not generally lack 
credit history because of immigration status. Also, as Taylor and colleagues (2011) found, 
Whites have the most diverse assets and investments, which can serve as a protective factor 
against foreclosure.  
Geographic Concentration 
Asian Americans are also geographically concentrated in metropolitan areas and states 
with higher foreclosure rates. Taylor et al. (2011) found that more than 40 percent of Latinos and 
Asian Americans were concentrated in California, Florida, Michigan, and Nevada, states that 
experienced the largest decline in home prices during the recession. These homeowners may then 
have owed more on their mortgage than the value of their home. These borrowers not only faced 
individual challenges, but they are also lived in areas with the greatest exposure to the 
foreclosure crisis and were struggling with larger structural issues and risk. While the majority of 
the total U.S. population may live in metropolitan areas, many do not live in neighborhoods and 
enclaves that also experience targeted subprime lending.  
Immigration Status 
Many Asian Americans do not have credit history and are not as familiar with the 
American banking system, two factors that pose additional risks. New immigrants do not have 
credit histories and may not have immediate access to a bank account (Del Rio, 2010). Some of 
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this unfamiliarity is also a result of immigrants arriving from countries whose financial 
institutions are quite different from the financial and banking services used in America. In a 
California study, all Southeast Asian American participants had no experience with formal 
financial structures such as credit scoring or reporting before they came to the U.S. (Phetchareun, 
2012).  
Also, the process of buying a home may drastically differ based on an immigrant’s 
country of origin. For example, homebuyers in Korea may pay as much as 80 percent of the 
mortgage as the down payment and take out loans that value 20 percent of the house value 
(Johnston, Katimin, & Milczarski, 1997). Without credit history and being unfamiliar with 
American financial institutions, many Asian Americans are at greater risk for foreclosure simply 
because they have to rely on nonmainstream lending institutions. As described, nontraditional 
mortgage products are more likely to have exotic terms and have higher fees or interest rates. 
These factors do not generally affect the general U.S. population because their citizenship results 
in lower foreclosure risk than for Asian Americans, particularly those who are foreign-born.  
Asian American Mortgage Delinquency and Foreclosure Rates 
Several studies have focused specifically on the impact of the foreclosure crisis on Asian 
Americans in California. For example, Laderman and Reid (2008) found that, after controlling 
for income and credit score, Californian Asian American borrowers were 1.6 times more likely 
to be in foreclosure than White borrowers. Similarly, in Glendale, Asian Americans were 1.7 
times more likely to foreclose than Whites (Patraporn et al., 2013). Also, the Center for 
Responsible Lending found that 7 percent of Californian Asian American borrowers were at risk 
for loan delinquency (Bocian et al., 2011).  
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AA CBOs have examined Asian Americans in their services areas and found that some 
ethnic groups are disproportionately at risk for foreclosures. For example, a study on Southeast 
Asian Americans in the Central Valley found that from May to August 2010, Southeast Asian 
Americans disproportionately made up 5 percent of all Notices of Default, a rate higher than 
their proportion of the total population (National Coalition for Asian Pacific American 
Community Development [National CAPACD] & Southeast Asia Resource Action Center 
[SEARAC], 2011). This report also found that some clients have paid money for foreclosure 
prevention help, up to $12,000, and fell victim to loan modification scams (National CAPACD 
& SEARAC, 2011).  Chhaya Community Development Corporation (Chhaya CDC) also found 
that 53 percent of Notices of Default were sent to South Asian Americans in some New York 
neighborhoods, where they comprised only 13 percent of the neighborhoods’ population (Chhaya 
CDC, 2009).  
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed a number of foreclosure risk factors that have affected 
homeowners, particularly as a result of the 2007 crisis. For example, the evolving mortgage 
market and the deregulation of lending institutions led to the proliferation of riskier loan 
products, which in turn contributed to these borrowers experiencing foreclosures at higher rates 
than borrowers with prime loans. Many of these factors disproportionately affect minorities and 
immigrants. In addition to the changing mortgage market, housing discrimination, race, 
geography, and information asymmetry are key indicators of foreclosure risk, which then impact 
homeowners’ trajectory.  Despite the dearth of published data on Asian Americans’ experience 
of the foreclosure crisis, there is evidence that these groups may have higher foreclosure risk 
than Whites and the general population. The literature suggests that language differences, 
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income, employment, geographic concentration, and immigration status affect Asian Americans 
in addition to overall changes in lending.  
To expand the knowledge on foreclosure risk, the current study examines another 
foreclosure risk factor—help-seeking behavior—in the next chapter. AA CBOs have worked to 
mediate foreclosures and foreclosure risk for clients through their local programming. By 
understanding their effectiveness at mediation, AA CBOs may serve as a protective layer against 
foreclosure risk. If researchers, policy makers, and planners better understand how the 
foreclosure crisis and foreclosure risk factors affect Asian Americans, they can better understand 
how housing and lending practices may disparately affect immigrant and smaller populations that 
have greater language needs.  
 38 
CHAPTER 3 
ASIAN AMERICAN-SERVING COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 
AA CBOs provide a lens through which to examine community-based interventions that 
mediate the impacts of the foreclosure crisis and foreclosure risk for Asian Americans. It is 
impossible to mention CBOs without examining racial, ethnic, and income disparities because 
they originated to specifically address these issues. With their long history of addressing social 
inequalities for minority and immigrant communities, CBOs are on the forefront of providing 
services to groups often overlooked in the public and private sector.  
Although CBOs have shouldered many of the responsibilities in assisting underserved 
groups, the government has increasingly pushed CBOs to offer even more of the services 
provided by the government since the 1970s; in other words, a trend toward devolution of 
government involvement (Ebrahim, 2010; Smith, 2010). However, this government strategy 
limits CBO effectiveness, whether it is through constrained funding; separation between policy 
makers and those who help implement policy; and/or disparities between enacted policies and 
how they affect minority and immigrant communities. The policies that are imposed on 
communities are oftentimes meant to benefit the total population; however, these generalized 
policies have different effects when local CBOs attempt to implement them for specific groups.  
This chapter reviews the history of CBOs and their role in housing programs, specifically 
how they have attempted to mediate foreclosure risk. Additionally, AA CBOs formed at a 
particular historical moment, and have provided the primary services targeting Asian Americans. 
With the increasing constraints on CBOs, the chapter then contextualizes the challenges and 
conflicting roles that AA CBOs experience while mediating between the public sector and 
private mortgage market. It then concludes with a discussion on the evolving role of these 
 39 
relationships and how the changing role of CBOs affects advocacy between private markets and 
the public policy.  
The Expansion of CBOs  
For decades, CBOs have played a critical role in providing greater access to basic 
community services. As DeFilippis and colleagues (2010) commented, “community and 
community-based efforts have been the primary site and method for addressing social need and 
promoting change.” (p. 12). CBOs also help residents and individuals gain skills to navigate and 
utilize bureaucratic government resources that impact their lives (Marwell, 2007). However, 
CBOs have evolved in their role of social change, largely influenced by the political context and 
increasing devolution of social services. Fontan, Hamel, Morin, and Shragge (2009) described 
how CBOs have “picked up increased responsibilities for social provision and economic 
development” while “more senior levels of government are actively involved in shaping these 
practices” (p. 835). In the government strategy of devolution, CBOs are then being asked to 
fulfill more social services.   
While CBOs were originally designed to address local community problems, they face a 
dilemma. As DeFilippis and Saegert (2012) explained, it is becoming more difficult to 
understand “which problems in a community are community problems—given that so much of 
what produces communities are relations and decisions that exist well beyond any single 
community” (p. 4). CBOs experience a complicated relationship with the local government, in 
that they are may collaborate with the government in contracting these services, but they also 
may experience conflict because they have to react to government-imposed policies and practices 
that CBOs do not have a voice in shaping. These trends have become established through a 
history of policies that have shaped CBO growth. 
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History of Community Organizations 
Peterman (2000) described how voluntary community organizations have been a solution 
to expanding democratic ideals from the 19th century when the U.S. government was 
considerably smaller. These organizations were both founded in wealthier communities and in 
lower-income slums. In middle-class and upper-class neighborhoods, residents and developers 
formed homeowners or neighborhood associations that were used to “ensure the continuing 
exclusivity of their neighborhoods and to protect their property values” while also minimizing 
government intrusion by providing street cleaning, water, and security (Peterman, 2000, p. 42).  
On the other hand, community advocacy organizations were formed out of social reform 
movements in the late 19th and 20th centuries that worked in lower-income and immigrant 
communities. Settlement houses were created to help integrate immigrants into the U.S. and to 
meet the needs of poor residents in urban areas. The settlement houses were designed to “address 
the entire array of problems facing poor people” and where they could “find services, job 
references, educational and cultural uplift programs, and, most important, all the moral and 
social benefits thought to derive from interaction with middle-class ‘neighbors’ or volunteer” 
(O’Connor, 2012, p. 14).  
Welfare organizations continued to evolve and significantly grow in the 1960s with the 
Great Society program and War on Poverty. These programs helped to fund community-based 
organizations through the Office of Economic Opportunity to “advance and coordinate 
community interests at the city level” (DeFilippis et al., 2010, p. 51). These programs were also 
the first effort by the federal government to support community organizations. The Economic 
Opportunity Act formed community action agencies (CAAs) to eliminate poverty through the 
participation of residents and direct local services (Wolman, 1972). However, after only a few 
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years, CAAs that were critical of their local governments or private corporations were defunded 
and federal funds were once again allocated to state and local governments (Marwell, 2007). 
DeFilippis (2012) noted that this time period was critical in limiting social change movements—
“Groups had to choose between becoming more professionalized development organizations or 
maintain their political identity” (p. 31). Some of these early community organizations were then 
placed in a contradictory position while providing services, of negotiating between government 
funding and advocating for clients. CBOs continue to have a collaborative yet contentious 
relationship with the government because of funding restrictions. With the civil rights 
movement, the Great Society also helped the government become more responsive to the needs 
of minority communities, including Asian Americans, as these groups formed organizations to 
apply for some of the “War on Poverty” monies (Espiritu, 1992; Murphy & Cunningham, 2003). 
Saul Alinsky started a surge of organizations that sought to mobilize local communities. 
Alinsky recognized the importance of locally-based community organizing and neighborhood 
councils to bring power back to local residents through the confrontation of local officials 
(Alinsky, 1941; Checkoway, 1995). Alinsky was critical of the race-based efforts of the civil 
rights movement and worked with local neighborhoods to learn about resident concerns 
(DeFilippis, 2012). However, because these organizations and political movements did recognize 
the need for conflict to win political power, they were able to advocate for the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) and CRA in 1975 and 1977, respectively.  
Community development corporations (CDCs) also emerged in the mid-1960s as 
grassroots organizations focused on community empowerment in neighborhoods with capital 
disinvestment (Frisch & Servon, 2006; Stoecker, 1997). CDCs have sought to address issues 
around economic development, job creation, affordable housing, and other social services in 
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low-income neighborhoods (Bratt & Rohe, 2004; Murphy & Cunningham, 2003). However, by 
the 1980s, CDCs were pressured by the government and private funders to focus more on 
housing and economic development rather than radical political activities (Murphy & 
Cunningham, 2003). CDCs have also matured and become more professionalized to obtain 
grants and secure more funding, which has diminished their ability to advocate and organize for 
neighborhood residents (Stoecker, 1997). With the growth of CDCs and other CBOs, these 
groups contributed indirectly to the federal government bearing less responsibility for providing 
resources to communities. 
Devolution of Social Services 
In a growing global market and in response to the civil rights era, the federal government 
decreased funding for urban problems. Devolution was also justified because of the ideology that 
the federal government is inefficient in administering social services—consequently, the 
government converted entitlement programs to state-specific programs (Alexander, 1999). 
Specifically, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 resulted in the Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program that shifted the responsibility of addressing 
community issues from the federal government to local municipalities, which then would 
disperse funds to community organizations (Peterman, 2000). While these grants channeled 
funding away from direct government subsidies, they perhaps unintentionally gave more funding 
to local governments, which in turn provided more funding to minority-led CBOs, including AA 
CBOs (Vo, 2004).  
With these trends of dependence on local initiatives, the 1980s saw an increase in 
community organizations and a greater reliance on them for social services. While public 
funding of CBOs was at the peak in the 1970s, CBOs saw a tremendous cut in funding in the 
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following decade, or more than $30 billion, even though they became the “last public safety net 
for our most vulnerable populations (Alexander, 1999). Essentially, CBOs found themselves 
operating in an environment, which “embraced the market as the vehicle for community-based 
interventions …because of the limits of what the public sector is actually providing” (DeFillipis, 
Fisher, & Shragge, 2010, p. 74). Much of this devolution strategy was institutionalized in the 
1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, in which the federal 
government made states responsible for administering and implementing welfare reform 
programs, and states in turn passed on the responsibility for these programs to nonprofit and 
private entities (Kisanne, 2010).  
While CBOs may focus on a specific neighborhood or group, they are intervening in the 
larger context of historical, political, and market forces that simultaneously impact their targeted 
geographies and populations. These organizations “consciously act as points of linkage to the 
economic and political fields operating in the city and beyond” while operating in a devolved 
environment (Marwell, 2007, p. 231). Communities are finding themselves interacting with 
global economic forces, and how they fare is “largely dependent upon institutions and a set of 
relationships that exist well beyond the community,” including lenders and the housing market, 
which then impact “the abilities of individuals and households to realize their goals and 
aspirations” (DeFilippis & Saegert, 2012, p. 4). These relationships have increasingly become 
important in the provision of housing services, particularly because of the national and global 
evolution of the mortgage market.  
Role of CBOs in Housing Services 
In an environment that cultivates this third sector, CBOs have achieved a number of 
successes in helping address housing needs. While these approaches may not help to redistribute 
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and address the core causes of inequitable housing policies, they can provide a means of 
intervention. By meeting a variety of housing services, CBOs can provide a protective layer 
against foreclosure risk for clients. As Immergluck (2009) described, "Not only is sound, 
affordable, community-reinvestment-oriented lending to underserved communities feasible, it 
can be a strong preventative to high levels of high-risk subprime lending and thus help expand 
and preserve homeownership when it makes sense to do so" (p. 166). A number of intermediary 
CBOs have formed to provide these housing interventions, which then filter resources and 
funding to a broader network of local CBOs that provide direct services to clients. CBOs then 
also devolve their services, in which they delegate to smaller CBOs through funding. 
National Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) are an example of how 
CBOs have proved vital to lower-income and minority homebuyers as an intermediary 
organization. They not only have garnered funding for technical assistance and training, but they 
also provide below market loans. Much of their success is “due to their special expertise in 
underwriting and management, and the fact that CDFIs spend more time on project management 
and finance fewer projects than is true for conventional lenders” (Swack, 2006, p. 271).  
The Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation is a congressionally-chartered CDFI that 
has a network of more than 235 local NeighborWorks organizations and has helped 1.52 million 
people with foreclosure counseling between 2007 and 2012 (NeighborWorks America, 2012). In 
2012, the network assisted 18,500 homeowners preserve their homes, counseled 15,000 new 
homeowners, and provided $73.8 million for its National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling 
program, which funds state housing finance agencies, HUD-approved housing counseling 
intermediaries, and local NeighborWorks organizations (NeighborWorks America, 2012). 
NeighborWorks also provides home loans, which had only one-tenth the foreclosure rate of 
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subprime mortgages in 2007 (Immergluck, 2009). Clients that use NeighborWorks 
organizations’ homebuyer counseling and education are one-third less likely to become 
delinquent on their mortgage within two years of buying a home than those who do not receive 
homebuyer counseling (Mayer & Temkin, 2013). 
 Other researchers have found evidence that other housing counseling programs have 
improved client outcomes. Collins and O’Rourke (2011) reviewed studies on the effects of home 
education counseling including homebuyer counseling, home repair, reverse mortgage, rental 
housing, homelessness counseling, and foreclosure and default counseling. They found that 
participation in pre-purchase programs help homeowners to pay their loans early or on time and 
that post-purchase programs lead to fewer delinquencies and foreclosures; however, they also 
acknowledge that those who seek counseling may be different from those who do not voluntarily 
seek out services, which provides a biased sample (Collins & O’Rouke, 2011). In addition, 
Quercia and Spader (2008) examined 2,688 mortgage borrowers who enrolled in a secondary 
market loan purchase program and traced those who received pre-purchase counseling and the 
loan performance up to 79 months after. The authors found that classroom-based and individual 
counseling resulted in higher pre-payment of mortgage loans. 
CBOs have helped to provide additional forms of housing assistance by purchasing 
foreclosed properties and helping mediate individual foreclosure risk. Immergluck (2008) 
described these efforts such as Neighborhood Housing Services of Minneapolis that rehabilitates 
foreclosed homes to help prevent decreasing home prices and match potential homeowners with 
new houses. Many CBOs also offer credit counseling to help individuals raise their credit scores 
over time, which impacts an individual’s ability to access hospitals, utilities, auto insurance, and 
employment (Immergluck, 2008).  
 46 
Despite their important programs and services, CBOs have struggled with limited 
funding. They have to constantly fundraise, which includes an “administrative nightmare of 
conceiving and carrying out complex development projects with multiple partners” (Bratt, 2006, 
p. 350). In part, CBOs have to combine multiple sources of funding because funders 
“acknowledge that no single blueprint can possibly respond to the widely varying needs of 
American communities” (O’Connor, 2012, p. 14). At the same time, this funding environment 
creates an: 
…interdependency and blurring of the lines between public and private, and a 
complicated system of public, private, local, state, and federal funding arrangements for 
communities in need. These arrangements in turn demand savvy grantmanship—the 
entrepreneurial capacity to work the system—and flexibility. They also, in deferring to 
private sector provision and local practice, leave objectives such as equity, redistribution, 
and racial integration largely unaddressed (O’Connor, 2012, p. 13-14). 
 
Although many CBOs provide important resources for Asian Americans and other minority or 
immigrant groups, they face challenges to fund their programs. Simultaneously, they operate in a 
context that discourages them from advocating against the expansion of the growing housing 
market and exploitative lending practices that are the core reasons their clients were targeted 
with subprime and predatory loans.  
The Evolution of AA CBOs  
 As with other CBOs, AA CBOs have worked to provide social services on behalf of 
Asian Americans. In particular because the majority of Asian Americans are immigrants, they 
provide necessary support for translation and integration (Hung, 2007). They also face similar 
pressures from the government to provide direct services to their clients with less funding and 
support. However, AA CBOs have also experienced a number of policy changes that specifically 
affected them more than mainstream CBOs.  
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The following section describes how stereotypes of Asian American clients have affected 
AA CBO funding and then explains the establishment of AA CBOs. It then describes several 
examples of community-based housing interventions on a local and national level that have 
targeted Asian Americans. The chapter then raises unresolved issues related to AA CBOs and 
how they mediate foreclosure risk for their clients.  
“Model Minority Myth” and “Perpetual Foreigner” Impacts 
  Asian Americans are a diverse group with varying socioeconomic differences in key 
factors such as homeownership, employment, education, and income. These disparate factors are 
in part because Asian Americans have experienced “bifurcated immigration policies that favor 
the entry of highly skilled economic immigrants and relatively less-educated refugees and their 
relatives” (Patraporn, Pfeiffer, & Ong, 2010, p. 288). Oftentimes, these differences are not 
captured when Asian Americans are aggregated in data collection and research methodology into 
one racial category, which has contributed to the “model minority myth”—the stereotype that 
Asian are hard working and self-sufficient (Listokin & Listokin, 2001; Ong, 2003). Though 
Asian Americans are thus stereotypically viewed as wealthier than other groups, poverty rates for 
Asian American groups ranged from 6 percent for Filipino Americans to 26 percent for Hmong 
Americans (AACAJ, 2011). Misconceptions of Asian Americans impact policies and funding.  
The model minority myth has persisted since its creation during the 1960s by scholars 
and reporters. Along with the stereotype that Asian Americans no longer need assistance, they 
are also rendered invisible and perpetually foreign. Vo (2004) described how these 
misperceptions have been utilized as political reasons for neglecting these groups: 
Before the 1970s, Asian Americans assumed responsibility for the social welfare of their 
communities, mainly because government-oriented social welfare agencies had been 
wholly unresponsive to their needs. Since Asian immigrants were not granted citizenship 
until the 1940s, they were denied social services provided by the government. Their 
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noncitizenship status cast them as ‘perpetual foreigners,’ which the state used to justify 
its social service negligence. Those who were citizens did not become public welfare 
clients because they were unaware of their welfare rights and there were limited outreach 
programs that provided them access. In the post-World War II era, Asian American 
groups were granted citizenship; however, given their exclusion from services in their 
past, they were still not provided with adequate social services (p. 35-36). 
 
Ong (2003) added how the stereotype assumes all Asian Americans could “be left in benign 
neglect and still manage to pull themselves up by their bootstraps” (p. 78). Additionally, many 
Asian Americans immigrated from countries where either the government did not provide social 
services and/or relationships between agencies were “unfavorable,” which led to some of these 
immigrants to subsequently be “reluctant to request help from governmental agencies in the 
United States” (Vo, 2004, p. 36).  
Another aspect of their racialization is Asian Americans’ relationship with Whites and 
Blacks. Kim (1999) described Asian Americans as “racially triangulated” with the two groups, 
where Whites have defined minority groups along two axes of “superior/inferior and 
insider/foreigner”: Asian Americans are then positioned against Blacks as superior, but remain 
foreigners in relation to Whites and kept outside of politics and power, which ultimately will 
“reinforce White dominance and privilege” (p. 107). This triangulation has presented challenges 
for Asian Americans who were “perceived as an ‘assimilated minority’ that lacked social 
problems…[and] as ‘inassimilable foreigners’ underserving of services” (Vo, 2004). Through 
this process of racialization, Asian Americans have difficulty obtaining and/or qualifying for 
services from mainstream resources and policy makers. Omi and Winant (1994) similarly 
described how racialization is a social and political process, where racial categories determine 
access to employment, housing, and other goods and services. In addition, these processes of 
racialization significantly limit the resources available for AA CBOs to intervene on behalf of 
their clients.   
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Establishment of AA CBOs 
Asian Americans were consequently underserved not only because of the growing lack of 
public and private funds, but also because they have been racialized as both self-sufficient and 
foreign, a stereotype that continues to impact contemporary funding of AA CBOs. To then 
address the gap of services, Asian Americans created their own formal CBOs. Before 1950, there 
were 30 AA non-profits across the U.S. in major metropolitan areas (Hung, 2007). At the same 
time as the Great Society programs and CDBG funding, the number of AA CBOs significantly 
increased. During the 1960s and 1970s, 130 and 349 AA CBOs formed, respectively (Hung, 
2007). This sudden increase of AA CBOs not only was a result of increased funding, but also 
due to a surge of Asian Americans immigrating to the United States after the 1965 Immigration 
Act—which abolished restrictive quotas on Asian countries—and the arrival of Southeast Asian 
refugees (Reimers, 1983).  
 De Voe (2008) described a wave of AA CBOs that resulted from these Southeast Asian 
refugees. When the United Nations created the designation of “refugee,” it created a bifurcated 
status among immigrants, separating “voluntary immigrants” from “refugees”; consequently, the 
United States had a newfound obligation to temporarily provide economic support to help 
refugees become economically independent, usually during a five-year period (De Voe, 2008, p. 
63). As part of these efforts, the federal government pushed for the creation of self-help 
voluntary associations, adding to the growth of the third sector and decreased dependency on 
public funding.  
When they first began, these self-help associations informally helped community 
members in “moments of crisis,” but were eventually expected to become “formal, charitable, 
social service agencies” as part of the refugee program, and take over federal efforts (De Voe, 
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2008, p. 64). These organizations then became more formalized and received grants for specific 
programs, which narrowly restricted their funding, while community members still expected 
these organizations to help with more informal problems, “from paying the electric bill, to 
finding a job, to reining in a son who is involved in gang activity,” creating more tensions within 
these ethnic organizations and their communities (De Voe, 2008, p. 65).  
AA CBOs have continued to grow in number since the 1970s. Hung (2014) used Internal 
Revenue Service data, and found a total of 3,086 AA CBOs in 2010. The dataset also tracked 
when AA CBOs were formed and describes how they increased in number for every decade until 
2000 (see Table 2). For every decade until 2001, AA CBOs increased in number and suddenly 
increased in the 1990s, similar to Latino nonprofits. However, while fewer AA CBOs formed in 
the 2000s, many of the CBOs that were established before 2001 have remained active (Hung, 
2014). As AA CBOs became more professionalized, they also grew in number and helped to 
provide a number of social services and cultural resources.  
Table 2. Year of Nonprofit Formation for Asian American and Latino Nonprofits 
 
Source: Hung, 2014. 
 
AA CBO Housing Interventions  
AA CBOs have evolved to lead targeted interventions in Asian languages and provide 
clients with asset-building opportunities and homeownership. These interventions are primarily 
on the local level. An example is Asian Americans for Equality (AAFE), which began in 1974 to 
serve the New York Chinatown area and provide housing services. The organization found that 
many Chinatown residents needed quality affordable housing for the immigrant workers in the 
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neighborhood who were exploited by landlords and slumlords. AAFE stepped in to help educate 
residents about their housing rights and improved affordable housing in the area, eventually 
sponsoring the first affordable housing project in New York Chinatown in 1997. In the 1990s, 
AAFE also expanded their resources to include pre- and post-purchase counseling with their 
AAFE Housing Center (Listokin & Listokin, 2001). 
Similar organizations have expanded their programs to help fill the gaps between 
mainstream banks and minority community members’ needs. Patraporn et al. (2010) surveyed 30 
key Asian American asset-building organizations and found the following programs were most 
frequently offered: financial education; homebuyer assistance programs; and individual 
development accounts, where CBOs match the client’s savings account. Many of these 
homebuyer programs include workshops and individual counseling. By providing asset-building 
services, these CBOs help to address some of their clients’ foreclosure risks—such as lack of 
credit and assets—that prevent them from purchasing homes.   
Additional intermediary organizations developed in the 1990s and have established 
coalitions across multiple geographies (Stone, 2006b). Similar to CDFIs, they also provide 
technical assistance and help community organizations share their best practices (Bratt, 2006, p. 
347). National CAPACD is an example, which is a national intermediary organization of Asian 
American and Pacific Islander-serving organizations. Founded in 1999, it has more than 100 
CBOs including community development corporations and financial institutions that work on 
housing, community development, and advocacy (National CAPACD, 2011a). National 
CAPACD is similar to other intermediary organizations where it convenes CBOs and provides 
technical assistance, resources for outreach, and holds annual conferences and meetings to help 
service providers share best practices.  
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Specifically for housing services, it became the only HUD-certified Asian American and 
Pacific Islander-serving housing counseling intermediary in the U.S. in February 2010 (National 
CAPACD, 2011b). Through their housing counseling network, National CAPACD has 19 CBOs 
that provide pre-purchase, homeownership, foreclosure, and homeless prevention counseling in 
more than 23 Asian American and Pacific Islander languages (National CAPACD, 2011b). Many 
of these CBOs thus play the role of a cultural and language mediator between clients and 
mainstream institutions, which are needed as more families face foreclosures. 
Additional Issues for AA CBOs 
 As Asian American communities have grown, AA CBOs have helped to form a sense of 
community and identity along ethnic or racial ties. As Toji and Umemoto (2003) described, some 
of these historic centers of various Asian American groups are becoming “less important in the 
daily matters of livelihood and existence,” but simultaneously “become ever more important as 
sites for the maintenance of ethnic identity and a sense of ethnic community” (p. 25). AA CBOs 
also work to “engage each generation in the process of identity formation and community 
building” (Toji & Umemoto, 2003, p. 38). Additionally, AA CBOs help to understand how they 
not only “build pan-Asian consciousness,” but also they inform “about the directions of the 
populations supposedly represented” (Espiritu, 1992, p. 16). It is not only through their social 
services, but also because of their group-specific connections that AA CBOs continue to be 
important to Asian Americans.   
Over time, AA CBOs have become an important part of the social service landscape, 
helping address issues of poverty, housing, childcare, cultural programs, and educational 
services. In doing so, they have become more professionalized, hiring more technical experts to 
help with their programs that were originally provided by the public sector, similar to other 
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CBOs. Furthermore, the state and foundations reward professionalism, or “the ability to deal 
effectively with elected officials and public agencies,” which then favors nonprofit leaders who 
are professional middle-class people and adds a dimension of class segmentation within 
organizations that may target a combination of ethnic groups, including AA CBOs, where great 
socioeconomic disparities already exist among Asian Americans (Espiritu, 1992).    
Despite becoming more formal CBOs and becoming professionalized, AA CBOs too 
receive less federal support. Similar to the conclusion reached by DeFilippis et al. (2010), this 
segmentation has “left certain people and communities in relatively favored positions, and 
(re)marginalized others through the uneven landscape of community organization density and 
representation” (p. 90). Asian American communities were not only originally left to develop 
their own social services, but they were provided with fewer resources to become self-sufficient. 
These processes are unfair when CBOs are expected to meet federal or state guidelines for the 
funding they do receive and to continue receiving funding, while the government continues to 
assume that all communities have the “capacity and the will to follow policy decided from the 
center,” or government (DeFilippis et al., 2010, p. 91). Paprocki and Chung (1998) also found 
that in the late 1990s, AA CBOs received only 2.7 percent of total corporate grants given to all 
racial and ethnic groups and 0.38 percent of top corporate funds, although Asian Americans 
comprised 4 percent of the population at the time. In these relationships with the public sector, 
AA CBOs are becoming increasingly marginalized, in particular those that serve smaller 
populations and have less capacity. 
Conclusion 
 It is clear that CBOs play an important role in service provision for many underserved 
groups. Relevant to the current study, AA CBOs are key institutions that support Asian 
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American communities. However, there are a number of unresolved issues from the existing 
literature. While they are expected to provide social services, it remains unclear if AA CBOs are 
designed to mediate on behalf of all Asian American homeowners. As DeFilippis et al. (2010) 
implied, AA CBOs may become more segmented with the government, but also potentially with 
other mainstream CBOs that have more resources. How is devolution experienced by smaller 
CBOs that focus on a target population with more social service needs? While they may have 
greater flexibility to address their clients’ needs, are AA CBOs also limited in their ability to 
advocate for larger changes that put their clients at risk of foreclosure in the first place? 
Additionally, AA CBOs are likely to be in contention with housing policies because they are 
encouraging homeownership, which ultimately places clients at risk of foreclosure; at the same 
time, AA CBOs may not have opportunities to provide the public sector with feedback on how to 
better protect Asian Americans from foreclosure.  
There is also less evidence of how AA CBOs fared in response to the foreclosure crisis. 
By understanding how AA CBOs have or have not successfully mediated their clients’ 
foreclosure risk, it may be possible to identify gaps in how generalized housing and foreclosure 
policies are implemented on the community level. Finally, if AA CBOs are unable to effectively 
mediate their clients’ foreclosure risk, it is important to explore potential roles for AA CBOs in 
foreclosure prevention work. More studies on AA CBOs will provide a more comprehensive 
approach to community-based planning and housing service provisions for a range of 
homebuyers.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
While the government has devolved its services to local CBOs and continued to take 
primary responsibility in establishing housing policies, there is evidence that AA CBOs and 
Asian Americans homeowners have remained marginalized. Asian American homeowners are 
disproportionately affected by housing and foreclosure policies that do not take into account their 
impacts on smaller populations that have diversity in socioeconomic disparities and language 
needs. Also, AA CBOs are constrained by funding, at times because Asian Americans are 
stereotyped as not needing social services. Even though they have adapted and developed 
housing programs, the experiences of AA CBOs raise important questions about the tensions that 
exist between AA CBOs, mainstream CBOs, the private market, and the public sector to address 
the foreclosure risk of their clients. It is also critical to understand how these relationships help 
or deter the allocation of scarce resources for underserved and vulnerable populations.  
Research Questions  
In response to these gaps in literature, the current study sought to answer the following 
questions:  
1. How did foreclosure risk affect Asian American homeowners during the foreclosure 
crisis? 
2. How have AA CBOs mediated these foreclosure risks for their clients? 
 
In particular, previous studies have failed to examine these questions for Asian Americans, 
aggregated as a single racial category, and Asian American ethnic groups (e.g., Hmong, Chinese, 
Vietnamese). While the literature identifies foreclosure risk factors for Asian Americans, there is 
a dearth of information on how these factors affected them in the context of the 2007 crisis. I 
predict that many Asian Americans were affected by the foreclosure crisis, in particular because 
 56 
these groups have several foreclosure risk factors that impact their assets, ability to remedy their 
housing situations, and disproportionate targeting by or geographic concentration of subprime 
loans.  
I also expect that AA CBOs have mediated in multiple ways for their clients. First, help-
seeking behavior, including approaching AA CBOs, may lower Asian American homeowner risk 
of foreclosure. However, if AA CBOs are underfunded or have less capacity, they may not be 
able to intervene as effectively as large mainstream CBOs. The study also examined how AA 
CBOs compare with mainstream CBOs to compare how devolution has affected their operations. 
Finally, are AA CBOs able to advocate for their clients by advocating for market and policy 
changes? If they operate similarly to most CBOs, they may not engage with this critical area, 
which would limit their ability to protect additional Asian American homeowners from 
foreclosing.  
The next section describes how other researchers have attempted to answer similar 
questions about foreclosures. After surveying other methods, I explain how these studies have 
lacked nuance in understanding Asian Americans and Asian American ethnic groups. After, I 
outline the study’s methods and potential contributions to literature on foreclosure policies and 
Asian Americans.  
Previous Methodologies 
Researchers have utilized a number of methods to study foreclosures because of the 
challenges in data acquisition and lack of uniformity in defining foreclosures. Newman (2012) 
discussed several challenges to studying foreclosures. First, the foreclosure process and timeline 
varies by state and may or may not include a judicial process. Foreclosures also have different 
stages, such as when a foreclosure is filed or when a foreclosed property is sold at auction, or a 
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Sheriff’s sale. Foreclosure rate calculations also vary in the numerator (e.g., filings or Sheriff's 
sales) and in the denominator (e.g. occupied housing units or total loans originated).  
Furthermore, there are very few publicly available data sources on foreclosures. They are 
oftentimes privately collected and expensive to purchase. Even if these data sets are purchased, 
data sources do not always provide enough detail about loan terms. Consequently, researchers 
examining foreclosures utilize a mix of datasets and methods to help resolve these issues (see 
Table 3 for a summary).
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Table 3. Publicly Available Data Sources on Foreclosures 
 
Note: Compiled by author. This summary is not meant to be extensive, but serves as a brief explanation of different methodologies related to foreclosures.  
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Publicly Available Data 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data 
HMDA was passed by Congress in 1975, and requires lenders to report loan data publicly 
(Federal Financial Institutions Examine Council, 2014). The data includes information on 
borrower characteristics, lenders, and loan type such as prime, subprime, government-backed, 
and manufactured lending, which allow researchers to track the performance of loans (Apgar & 
Fishbein, 2005). While depository and nondepository institutions are required to submit loan 
data, they must meet a list of criteria, including a minimum amount of assets. 
Scholars have matched HMDA to other data sets since it does not include foreclosure 
data. For example, Laderman and Reid (2008) matched HMDA data to Lender Processing 
Services, Inc. Applied Analytics (LPS) data to examine interracial disparities in loan 
performance.4 They found that minorities disproportionately were likely to be foreclosed, 
controlling for income and credit score (Laderman & Reid, 2008). HMDA is thus useful because 
it allows researchers to differentiate other foreclosure data sources by loan type, which is 
particularly important since subprime loans tend to have higher default risks while CRA loans 
tend to lead to fewer foreclosures. Other researchers have used HMDA to examine foreclosures 
by racial segregation (Rugh and Massey, 2010) and the relationship between subprime lending 
and housing price appreciation (Ong and Pfeiffer, 2008).  
However, as noted by Dymski, Hernandez, and Mohanty (2011), non-depository lenders 
may not report the race and ethnicity of borrowers to HMDA. Without accurate reporting, it is a 
challenge to have a full understanding of the predatory and subprime lending landscape. HMDA 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 LPS allows researchers to examine loan performance as reported by 15 mortgage servicers, which covers a 
majority of mortgages (Laderman & Reid, 2008). 
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also does not include ethnic groups and aggregates all Asian American borrowers, masking 
interethnic differences.  
Notice of Defaults (NODs) 
 NODs are sent to homeowners who have missed a number of mortgage payments. NODs 
are publicly recorded and begin the foreclosure process. However, homeowners have the 
opportunity to keep their house if they pay back missed payments in a prescribed time period. 
CBOs have also used NODs to examine if Asian Americans in their service areas are 
disproportionately at risk for foreclosures. For example, Chhaya CDC (2009) and National 
CAPACD and SEARAC (2011) found that their clients have disproportionately higher defaults 
than other groups in these neighborhoods. While not all homeowners who default ultimately go 
into foreclosure, NOD data do help CBOs better understand who is at greater risk of foreclosure 
and where to focus interventions. In order to determine ethnic group differences, these 
organizations matched homeowner names listed online with a surname list that the CBO 
developed for their targeted ethnic groups. This method allows researchers to understand Asian 
ethnic group default rates oftentimes at small locales such as in a zip code or by a street address.  
However, this method also has a number of limitations. First, users are required to pay a 
fee to access all of the information available on these websites because it includes privately 
collected data. Although the sites do list houses in a variety of stages such as bankruptcy, 
foreclosure, or short sales, they do not allow researchers to aggregate data, which would enable a 
more accurate count of each stage. Furthermore, the listings do not extend beyond a year of the 
query date, which does not allow researchers to track foreclosures over time. This data source is 
thus piecemeal and limited.  
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While it is useful to have homeowner names to help identify ethnic or racial groups in the 
data, this method can lead to some inaccuracies because some homeowners may have a name 
that is identified with several ethnic groups, such as the surname “Lee.” The accuracy of these 
studies also depends on the surname list, which may not capture Asian Americans that are 
married, adopted, and/or do not have traditionally-recognized surnames of a particular ethnic 
group. If attempting to compare with other groups, surname lists can also prove difficult for 
distinguishing differences between e.g., Latino, Filipino, and some Pacific Islander groups that 
were colonized by Spain. This difficulty extends to differentiating between African American 
and some non-Hispanic White names.  
Sheriff’s Sale Data 
Other studies have used Sheriff's sales data because it is publicly available. Depending on 
the state, Sheriff's sale information may be collected by courts or the county records offices. As 
mentioned, Sheriff's sales do not necessarily capture all foreclosures, but are more readily 
accessible. Depending on the entity that collected the information, some Sheriff's sale records 
include the name of the previous homeowner; address of the house; the loan originator or lender; 
the final selling price of the home; and the date of the sale.  
For example, Allen (2009) matched Sheriff’s sales data, Hennepin County Assessor’s 
Office records on parcel homestead status, and the Minneapolis Public School student database, 
which includes student addresses. Using this methodology, Allen (2009) analyzed foreclosed 
properties with children in the Minneapolis Public School (MPS) system by language spoken at 
home and nativity. While helpful to disaggregate Asian American ethnic groups and other 
immigrant groups, this data does not include those students born in the United States, including 
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second generation Asian Americans. Also, since it depends on MPS data, it restricts the analysis 
to families with MPS students.  
While publicly available, some of these data still have limitations. For example, some 
Sheriff’s sale records do not include the lender, especially smaller lenders that are not required to 
file with HMDA (Newman, 2012). Without lenders, it may restrict analyses that may want to 
connect the type of loan with the borrower’s outcomes. However, this method does not include 
property owners who sell their homes before going to auction. While it does include borrower 
names, there is no self-identified race or ethnic data included—consequently, a surname list 
would have to be matched to this data to determine interethnic and interracial differences. 
Without more accurate and accessible data, Dymski et al. (2011) argue that predatory lending 
renders racial, ethnic, and gender disparities as “invisible” (p. 9).  
Qualitative Data Collection on Foreclosures 
To complement these quantitative studies, researchers and policy analysts have used 
qualitative methods such as focus groups and interviews to understand foreclosure risk factors 
for individual homeowners. For example, in a National CAPACD and SEARAC report (2011), 
researchers conducted focus groups with clients to understand individual effects of the 
foreclosure crisis. Through their research, they found that some clients have paid money for 
foreclosure prevention help, up to $12,000, and fell victim to loan modification scams (National 
CAPACD & SEARAC, 2011). Newman (2012) conducted focus groups and found that many 
residents in the neighborhood Vailsburg, New Jersey, had brokers directly approach them about 
refinancing and felt they were treated unfairly by the lender, except one resident who had an 
attorney; these residents were also fairly educated about their finances, but still had difficulty 
with fully comprehending their mortgage terms.  
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These studies help to decipher the reason for the defaults, foreclosures, and loan 
outcomes in a specific geographic jurisdiction. However, more studies with mixed-methods are 
needed to address limitations of each methodology and understand the foreclosure landscape, 
which can inform policies and foreclosure prevention programs. Specific to the research 
questions of the current study, there is still little evidence of how foreclosures have affected 
Asian Americans.  
Conceptual Framework 
 To answer the research questions, the study used several methods on two geographic 
levels. Figure 4 conceptualizes how the various areas of inquiry are used in the study. The study 
answered the two research questions through a national and local analysis in Minneapolis-St. 
Paul, Minnesota, which creates the four quadrants. It is difficult to understand the tangible 
impacts of foreclosure risk and foreclosures solely on the national level because it does not take 
into account context and the local setting.  
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Figure 4. Conceptual Framework 
 
 Note: Compiled by author.  
 
The top two quadrants in Figure 4 address the first research question on Asian American 
foreclosure risk factors. The national analysis provided a glimpse of larger trends that affect the 
major foreclosure risk factors. As described in the literature, five of the factors were found to 
affect Asian American’s vulnerability to foreclosure—language differences, 
income/employment, geographic concentration, lending/housing market factors, and immigration 
status—which the study sought to verify.5 As described with previous methodologies, however, 
there is little focus on the differences among Asian American ethnic groups, which I included as 
a potential risk factor. The local study also focused on Laotian homeowners to explore if there 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Geographic concentration can include the uneven concentration of subprime loans, a certain population group, 
foreclosures, or other factors that are tied to a specific geography. 
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are any foreclosure risk factors specific to this ethnic group. Also, the local analysis helped to 
explore geographic concentration and additional factors that may impact how the foreclosure 
crisis affected Asian Americans’ vulnerability to foreclosure. Geographic concentration is a 
focus of the foreclosure risk analysis because I assume that Asian American households who live 
in areas with greater foreclosure risk are likely to be at greater risk for foreclosure or other 
negative collective outcomes from foreclosure such as home value declines. 
Both analyses added help-seeking behavior as a seventh factor, but instead as a protective 
factor against foreclosure. Depending on if Asian American homeowners seek help from 
community resources, they may be less likely to foreclose. Although community resources can 
encompass multiple institutions and informal networks, I specifically examined AA CBOs as the 
primary community resource. The first research question then informed the second research 
question, which examined how CBOs have mediated Asian American foreclosure risk.  If Asian 
American homeowners are using AA CBOs as a community resource to prevent foreclosure and 
mediate other foreclosure risks, it is important to understand AA CBOs and how they were 
affected by the foreclosure crisis.  
On the national and local levels, the study examined specific aspects of CBOs—
devolution, capacity, and strategies—to understand how they have mediated their clients’ 
foreclosure risk (see the bottom quadrants in Figure 4). As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
nonprofit sector has experienced many changes because of devolution. While it is expected that 
AA CBOs have also been impacted by devolution, how have these shifts in funding and 
responsibilities specifically affected their housing and foreclosure programs? The study also 
explored what is the capacity of AA CBOs to mediate foreclosure risk, either through asset-
building, housing education, and foreclosure prevention work. If they are expected to take on 
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additional responsibilities, are they able to remain effective? If so, it is critical to learn more 
about the strategies that AA CBOs use to efficiently and effectively serve their clients. These 
strategies clarify the way that AA CBOs are able to help Asian American homeowners, and in 
what ways additional government interventions or policies can support their work.  
In addition to these three factors, the local level compared the experiences of AA CBOs 
to those of mainstream CBOs. While it would be unmanageable to conduct a national study on 
mainstream CBOs and AA CBOs, the local study provided an opportunity to make these 
comparisons on a smaller scale in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region. The study contributes to 
existing literature by examining how different types of CBOs have been affected by the crisis. 
There is evidence suggesting possible additional segmentation not only between the government 
and the nonprofit sector, but also among CBOs. If so, this additional segmentation may further 
marginalize CBOs that target underserved populations, and consequently affect their ability to 
effectively serve certain homeowners, including Asian Americans.  
Finally, these comparisons on the local level pointed to larger patterns that may exist in 
CBO mediation around foreclosure risk. Without the national analysis, the study would not 
include larger trends affecting Asian Americans and AA CBOs. At the same time, without the 
local study, it would be difficult to determine what findings are tied to a geographic and 
foreclosure context or connected to factors that are more generalizable to national trends. In this 
way, the national and local analyses mutually informed each other.   
Analyses Steps 
As previously explained, there are limitations to a number of methods to study 
foreclosures. I used a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to answer the two 
research questions and address constraints in each method (see Table 4). The following describes 
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the methods and steps used by each research question for the national and local study presented 
in Table 4.  
Table 4. Analysis Steps for Foreclosure Impacts 
 
Foreclosure Risk Analysis 
On the national level, the seven risk factors were examined using a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods. The first step explored geographic concentration and ethnic 
group differences—specifically, it matched neighborhoods with foreclosure risk scores to the 
population in the area. HUD’s Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) 2 foreclosure risk 
score was used, which designates census tracts a score that ranges from 1 to 20 using data on 
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high cost loans, changes in home values, unemployment rates, and delinquent loans (a score of 
20 indicates the worst foreclosure risk; HUD, 2013b).6 Because the current study was more 
interested in foreclosure risk, the NSP score made it easier to understand additional factors that 
put homeowners at risk of foreclosure based on geography, including decreasing home values 
and unemployment.  
However, NSP data does not include the race or ethnicity of residents in the designated 
geographic area. Consequently, I matched risk scores with 2010 Geolytics Decennial Census 
population statistics that were adjusted to 2000 census tracts, and tracts were used to 
approximate neighborhoods.7 After, I estimated the average foreclosure risk based on various 
racial and ethnic groups in three steps: 
1. Majority Tract Analysis: census tracts where at least 50 percent of the population is one 
race or ethnic group to compare if groups live in neighborhoods with higher risk than 
others 
2. Asian American Majority Tract Clusters: counties with at least 2 census tracts of more 
than 50 percent Asian Americans—it is important to look at clusters to evaluate if areas 
with larger Asian American populations tend to have higher foreclosure risk 
3. Asian American Ethnic Group Tracts: varying population thresholds less than 50 percent 
to examine smaller Asian American ethnic groups—this step helps to examine foreclosure 
risk for smaller Asian American ethnic groups. 
 
These steps demonstrated the racial/ethnic group and geographic disparities in foreclosure risk 
scores nationally.  
While the NSP foreclosure risk analysis helps to understand where Asian Americans live 
and ethnic group differences, it does not offer an explanation for why Asian Americans may 
have higher or lower foreclosure risk scores. Consequently, interviews helped to examine the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 HUD has used these scores to allocate NSP funds to state and local governments to purchase foreclosed homes that 
“might otherwise become sources of abandonment and blight” in areas with higher foreclosure risk scores (HUD, 
2013a). NSP funds have been allocated as a result of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform Act (HUD, 2013a). NSP data can be downloaded from 
http://www.huduser.org/portal/NSP2datadesc.html by state. 
7 Geolytics Tables P5, P7, and PCT7 were used to find race and ethnic data. Because NSP scores were determined in 
2007 and 2008, the data utilize 2000 geographic boundaries. 
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other five risk factors—language differences, income/employment, lending/housing market, 
immigration status, and help-seeking behavior. Interviews were conducted with 12 staff 
members of ten AA CBOs who lead housing and/or economic sufficiency programs that 
impacted homeownership opportunities during 2012 and 2013 (see Table 5 for more detailed 
descriptions of CBOs). While the interviews may not provide longitudinal data, they provide a 
snapshot from the perspective of staff members of how Asian American homeowners were 
affected during the crisis. Staff members were used instead of individual homeowners because 
AA CBO staff can help identify larger trends among clients since they work with multiple 
homeowners at once; it also offered sampling convenience.  
These CBOs were identified from the National CAPACD housing network.8 National 
CAPACD members then referred CBOs that are not part of the National CAPACD network and 
are not HUD-certified. Half of the interviewed CBOs were part of the National CAPACD 
network, while others operated housing programs that are not HUD-certified. Non HUD-certified 
AA CBOs were included in the study because they may mediate foreclosure risk for clients 
without providing HUD-certified foreclosure prevention assistance. For example, Asian Services 
in Action, Inc. (ASIA) helps clients with individual development accounts, which may not 
directly mitigate against foreclosure, but may help homeowners to build their assets and prevent 
them from defaulting. Also, Koreatown Youth and Community Center (KYCC) does not offer 
foreclosure prevention work, but may help clients to better understand their mortgage terms and 
the American financial system through their financial education programs.  
Most AA CBOs interviewed also offer a range of social services aside from housing 
including employment assistance, civic engagement, English-language services, and health. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 A list of National CAPACD organizations involved in the housing network can be found at: 
http://www.nationalcapacd.org/content/find-counselor. 
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These AA CBOs consequently may address other foreclosure risk such as language differences, 
income/employment, and immigration status. Asian-American Homeownership Counseling, Inc. 
(AAHC) is the only AA CBO solely focused on housing services.  Interviewees are located in 
various geographic regions including the West, East Coast, and Midwest, and provide services 
for a range of target areas (e.g., metropolitan area, multi-county region, state). They also differ in 
organizational size and structure, where some were founded a few years ago, while others have 
been working in their communities for more than 30 years. Aggregated, they provide translation 
and services in more than 14 different languages, with a few including Spanish.  
Actual CBO names were used because there are few CBOs per geographic area that 
provide housing assistance and/or are HUD-certified. However, staff members were not 
identified by name and no personal information was collected that would identify individual 
staff. Furthermore, a number of CBOs had staff turnover since the interviews were conducted, 
which helps maintain anonymity of individual interviewees.  
Phone interviews were semi-structured and asked staff members to share their insights on 
how the foreclosure crisis has impacted clients, including what factors lead to clients defaulting 
and what resources clients used to prevent foreclosure or help themselves after foreclosing (see 
Appendix for interview questions). These interview questions were based off of Pfeiffer, Wong, 
Ong, and De La Cruz-Viesca (2014) study with the UCLA Asian American Studies Center. 
Interviews lasted between 30 to 60 minutes. Some follow-up e-mails were exchanged with AA 
CBO staff to clarify questions.  
Interviews with CBO staff were more informal and were not audio recorded, but detailed 
notes were taken during the interviews. After, notes were sent to interviewees to verify accuracy 
of comments. However, one staff member did not receive notes because the person left the 
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organization soon after the interview. Interviews were also analyzed according to themes that 
related to foreclosure risk factors. AA CBO staff members also electronically received a 
summary of themes related to client foreclosure risk to obtain their feedback. However, none of 
the staff members responded with additional feedback. 
CBO Mediation 
Staff members were also asked about their housing programs and how the foreclosure 
crisis affected their programming. To gauge capacity, they were also asked about challenges and 
which housing programs had been effective and ineffective. Finally, they were asked about 
connections or partnerships with other CBOs or agencies to implement programming to gauge 
impacts of devolution and potential strategies that AA CBOs use to serve clients. 
This step helps to contextualize larger trends that AA CBOs may experience that are 
directly involved with assisting Asian Americans with housing, specifically looking at the 
impacts of devolution, capacity to address foreclosures and foreclosure risk, and strategies to 
remain effective. It also explores how foreclosures may have impacted CBOs themselves, which 
has implications for how to support and develop AA CBOs.  
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Table 5. AA CBO Interviewee Descriptions 
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Local Analysis 
 
Foreclosure Risk 
The local level used similar steps, but focused on clients of the Lao Assistance Center of 
Minnesota (Lao Center) for several reasons. While conducting several AA CBOs for interviews, 
the Lao Center was open to work together to develop a local study. Also, most of the clients at 
the Lao Center are Laotian, which helped to narrow down the analysis to a specific ethnic group. 
Nationally, Laotians on average have lower per capita, higher unemployment rates, and lower 
educational attainment than other Asian American groups, which may increase their foreclosure 
risk in Minneapolis-St. Paul (AACAJ, 2011). However, there is still more research needed on 
Laotians to better understand how they fared in the foreclosure crisis.  
Also, due to time and resource constraints, it was helpful to identify individual 
homeowners who already participate in the Lao Center rather than find homeowners who live in 
the general Minneapolis-St. Paul community. While this method of recruitment did bias the 
sample toward those who have sought help, this step made it easier to understand foreclosure risk 
factors for a particular group that uses a similar community network.  
 The Lao Center is located in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and was established in 1983. It 
provides resources in English, Lao, and Thai for programs related to health education, youth 
advancement, elder empowerment, employment counseling, housing counseling, civic 
engagement, and leadership development. It is also a member of the National CAPACD housing 
counseling network and has more than 100 clients. To administer their housing programs, the 
Lao Center has two HUD-certified counselors.  
 To examine foreclosure risk for Lao Center clients, several steps were used. The Lao 
Center provided addresses of clients who participated in housing programs—foreclosure 
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prevention and homebuyer education—between 2011 and 2013. Then, Lao Center client 
addresses were geocoded using ArcGIS online. Similar to the national analysis, Lao Center 
addresses were matched to NSP 2 foreclosure risk scores to distinguish if they live in areas with 
higher foreclosure risk.  
 After, a more detailed analysis was conducted for clients who live in Hennepin County. 
With Sheriff's sale data from 2012, foreclosure listings were compared to where clients lived and 
the HUD foreclosure risk scores.9 This step determined if clients live in tracts that not only have 
higher foreclosure risk scores, but also have a higher concentration of foreclosures within the 
county. A greater concentration of foreclosures would also affect housing prices. It was 
important to also include 2012 data because it offers a more recent perspective on foreclosures 
compared to the NSP scores, which were determined in 2007 and 2008. Then, to explore if there 
were discrepancies between the two groups of clients, those who sought foreclosure prevention 
were compared to those wanting to buy a home.  
Finally, the near table tool was used in ArcGIS to identify where the Lao Center was 
located, relative to other HUD organizations, and Lao Center clients.10 This last step helped to 
understand if clients lived in areas that are serviced by organizations that do not provide 
resources in Laotian. It also helps to expand the understanding of what community resources are 
available to Laotian homeowners based on their neighborhoods.  
However, these steps also have limitations because they do not include whether or not 
clients foreclosed and what risk factors contributed to their vulnerability to foreclosure during 
the crisis. The last step of the local foreclosure analysis included focus groups with Lao Center 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Sheriff’s sale data were provided by the University of Minnesota’s Center for Urban and Regional Affairs. 
10 HUD provides addresses of HUD-approved organizations online, which were geocoded using ArcGIS online. 
More information is available for Minnesota HUD-approved organizations at 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/hcc/hcs.cfm?&webListAction=search&searchstate=MN. 
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clients to learn about layers of risk. Two focus groups were conducted at the Lao Center during a 
week in June 2013. One of the focus groups was conducted on the weekend to offer clients an 
opportunity to participate if they had to work during the week. Lao Center staff recruited 
attendees who either experienced foreclosures or were at risk of foreclosure and participated in 
Lao Center housing programs.  
UIUC Institutional Review Board approval was received for these focus groups with a 
waiver of documentation because many of their clients’ primary language is Laotian and are not 
accustomed to signing long and technical consent forms. Instead, they were informed of their 
rights to not answer a question or to leave the focus group early and were asked to give verbal 
consent (see Appendix for consent form). For participation, clients received a $15 gift card to 
Target, which they would receive even if they decided to not finish the focus group. 
The first focus group had two clients, while the second focus group had nine clients. (One 
client attended both focus groups for a total of 10 participants.) However, a couple of 
participants did not speak during the focus group, in part perhaps because their spouses also 
attended the focus groups and shared their family’s experiences. While two participants were 
fluent in English, the other participants primarily spoke in Lao. Two clients experienced 
foreclosures, while the others defaulted or were at risk of not paying their mortgage.  
Focus groups were audio recorded and lasted about 90 minutes. Groups took place at the 
Lao Center conference room for a convenient and comfortable environment. Client addresses 
were the only information collected, but were not identified by name, so as to compare where 
attendees live in relation to foreclosure risk. Pseudonyms were used to protect the identities of 
clients. Two Lao Center staff translated during the focus groups. The focus groups were 
transcribed and analyzed by the researcher to better understand how individual homeowners have 
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been impacted by foreclosures and foreclosure risk. Similar to the AA CBO interviews, themes 
were developed for the two focus groups based on foreclosure risk factors. 
Although Lao Center clients were offered the option to participate in individual 
interviews, no clients expressed interest in speaking alone. Clients were asked about their 
financial situations that led to defaulting and how they bought their home, including if they 
received any additional assistance or what kind of lender they used (see Appendix for the list of 
questions used). Additionally, the focus group participants were asked how they may or may not 
have sought help when they defaulted, including any barriers that clients may have had when 
seeking housing assistance. This step begins to distinguish how clients’ experiences impact 
CBOs and what policies and resources can help increase CBO effectiveness in preventing 
foreclosures for Asian Americans. Lastly, they were asked what resources they had following 
foreclosure if it was applicable to their situation and what advice they would offer to other 
potential homebuyers. 
Similar to the national analysis, interviews with housing CBO staff in the region were 
also conducted to better understand how CBOs and their clients were impacted by foreclosures. 
A total of six interviews were completed for five CBOs during 2013 (see Table 6 for CBO 
descriptions). The first four organizations are HUD-certified and provide foreclosure prevention 
counseling for clients. They also vary in geographic scope, where two focus on the state and the 
others focus on the metropolitan areas. Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota (LSS) and Twin 
Cities Habitat for Humanity (TC Habitat) are both faith-affiliated institutions, while Hmong 
American Partnership (HAP) and Lao Center focus on serving Asian American groups. The 
Minnesota Homeownership Center (MNHOC) serves largely as a parent organization and 
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streamlines information and resources to other organizations in the state through its 
Homeownership Advisors Network and does not provide direct housing services. 
Table 6. Minneapolis CBO Descriptions 
 
 AA CBOs and mainstream HUD-certified CBOs were interviewed to glean what these 
staff members may know of Asian American foreclosure. Although mainstream CBOs may not 
offer translation or programming in Asian languages, they may still work with Laotian or other 
Asian American homeowners who speak English. LSS also has a larger geographic range than 
either AA CBO. While the Lao Center does serve the state, LSS has more offices and resources 
to help Laotian homeowners or Asian American homeowners in more isolated areas of the state.  
CBO Mediation   
Interviewed CBO staff members were also asked similar questions about programming 
and the impacts of the foreclosure crisis on their networks (see Appendix for interview 
questions). Interviews were coded again for the three themes of devolution, capacity, and 
strategies. By comparing these various CBOs, the local study helped to explore differential 
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impacts of the foreclosure crisis on CBOs that provide similar work, but for different target 
populations. This step also helps to understand how AA CBOs and mainstream CBOs utilize 
organizational networks and local stakeholders to strengthen the impact of their housing 
programs. If they are using different networks, do these disparities result from the trends 
devolution and segmentation? This comparison helps understand the more tangible impacts of 
these trends on individual homeowners and housing programming. These networks also impact 
what resources are accessible for the CBOs. The interviews with housing staff are also 
instrumental for comparing how AA CBOs and mainstream CBOs interact with HUD and 
changes in housing policy. This relationship is particularly important because it will provide 
insight into how CBOs interact with policy changes and how they relay these changes to their 
clients.  
Limitations 
 Several constraints should be noted that impact the analysis. First, as previously 
described, foreclosure risk is not the same as foreclosure rates for individual homeowners. 
Foreclosure risk is used to approximate where Asian Americans and Lao Center clients live in 
relation to factors that affect vulnerability to foreclosure; however, individual homeowners’ 
experiences vary significantly, depending on e.g., loan terms, financial resources, and lender 
used, in addition to neighborhood factors such as vacancy/foreclosures and drops in housing 
prices.  
Second, the sample size is small, which limits generalizability of the findings.  According 
to National CAPACD’s website, there are 19 AA CBOs in their housing network, while the 
sample includes 5 AA CBOs in the network. Consequently, findings are restricted to the 
interviewed CBOs and may not reflect the experiences of all National CAPACD organizations 
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nor all AA CBOs with housing and economic assistance programs. The same limitations apply to 
the Lao Center clients, since 10 of 83 clients were included in the focus groups.  
Also, there are some limitations with speaking to AA CBO staff and AA CBO clients. As 
with other described studies, there may be a sample bias. The homeowners who approach CBOs 
for assistance may be different than those who do not use these community resources. These 
disparities may reflect individual homeowner differences and challenges to access CBOs. 
However, their experiences are not included in the current study.  
Additional limitations also apply because of the primary researcher’s background. I am 
not Laotian and experienced language barriers with the focus group participants. By relying on 
Lao Center staff to translate for me, I was unable to fully grasp client experiences and emotions. 
Nevertheless, there are very few scholars who have explored the impacts of foreclosures on 
Asian Americans and Asian American ethnic groups. Although there are some quantitative 
analyses, they lack nuances of individual homeowner experiences by not including qualitative 
methodologies.   
 80 
CHAPTER 5 
NATIONAL ANALYSIS 
 In the study, there was evidence that many Asian Americans have greater foreclosure risk 
than other groups. However, this vulnerability varied depending on a number of foreclosure risk 
factors. The following describes the risk factors—geographic concentration, ethnic group 
differences, language differences, income/employment, lending/housing market changes, 
immigration status, and help-seeking behavior—and how they relate to Asian Americans across 
the country. It then expands upon help-seeking behavior and discusses how the crisis affected 
AA CBOs. 
Geographic Concentration and Ethnic Group Differences11 
This research predicted that foreclosure risk for Asian Americans varies by ethnic group 
and geographic location. In order to test this at the national level, foreclosure risk was examined 
for all racial and ethnic groups that comprise a majority of a tract (majority tract). When 
aggregated, Asian Americans tended to live in tracts with lower average foreclosure risk than 
other racial groups (see Table 7). Interestingly, these census tracts also had the second highest 
drop in average home price following Latinos with -13 percent, compared to about -6 percent for 
non-Hispanic Whites. 
When examining Asian American ethnic group majority tracts, however, there were 
significant differences in average foreclosure risk and home price change. For example, 
Vietnamese majority tracts tended to have foreclosure risk that are higher than non-Hispanic 
Whites, while Filipino majority tracts had similar foreclosure risk as American Indians and 
Alaska Natives and Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Geographic concentration and ethnic group differences are combined in the foreclosure risk analysis. While the 
study disaggregated by ethnicity, the findings do not describe individual foreclosure risk. Instead, it matched NSP 
risk scores to where Asian Americans lived to understand how geography interacts with ethnicity. 
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Table 7. Majority Census Tracts and Foreclosure Risk by Racial and Ethnic Group 
 
Note: *excludes Taiwanese.  Foreclosure Risk is on a scale from 1 to 20, where 20 is the highest foreclosure risk. 
Only tracts with more than 500 of the majority race or ethnic group are included in the analysis. Average home price 
change is calculated by the decline from home peak values from any year between 2000 and 2008 and the second 
quarter of 2008. 
NHPI = Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander; AIAN = American Indian and Alaska Native; NHW = non-Hispanic 
White. Latino can be of any racial group. African American, NHPI, AIAN, and Asian American values include 
alone or in combination with another ethnic or racial category. Non-Hispanic White is the only category that does 
not include Latinos. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Decennial Census, Tables P5, P7, and PCT7; 2008 HUD NSP 1. 
When examining average home price change, Vietnamese majority tracts had the highest 
difference in home prices (or 22 percent) compared to Japanese majority tracts (a home price 
drop of 4 percent). There are limitations in this approach because many Asian American ethnic 
groups do not comprise more than 50 percent of any census tracts. Consequently, this method 
includes only those groups with larger populations and does not reflect experiences of smaller 
Asian American groups. 
To disaggregate foreclosure risk scores for additional Asian American ethnic groups, 
tracts with less than a majority of Asian American groups were included (see Figure 5). When 
disaggregating foreclosure risk for 12 ethnic groups and for different tract population 
concentrations, foreclosure risk scores varied from 2 to 20. For example, Bangladeshi, Burmese, 
Cambodian, Filipino, Hmong, and Vietnamese Americans lived in tracts with the highest average 
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foreclosure risk score in tracts with varying population concentrations less than 50 percent. Most 
tracts with other ethnic groups also had higher foreclosure risk than Asian Americans 
aggregated, except for tracts with Chinese, Indian, and Japanese Americans, which were areas 
with the lowest foreclosure risk. However, the majority of Southeast Asian Americans and newer 
Asian American groups lived in tracts with higher foreclosure risk.  
Moreover, the average foreclosure risk scores for each group were in the zero to 10 
percent tract concentration point, which showed that most Asian American groups lived in tracts 
with an average risk score of more than 12. This value is different from the previous analysis, 
which found the average foreclosure risk score for Asian American majority tracts. Among 
ethnic groups, Taiwanese, Pakistani, and Laotian lived in tracts with the highest average 
foreclosure risk score overall. However, these risk scores increased and decreased differently 
when examining tracts with varying group percentages. For example, Laotian risk scores 
increased when they comprise between 10 and 20 percent of a tract’s households, while 
Taiwanese risk scores decreased when they comprise between10 and 20 percent of a tract’s 
households. This trend raised additional questions of whether ethnic group concentration may 
help protect against foreclosure risk for certain groups, while concentration may serve as an 
additional risk factor for other Asian American groups.  
A similar method was used to examine if home prices also varied among Asian American 
ethnic groups. If Asian Americans tend to live in areas with a greater housing price drop, they 
may be at risk of becoming underwater borrowers, or those who owe more on their mortgage 
than the value of their house. Some underwater borrowers eventually walk away from their home 
because they have negative equity in their house.  
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Figure 5. Average Foreclosure Risk for Asian American Ethnic Tracts by Varying Concentrations  
 
Note:  Only tracts with more than 500 Asian Americans are included in the analysis.  Foreclosure Risk is on a scale from 1 to 20, where 20 is the highest 
foreclosure risk. NHW = non-Hispanic White. All groups are alone or in combination except for NHW to account for mixed-race individuals. 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Decennial Census, Tables P7 and PCT7; 2008 HUD NSP 1. 
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Once again, there were significant differences in home price declines by ethnic group, 
ranging from -1 percent home price decline for tracts with 20 to 30 percent Burmese Americans, 
compared to -25 percent home price decline for tracts with 30 to 40 percent Bangladeshi 
Americans (see Figure 6). Other groups with higher home price drops than Asian Americans 
overall included Bangladeshi, Korean, and Vietnamese Americans. On the other hand, Burmese, 
Indian, Japanese, and Pakistani Americans tended to live in tracts with less home price declines 
than other ethnic groups.  
Differences in foreclosure risk scores also varied by the geographic location. For counties 
with clusters of Asian American majority tracts, almost half have higher than average foreclosure 
risks (or scores above 10; see Table 8). Of the top 10 counties with the highest foreclosure risk, 7 
are located in California. Hawaii and Kauai Counties also have high foreclosure risk scores. On 
the other hand, Kings and New York Counties had the lowest foreclosure risk among these 
counties. Some counties with more Asian American majority tracts at times correlated with 
greater foreclosure risk: Los Angeles, Santa Clara, Orange, and Alameda Counties had large 
Asian American population concentrations and high foreclosure risk.   
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Figure 6. Average Home Price Drop for Asian American Ethnic Tracts by Varying Concentration 
 
Notes:  Only tracts with more than 500 Asian Americans are included in the analysis.  Average home price change is calculated by the decline from home peak 
values from any year between 2000 and 2008 and the second quarter of 2008.  NHW = non-Hispanic White. All groups are alone or in combination except for 
NHW to account for mixed-race individuals. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Decennial Census, Tables P7 and PCT7; 2008 HUD NSP 1. 
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Table 8. Asian American Majority Tract Clusters by County 
 
Note: Majority tract clusters are defined as counties with at least one tract that has more than 50 percent Asian 
Americans alone or in combination. Only tracts with more than 500 Asian Americans are included in the analysis. 
Foreclosure Risk is on a scale from 1 to 20, where 20 is the highest foreclosure risk. Average home price change is 
calculated by the decline from home peak values from any year between 2000 and 2008 and the second quarter of 
2008. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Decennial Census, Table P7; 2008 HUD NSP 1. 
 
Some of these counties also had significant home price drops. The majority of these 
counties had higher average price changes than the average price change for non-Hispanic White 
majority tracts (or -5.7 percent in Table 7). Also, the six counties with the greatest average home 
price drop and more than 15 percent were in California (Solano, Alameda, San Diego, Orange, 
Los Angeles, and Santa Clara), a state with some of the highest foreclosure rates (Taylor et al., 
2011). Solano County—located in the Central Valley—in particular had the highest foreclosure 
risk and average home price drop, and one of the highest unemployment rates out of the Asian 
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American majority tract clusters counties (Hoak, 2011). Thus, geographic distribution impacts 
foreclosure risk among Asian American majority tract clusters. Some areas such as those in 
California face greater challenges to overcome the effects of foreclosures for these Asian 
American majority tracts. Although Asian American majority tracts tended to have lower 
foreclosure risk than other racial majority tracts aggregated, some Asian American majority 
tracts also have high foreclosure risk and drops in average home price that put these Asian 
American homeowners at risk for foreclosure. 
These analyses demonstrate that many Asian American groups live in neighborhoods 
with higher foreclosure risk. However, there are interethnic disparities that may reflect aspects of 
immigration history that affect these differences in vulnerability. Without understanding nuances 
of foreclosure risk, it is difficult to shape policies and programs to help prevent future 
foreclosures.  
Language Difference 
Since one-third of Asian Americans are limited-English proficient, AA CBO housing 
counselors have also found that their clients experience significant language barriers, which is 
oftentimes linked to exploitation and predatory lending. As National CAPACD staff 
acknowledged, “Language is a great concern for working with mortgage services and impacts 
from the beginning to the end of homeownership.” Korean Resource Center (KRC) and ASIA 
identified that clients are more susceptible to scammers because of limited-English proficiency. 
These scammers “understand language barriers and make themselves look legitimate, or talk to a 
sibling who can translate and get the family involved,” according to an ASIA housing counselor. 
HAP also has clients who have worked with lenders who may be from the same ethnic 
background, but “may say it’s a great deal when the actual terms may have a floor where interest 
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can’t be below a certain percentage or what you can’t pay will be added to the principal.” As 
discussed earlier, predatory loans have significantly higher default rates than prime loans.  
Because of language differences, lenders and banks are inaccessible for their clients, in 
particular because lenders only provide contracts or notices in English. As a housing counselor at 
KRC stated, “Banks may have multilingual staff for marketing, but after Korean Americans 
become a customer, banks only give information in English or there is no customer service in 
Korean.” Even if banks do have translation services, National CAPACD noted that language 
lines have “questionable quality” and AA CBO housing counselors “spend hours going over 
what the interpreter actually said and what is being discussed and if the terms make sense.” 
Although some lenders may attempt to help provide in-language resources, these services are 
ineffective and AA CBOs still have to translate between the client and lender. 
Because of Asian Americans’ language needs, many of these AA CBOs do focus on 
providing multilingual services. For example, 90 percent of ASIA staff are bilingual and AAHC 
provides materials in Chinese, Korean, Hmoob, Portuguese, Spanish, Tagalog, and Vietnamese. 
KYCC also explained how clients travel more than two hours for their services in Korean 
because San Diego and Orange County do not have as many resources in Korean as Los 
Angeles. Despite focusing their services in Los Angeles, KYCC’s services extend beyond this 
geographic area because of the dearth of Korean language resources. 
Income/Employment 
A significant reason that some clients foreclosed is loss of income or wealth during the 
economic downturn. For example, HAP clients lost income from public resources such as cash 
benefits, social security, and disability, which contributed to clients defaulting on their 
mortgages. Even if clients had higher incomes, the Lao Center mentioned that some lost their 
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jobs and their expenses dramatically increased. With the economic downturn, the Fresno 
Interdenominational Refugee Ministries (FIRM) also has clients who have put multiple family 
members on a mortgage to buy a home. Then, when entering the foreclosure process, multiple 
lines of credit are affected. Losing income and family wealth made these Asian American clients 
especially vulnerable to defaulting and foreclosing. 
 Many Asian Americans are also small business owners, and self-employment impacted 
their income. Asian Americans owned more than 1.5 million businesses in 2007 (AACAJ, 2011). 
ASIA staff mentioned that they have a lot of clients who are small business owners of restaurants 
and grocery stores and are “using business capital to stay afloat.” KRC shared similar 
experiences with clients’ businesses slowing down or closing from the recession; clients then lost 
income and foreclosed. As AAHC’s staff member noted, “Between the small business and 
mortgage, clients are renting out rooms, defaulting on their mortgage, and using lots of credit 
cards.” The types of employment for some Asian Americans make it more difficult to earn a 
steady income, which causes them to become more susceptible to impacts from the recession. 
These small business owners also then take on more debt and increases their vulnerability to 
foreclosure.  
Lending/Housing Market Factors 
Some of the clients were less financially knowledgeable, which led them to take loans 
with unfavorable terms. For example, HAP has clients who did not understand negative 
amortization or ARMs, but instead would only look at the monthly payments rather than the 
entire mortgage product. As a counselor at the Lao Center described, “Many clients have ARM 
loans because they think it’s cheaper at first. They don’t know in-depth information about their 
mortgage but are just happy that they got approved.” With the proliferation of more exploitative 
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loans and lack of financial education, clients were unknowingly signing mortgages with 
unfavorable and more expensive terms.  
Other clients also accumulated more debt, a trend for many minority homeowners. For 
example, some homeowners went to the Lao Center because they defaulted from overspending 
and not understanding the interest rates on their credit cards. Similarly, clients at KYCC “know 
that their credit report is bad, but don’t want to look at them.” These examples help demonstrate 
that many Asian Americans may need a combination of programs to educate them on specific 
mortgage questions and more general financial education.  
Immigration Status 
Clients’ immigration status is another layer of risk that impacts their vulnerability to 
foreclosures. Many heavily rely on their families and local communities, in particular if they do 
not have access to mainstream resources. Some KRC clients obtained incorrect information from 
their family and friends about mortgages. HAP has clients who depend on their children to help 
them talk to a loan officer—however, when they become frustrated by this dependence, these 
clients “will just try and go to someone who speaks the language, which can lead to predatory 
lending.”  
This dependence continues for clients who are unable to stay in their houses. For 
example, Lao Center clients tend to move in with family while they process their bankruptcy. 
With the recession, Fresno Center for New Americans (FCNA) saw that multiple families would 
move in together to help pay bills. When their clients do enter foreclosure, HAP clients also 
“stay within the community or move in with family.” Because some clients do not have direct 
access to their lenders due to language barriers and other layers of risk, these immigrant clients 
depend more heavily on their family and friend networks. However, this dependence can make it 
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difficult for family members to receive adequate help, especially if other family members are 
experiencing financial difficulties. 
Help-Seeking Behavior 
Because of the accumulated impacts from these layers of risk, clients oftentimes come to 
AA CBOs late in the foreclosure process, which makes it difficult for counselors to help them. 
AAHC’s staff member mentioned that some clients do not know where to go and “seem to not 
pay their mortgage or answer their phones until they get kicked out, or they get scared and 
contact AAHC.” A Lao Center counselor mentioned similar clients who face language barriers 
and do not seek help until they have to sell the home; clients “come so late in the process that the 
Lao Center can’t do much to intervene.”  
These barriers that AA CBO staff and clients experience present critical challenges for 
AA CBOs to address the impacts of foreclosure for their clients. These factors impact funding, 
time, resources, and hinder AA CBOs from effectively helping to prevent foreclosures for other 
clients that they may have to turn away due to lack of capacity. As a KRC counselor explained, 
“Minority counseling agencies work three times as hard as mainstream organizations.” Although 
many CBOs already struggle with capacity, AA CBOs face additional challenges to 
simultaneously address client needs and sustain themselves. 
CBO Mediation 
The interviews with housing staff also helped to understand how various organizations 
were impacted by the foreclosure crisis. While these AA CBOs met the needs of their clients, 
these staff members oftentimes have to micromanage their clients because of their multiple 
layers of risk. As a result, AA CBOs were likely affected in their capacity, particularly if social 
services were becoming more devolved.  
 92 
Many of these CBOs were founded because it was the only organization in their 
geographic area to specifically serve Asian Americans. For example, AAHC is the only housing 
and financial services CBO in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, which has almost 
600,000 Asian Americans. Also, many of the interviewed staff members are the only HUD-
certified counselors that provided services in Asian languages in their region. Although Asian 
Americans are the fastest growing racial group and live in areas with higher foreclosure risk, 
there are few housing organizations available. Of the interviewed AA CBOs, many are also 
located in major metropolitan areas, or areas with significant changes in housing prices. Despite 
these challenges, AA CBOs have continued to prevent Asian Americans from entering 
foreclosure.  
Devolution 
Oftentimes, these AA CBO housing counselors are also directly mediating clients’ 
foreclosure risk. It is unclear if they are filling a void of services targeting Asian Americans 
because of greater devolution within housing services. However, within AA CBOs, some 
interviewees described segmentation. For example, the Lao Center sometimes refers Hmoob 
speaking clients to HAP. A KRC counselor also described some challenges with trying to partner 
with mainstream counseling organizations—she used to:  
…send Korean homeowners to another agency after intake, but then it would take 3 
weeks for clients to receive a response. KRC decided to help Korean Americans directly 
and attended training sessions, eventually becoming HUD approved in 2010. 
 
Alternatively, AA CBOs may have greater capacity or flexibility to address Asian 
American housing needs than local governments, which may contribute to the government 
shifting responsibilities to CBOs. For example, several AA CBOs decided to change their 
housing programs as a reaction to the foreclosure crisis. Chinese American Service League 
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(CASL) and KRC both wanted to provide homebuyer education, but transitioned to providing 
foreclosure prevention assistance due to the huge demand from their clients. Many of the 
interviewed AA CBOs also obtained foreclosure prevention programs at least within a couple 
years after the foreclosure crisis began. Thus, it is possible that AA CBOs are partially filling the 
gap between private and public resources because they have staff who already speaking Asian 
languages and are able to adjust their programming.  
Because some of these AA CBOs established their foreclosure prevention assistance as a 
reaction to the recession, housing counselors had to do their best to quickly learn about 
foreclosures with limited resources. As a counselor at KYCC explained:  
I had to learn about the legal terms because of my client’s experiences and to help 
them—we didn’t expect clients to be in a crisis. There was no training for staff to help 
people who became homeless and had no food to eat from the recession.   
 
As some of these housing programs changed from homebuyer to foreclosure, staff also had to 
begin learning about the foreclosure process and assistance. Some counselors found it especially 
challenging because they were confused about changing policies. For example, a HUD-certified 
counselor at HAP was frustrated when trying to learn about the National Foreclosure Settlement 
and independent foreclosure settlement review because “the federal government didn’t even have 
a clear understanding of how these programs work, which makes it confusing for CBOs on the 
ground level.” Also, the Lao Center noted how their two counselors have to “keep getting re-
educated because HUD makes changes every month and it’s hard to keep track.” Even though 
these housing counselors are knowledgeable of changes in policy, policy makers and housing 
agencies may not be reaching out to help clarify changes. With a lot of changes occurring during 
the foreclosure crisis, AA CBO housing counselors unexpectedly change their programming to 
address foreclosures. 
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As staff learned about various options and programs for their clients, some staff members 
were frustrated with limiting and confusing policies. For example, a HAP counselor noted that 
when they are getting trained, many of the solutions are geared towards the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP), rather than including trainings on forbearance and short sale, 
which could help improve their ability to serve clients. More research needs to be conducted in 
this area to help better understand if AA CBOs are assumed to be more proficient at providing 
in-language resources than mainstream housing organizations. Even if these CBOs do have 
relative flexibility in their programming compared to local governments, these housing 
counselors’ experiences demonstrate that they need more assistance to learn of new policy 
changes and a range of solutions that will help them to advocate for their clients. 
Limitations in Capacity 
While they are assisting clients, the interviews shed light on how AA CBOs need 
additional resources to fill the gap in Asian American-specific housing services. Similar to other 
CBOs, AA CBOs struggle to obtain funding. A housing counselor at CASL noted that a lot of 
funding cuts threaten to scale back their services. FCNA also lost four people in their self-
sufficiency program due to funding cuts, while the organization overall lost half of their staff 
after the recession. While the Lao Center did provide foreclosure prevention work before they 
became HUD certified in 2010, but they had to provide these services without funding. As with 
the Lao Center, there are some AA CBOs that are working to react to client needs, but are not 
provided with the resources to help sustain services. 
Unlike CBOs that do not target Asian Americans, AA CBOs particularly noted a dearth 
of data that they can use to help them obtain more funding for foreclosure prevention work. 
AAHC described how it is difficult to find information on Asian Americans because they are 
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categorized as “other.” Not only is there not enough data that actually includes or separates 
Asian Americans from other groups, but also AA CBOs need more ethnic specific data. KRC 
explained that it is easy to get regional data, but that in Los Angeles they need more ethnic 
specific data. As described earlier, the vast socioeconomic differences make it imperative to 
provide ethnic specific data when possible for Asian Americans. This is particularly relevant for 
AA CBOs that target specific ethnic groups due to their language capacity. Without data, these 
organizations have difficulty substantiating their need to fund housing programs. 
 Aside from a lack of funding, some housing counselors described additional resource 
constraints that make it challenging for them to provide foreclosure prevention assistance. First, 
each foreclosure prevention case can take anywhere from 6 months to more than a year because 
counselors are working with lenders and various modification processes. As a housing counselor 
at HAP described, “funding is an issue, and given inadequate funding it’s even more challenging 
because there is so much work that goes into serving one client.” With less capacity, these AA 
CBOs had at most 2 full time staff working on foreclosures. With fewer resources, a counselor at 
KRC explained that her job:  
…requires data entry, trainings, and webinars due to so many changes in policy. Even if 
KRC adds another counselor, that person would need to be trained for on average 1 year 
to become HUD certified. If that staff leaves after 1 year, it becomes hard. 
 
Although this is the same for all CBOs that provide foreclosure prevention, these AA CBOs 
noted that they also have frequent staff or volunteer turnover. When staff members leave these 
CBOs, it is especially devastating when related to foreclosure prevention work because of the 
length of time required not only to help clients, but also to obtain HUD certification.  
AAHC is an example of how taxing it is to obtain HUD certification. Because they were 
established in 2010, AAHC has had to rely on a lot of volunteers and tries to help them become 
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nationally certified in return for their assistance. However, this is a taxing endeavor—while they 
had 5,400 volunteer hours in a year, it also cost AAHC $132,000 to train these volunteers, and 
many turnover after training. Due to the expertise needed to handle foreclosure prevention, these 
programs require more resources from AA CBOs who already have limited capacity. 
 On top of the funding constraints, longer length of each case, and cost to becoming HUD 
certified, these counselors explained challenges with translation work. For example, a KRC 
counselor described how she sometimes has to micromanage her clients: 
I have to follow up after every step, analyze the financial situation, and then plan the next 
action step with the client. If the client applies for a repayment plan or modification, I 
need to prepare documents with them and follow up with the bank because of language 
barriers—oftentimes there is miscommunication between banks and clients. A client gets 
a call from the bank asking about their loan modification, and the client may just say 
“yes” because the call is in English and they don’t understand, and then their 
modification will get cancelled. I have to tell clients to not say yes and to give the lender 
my phone number. 
 
Although the number of cases may be smaller than larger mainstream organizations, she 
explained that they work very closely with clients because of their language barriers. Mainstream 
organizations do not need to work as closely with their clients if they speak English, which also 
allows mainstream counselors to spend less time coordinating between clients and lenders. As 
previously mentioned, AA CBOs are also not receiving help from lenders or local governments 
and have to provide all of the translated resources themselves. Although they may receive 
information from HUD or other housing agencies, it is up to AA CBOs to translate materials and 
provide in-language workshops or resources, which also decreases the time they can spend with 
clients. 
Strategies 
Despite these challenges, AA CBOs have developed several strategies to build networks 
to expand their capacity to help clients and reduce their foreclosure risk. Seven of the ten AA 
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CBOs have worked with National CAPACD to become HUD certified foreclosure counselors. 
National CAPACD is a national advocacy organization that addresses community development 
issues for Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders with a network of over 100 CDCs, AA CBOs, 
and advocacy agencies (National CAPACD, 2011a). According to their housing program 
coordinators, National CAPACD realized that few AA CBOs were eligible for Congress’ 
appropriated funds given to NeighborWorks in 2008. National CAPACD then began discussions 
with their network and found that many had clients looking for foreclosure assistance but did not 
have funding or training to do so. They then became the first Asian American intermediary with 
HUD—19 AA CBOs are part of the housing network and in part get funding from National 
CAPACD for their foreclosure programs. A Lao Center counselor mentioned that their 
foreclosure programs were not sustainable until they became HUD certified through National 
CAPACD and the knowledge they gained through workshops and trainings.  
After becoming HUD certified, AA CBOs can also more effectively serve their clients. 
For example, ASIA was in the process of becoming HUD certified with National CAPACD in 
2012. They were mostly helping clients who needed foreclosure assistance by referring them to 
more qualified agencies and attending meetings with clients to translate. Consequently, HUD 
certified AA CBOs are able to retain clients and help them within the organization rather than 
referring clients outside and not being able to provide assistance.  
Also, these AA CBOs are listed on the HUD online directory with the languages that 
counselors speak, which helps clients find resources in their particular geographic region based 
on their language needs.12 The website lists 25 languages including the following: Asian 
languages: Cambodian, Cantonese, Mandarin, Hindi, Hmong, Indonesian, Korean, and 
Vietnamese.  Other languages are categorized as “Other,” but the online directory does not list !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 The HUD directory is available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/hcc/hcs.cfm. 
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the other languages, which may present challenges for clients who speak a language not listed. It 
also helps these counselors to receive updates on major foreclosure policies, although as 
previously mentioned, it can be confusing to understand these changes.  
By becoming HUD certified, CBOs can obtain additional funding from the government 
and foundations. AA CBOs not only then have greater resources to help their clients, but it can 
help with sustaining foreclosure prevention and other housing programs. Support networks such 
as National CAPACD are providing evidence of helping establish housing programs through 
funding and importance resources such as updates on foreclosure policies that then help AA 
CBOs more effectively serve their clients.  
Another benefit of these AA CBOs is they offer a range of other social services. For 
example, KYCC found that while clients may come in for one issue, staff then realizes clients are 
experiencing multifaceted problems. Because foreclosures are a combination of multiple factors, 
HAP involves multiple staff that can work with clients to address other issues such as drugs or 
employment. They also provide a range of housing issues to help clients who do enter 
foreclosure by involving staff members who can help with rental assistance and preventing 
homelessness. They also follow up with these clients while they are renting and will provide 
financial literacy, asset management, asset building, and collections to help these previous 
homeowners pay off their debt and build their financial resources to eventually become 
homeowners. Except for AAHC, the other AA CBOs have multiple social services that can help 
clients to receive assistance with multiple issues without having to find another resource. These 
AA CBOs can then more effectively and efficiently provide assistance for Asian American 
clients at the same time in an Asian language.  
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Conclusion 
 The national analysis helps to demonstrate that foreclosure risk does impact Asian 
Americans and AA CBOs. As measured by NSP scores, foreclosure risk is not only 
geographically concentrated, but also disparately impacts some Asian American ethnic groups 
more than others. Furthermore, interviews with AA CBO housing staff helped explore how 
CBOs have mediated foreclosures for Asian American homeowners, in particular as they work 
on behalf of their clients by working with lenders, the evolving housing market, and changing 
foreclosure policies.  While they are helping to prevent foreclosures, AA CBOs and homeowners 
are also struggling because they experience layers of risk such as lack of data on Asian 
Americans, significant language barriers, and immigration history—these layers of risk interact 
and make it challenging to prevent Asian American homeowners from defaulting or foreclosing.  
 However, these analyses are limited in scope because they offer a cursory perspective on 
the impacts of foreclosures. Building upon the national analyses, the local study provided more 
insights into how the housing market, local housing policies, and institutional networks impact 
Asian Americans’ foreclosure risk. The local study also fills the gap in understanding a specific 
institutional network and how it affects AA CBOs and their capacity to serve clients, which was 
difficult to clarify in the national analysis.   
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CHAPTER 6 
LOCAL STUDY: MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL, MN 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN (Twin Cities) Local Study Selection 
Minneapolis-St. Paul was selected as the local study site for several reasons. First, it has a 
substantial concentration of Southeast Asian American populations, who are oftentimes 
understudied due to small population size. They also tend to live in tracts with higher NSP 
foreclosure risk. For example, Laotians lived in tracts with an average foreclosure risk score of 
16 and 17; Hmong lived in tracts with risk scores of 14 and 18; and Vietnamese lived in tracts 
with risk scores ranging from 12 to 17. More research on smaller Asian American groups also 
creates a more comprehensive portrait of Asian Americans, in addition to newer immigrant 
groups of other racial backgrounds.  
The Twin Cities were also selected because of the smaller institutional structure. There 
are only two AA CBOs that are HUD-certified in the region, and overall there are few AA CBOs 
that serve each ethnic group. In larger and more populated areas such as Los Angeles, there are 
hundreds of AA CBOs, which is a more challenging institutional landscape to navigate for an 
exploratory and preliminary local study. With fewer AA CBOs, it is easier to describe how they 
work with policy makers and other institutions to mediate for their clients.  
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota Background 
 The Minneapolis-St. Paul region is the most populated area in the state. The region 
surrounds the two major cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, which are collectively known as the 
Twin Cities. Minneapolis has the largest population of any city in Minnesota, while St. Paul is 
the state capital. In this study, the Twin Cities is defined as a seven county region because these 
boundaries are used for governmental purposes, such as the Metropolitan Council—the state’s 
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regional governmental planning organization—and includes Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, 
Ramsey, Scott, and Washington Counties (Metropolitan Council, 2013).  
Much of the population lives outside of the central city and in the surrounding suburbs 
(see Figure 7). In addition, Minneapolis-St. Paul is following national trends of suburbs 
becoming more diverse. As reported by the Metropolitan Policy Program (2010), American 
suburbs are more than a third non-White with rapid growth from immigrants moving to suburbs. 
Similarly, Orfield and Luce (2012) of the Institute for Metropolitan Opportunity found that 26 
percent of American communities in 2000 were diverse suburbs, which they define as 
municipalities with populations comprised of 20 to 60 percent minorities, which increased to 31 
percent in 2010. However, the Twin Cities lag in the percentage of diverse suburbs—their report 
found that only five percent of communities in 2000 were diverse suburbs (or eight 
communities), which increased to 23 percent in 2010 (or 29 communities; Orfield & Luce, 
2012).13  
Some suburbs such as Brooklyn Park and Brooklyn Center have large non-White 
populations. In 2010, Brooklyn Park had 50 percent non-White population, increasing from 30 
percent in 2000, while Brooklyn Center had 54 percent non-White population, increasing also 
from 30 percent in 2000 (Orfield & Luce, 2012). According to the 2010 Census, among the 50 
percent population, Brooklyn Park was 27 percent African American, 16 percent Asian 
American, and 6 percent Latino. Also in 2010, Brooklyn Center was 29 percent African 
American, 15 percent Asian American, and 10 percent Latino.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The Institute for Metropolitan Opportunity released metropolitan specific maps and data, which are available at 
http://www.law.umn.edu/metro/maps-and-data/maps-by-metropolitan-area.html.  
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Figure 7. Total Population – Minneapolis-St. Paul Region (2005-2009 5-Year Estimates)  
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Foreclosures in Minnesota 
 Minnesota uses a non-judicial procedure, which lengthens the foreclosure process.14 
When the homeowner misses several mortgage payments, the lender sends an NOD and 
preforeclosure notice to the borrower (Minnesota Homeownership Center [MNHOC], 2011). The 
loan then transfers to an attorney, who will schedule a Sheriff’s sale, which is posted in public 
places and noted at the county recorder’s office (Mortgage Bankers Association, n.d.). At the 
Sheriff’s sale, the highest bidder becomes the new homeowner. However, Minnesota offers 
homeowners two redemptive periods to save their house. The first is a six-week period before the 
Sheriff's sale to repay the debt, and the second involves the six months after the Sheriff’s sale, 
when the borrower is legally allowed to stay in their house and can keep their house if they pay 
back the Sheriff’s sale in addition to any interest and fees (MNHOC, 2011). These two 
redemption periods allow more homeowners to save their homes, although homeowners are not 
always aware that they have the option to save their homes (Mador, 2010).  
Even with these two redemptive periods, Minnesota was still affected by the foreclosure 
crisis. Approximately 1.7 of every 20 households in the state entered foreclosure between 2005 
and 2012, or 8.5 percent of total homes (Helms, 2013). A majority of these foreclosures were 
concentrated in the Twin Cities metro area (HousingLink, 2013). Between 2008 and 2012, 
foreclosures cost Hennepin and Ramsey Counties approximately $523 billion and $189 billion, 
respectively (The Wall Street wrecking ball, 2013). There is evidence of subprime lenders 
targeting minorities and immigrants. Using HMDA data in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties, 
Crump (2007) found that Whites were less likely to receive a high cost loan than any other racial 
group (64 percent likely for African Americans, 49 percent for Latinos, 48 percent for Asian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 As a point of comparison, judicial processes oftentimes result in foreclosure because borrowers are in default and 
do not have much evidence to contrast the ruling (Mortgage Bankers Association, n.d.). 
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Americans, and 25 percent for Whites). In Allen’s (2009) study of MPS families, Asian 
Americans comprised 6 percent of foreclosures in Minneapolis, compared to 63 percent for 
Blacks, 18 percent for Latinos, 10 percent for Whites, and 3 percent for American Indian. 
Among Asian American families in MPS, 4 percent of households that foreclosed spoke Hmong 
and 1 percent of households spoke Laotian at home (Allen, 2009).  
While foreclosures have declined recently, they remain a problem in the Twin Cities. The 
first quarter of 2013 showed that the number of foreclosures were almost double the number 
before the foreclosure crisis (HousingLink, 2013). In a report by a coalition of community 
organizations and faith groups, a number of troubling statistics also remain in the region. For 
example, underwater borrowers in Minneapolis owe 155 percent of their home value and banks 
lose about half of the principal, or $93,000 on average, per foreclosure in the city (Why banks 
should fix mortgages instead of foreclosing on homes, 2012). These underwater borrowers and 
loss of wealth may contribute to future foreclosures and continue to destabilize the economy.  
Foreclosures are disproportionately concentrated in Northern Hennepin County. 
Hennepin County had 2,340 Sheriff’s sales in the first half of 2012, while the cities of 
Minneapolis and Brooklyn Park, though, had 811 and 263 sales, respectively (Avre, 2012). 
However, Brooklyn Park has 20 percent fewer in population and is about half the size of 
Minneapolis. This unequal concentration of foreclosures in Northern Hennepin may be a result 
of not only subprime targeting, but also the growing number of middle- and upper-class residents 
who lived there during the housing boom and contributed to the area growing too quickly (Avre, 
2012).  
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Government Intervention 
 To help combat the effects of foreclosures, Minnesota has received federal aid and 
established local programs. For example, several of its municipalities have received NSP funds, 
including Brooklyn Park, which was awarded $7.2 million between 2009 and 2011 to help 
combat the almost 4,000 owner-occupied homes that foreclosed (Helms, 2013). Much of these 
foreclosures were a result of predatory lending that targeted this majority non-White 
neighborhood. Up to 2013, Brooklyn Park had sold almost 150 properties after rehabilitating 
homes (Helms, 2013). Other cities like St. Paul Park implemented small registration fees for 
owners with vacant properties to create a database that can keep the city informed of the status of 
these properties, which can impact neighborhood viability (Helms, 2013).  
Minnesota policy makers have reinforced these policies through new laws to help 
distressed homeowners. In August 2013, they passed a new law that had three key provisions: (1) 
lenders are not allowed to sell a home until the borrower has had opportunities to modify their 
loan, and lenders must help homeowners submit their paperwork; (2) homeowners can bring 
their case to court if their lender broke the law; (3) and lenders are banned from dual tracking, 
where homeowners are led to believe that their loan is being modified, while the lender is 
processing the foreclosure (Schmickle, 2013). These new laws help to provide more support for 
homeowners, in particular when some lenders or mortgage servicers were overwhelmed with 
delinquencies and made errors in reporting information. For example, some lenders failed to 
provide homeowners with alternatives to foreclosure, lost their paperwork, or gave them an 
incorrect phone number (Schmickle & Miller, 2013). These efforts will ensure that borrowers 
have exhausted other options before entering foreclosure and they hold lenders accountable.  
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While the state and Twin Cities region in particular are working to recover from 
foreclosures, minorities have still borne many of the impacts from foreclosures. For example, 
Wells Fargo, which is the largest lender in the state, made subprime loans to African Americans 
and Latinos 4.8 times and 2.4 times more than to Whites, respectively (Why banks should fix 
mortgages instead of foreclosing on homes, 2012).  Additionally, African Americans have an 
unemployment rate that is three times the rate for Whites, the highest unemployment disparity 
between African Americans and Whites in the country, which contributed to the 25 percent 
decrease in the number of moderate-income African American households between 2006 and 
2010 (Matos, 2013; Williams, 2012). The state’s homeownership gap between minorities and 
Whites increased after the recession to 26 percent, or the 48th highest disparity rate in the 
country (Skobba, 2013). While there has been a growing Asian American community in the 
region, much is still unknown about how they have been impacted by the crisis. 
Asian Americans in the Twin Cities 
 Asian Americans immigrated as early as the 19th century to the Minneapolis region to 
work on railroads (AACAJ, 2012). However, more Asian Americans came to the area after the 
1965 Immigration Act, in particular Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino immigrants. The Asian 
population diversified with the Vietnam War, which brought Hmong, Lao, Cambodians, and 
Vietnamese immigrants (Boyd, 2013). A second group of Hmong refugees arrived in 
Minneapolis-St. Paul after the Wak Tham Krabok temple closed in Thailand in addition to more 
recent Burmese and Bhutanese refugees who have moved to the region (AACAJ, 2012). 
Asian Americans are the fastest growing group in Minnesota (Boyd, 2013). A majority of 
these groups is concentrated in the Twin Cities, or about 83 percent (AACAJ, 2012). They also 
are one of the fastest growing groups in the Twin Cities area, growing at a rate similar to African 
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Americans between 2000 and 2010 (or about 52 percent; see Table 9). Asian Americans overall 
comprise about 7 percent of the total region’s population, which is similar to the percentage of 
Latinos in the area. They are also concentrated in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties in the cities of 
Minneapolis and St. Paul and the surrounding suburbs (see Figure 8).  
Table 9. Twin Cities Area Population by Race 
 
Note: The population includes a sum of the groups in seven counties: Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, 
Scott, and Washington Counties. NHPI = Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander; AIAN = American Indian and 
Alaska native; NHW = non-Hispanic White. Latino can be of any racial group. African American, NHPI, AIAN, 
and Asian American values include alone or in combination with another ethnic or racial category. Non-Hispanic 
White is the only category that does not include Latinos. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Decennial Census Tables QT-P6 and P11; 2010 Decennial Census Tables QT-P6 
and P4 
 
There are also a lot of Asian American ethnic groups present in the Twin Cities. Notably, 
the Twin Cities has the largest Hmong American population in the country, which is a result of 
secondary migration, cheaper cost of living, and availability of jobs (Pfeifer, 2003). They are 
also the largest Asian American ethnic group in the region with more than 60,000 in 2010 and 
almost a third of the Asian American population (see Table 10). Indian and Chinese Americans 
followed behind as the next largest groups. Many ethnic groups significantly increased from 
2000, including Bangladeshi and Pakistani Americans, who grew 270 percent and 143 percent, 
respectively; Indian Americans followed behind with a growth of 96 percent. While Asian 
Americans overall comprise a small percentage of the Minneapolis-St. Paul region population, 
some ethnic groups in particular are expanding in the region.  
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Figure 8. Asian American Population, Minneapolis-St. Paul Region (2005-2009 5-Year Estimates) 
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Table 10. Twin Cities Area Population by Asian American Ethnic Group 
 
Note: The population includes a sum of the groups in seven counties: Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, 
Scott, and Washington Counties. The total Asian Americans in this table do not equal to Table 9 because it excludes 
individuals who identify with an ethnic group that was not provided a group in the Census.   - Data not available 
because group was not identified in 2000 Census. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Table PCT7; 2000 Table PCT7  
Laotian Americans 
  Laotians came after the Vietnam War to the Minneapolis region. More than a million 
Southeast Asian refugees settled in the U.S. as a result of the Vietnam War, including those from 
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos (Rumbaut, 1995). With the Vietnam War, President Carter signed 
a refugee act that increased the quotas of immigrants and refugees from Southeast Asia (Ong, 
2003). The American government granted them refugee status and resettlement funds “as a 
symbol of the failures of Communism” (Vo, 2004, p. 43). As with other refugee groups, the 
resettlement process included working with a variety of agencies and institutions, including 
churches, to help the new refugees adjust to American life.  
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Resettlement agencies sought to disperse these refugees so that one geographic area was 
not overburdened in their provision of educational and social services and to also help refugees 
become self-sufficient. In doing so, the resettlement process ignored “the long-term effects of 
post-traumatic stress syndrome, preliteracy, non-English preparation of other socio-cultural-
economic incongruities between the home environment and the United States”; agencies also 
ignored “the existence of established ethnic communities being available in the area to support 
the newcomers,” instead focusing on “immediate job placement, thereby effectively putting 
English-language acquisition as a secondary, almost inconsequential, concern” (De Voe, 2008, p. 
53).  
Because English-language acquisition was not a priority, these refugees have suffered in 
economic opportunities. While some were less educated, there were other highly educated 
Laotians who did not have proper documentation, and thus most were initially given unskilled, 
low wage jobs. During their time in refugee camps, Ong (2003) noted that Southeast Asians were 
trained to jobs such as “janitors, hotel maids, and domestic workers…regardless of their former 
backgrounds” to then join the “working poor in the United States” (p. 83-84). If they were laid 
off from their jobs, many have only developed skills relevant to their specific previous jobs. As 
De Voe (2008) explained, “What was originally considered a successful pattern of adjustment—
quickly moving into stable, long-term employment—has become a double-edged sword,” in 
particular when many American companies have moved operations to other countries (p. 56).  
 De Voe (2008) described a number of historical events that added to these discrepancies 
between life in Laos and the United States. In the early 1900s, France colonized Laos, which 
impacted language and educational attainment. Books were printed in Thai, which diminished 
use of the Lao language and its prominence. France also provided Vietnamese people with public 
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administrative and political positions, which underdeveloped the Lao middle class. After France 
left in 1954, the U.S. attempted to defray the influence of Communism in the region, and 
“dropped between 2 and 3 million tons of bombs—more than the total tonnage dropped in World 
War II,” which left a third of Laotians homeless and displaced (De Voe, 2008, p. 55). The 
Communist Pathet Lao party then took over the country, which led to more U.S. bombings, 
leaving thousands of Laotians to flee to Thailand.  
In United Nations refugee camps, Laotian refugees started arriving in the U.S. from 1979, 
while others continued to live in refugee camps for several years before they could resettle in 
another country. As a result, many refugees were traumatized by years of war and resettlement 
before arriving in the United States. Laotians also tend to have lower socioeconomic status and 
educational attainment as a result of these historical traumas and conditions. 
In the Minneapolis region, Laotian Americans are concentrated in Hennepin and Ramsey 
County (see Figure 9). However, they comprise the largest percentage of the population in 
Brooklyn Park and Brooklyn Center. As previously mentioned, these suburbs particularly 
experienced high foreclosure rates. While they comprise a smaller percentage of the population, 
it is helpful to look at how one ethnic group has been affected by the foreclosure crisis and their 
foreclosure risk factors.
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Figure 9. Laotian Population, Minneapolis-St. Paul Region (2005-2009 5-Year Estimates) 
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Geographic Concentration 
Similar to the national analysis, the local study demonstrates that Lao Center clients 
experience greater foreclosure risk than the average Minnesotan. In part, clients have higher 
foreclosure risk because they live in areas with higher foreclosure risk scores. The Lao Center 
had a total of 82 clients who participated in their two housing programs between 2011 and 2013. 
A majority (or 59 clients) participated in foreclosure prevention, which may suggest a greater 
need for foreclosure assistance after the 2007 recession began. As with Asian Americans overall, 
the majority of Lao Center clients live within the Twin Cities region (see Figure 10). Also, 
clients who use the home purchase program are concentrated within Hennepin County. However, 
those who use foreclosure prevention programs are dispersed in various counties, which may be 
in part because homeowners tend to be clustered in the suburbs that are outside of the central city 
area that is located in Hennepin and Ramsey counties. Despite this dispersion, foreclosure 
prevention workshop attendees are still mostly located in Hennepin County. 
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Figure 10. Lao Assistance Center Client Locations (2011-2013) 
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When mapping addresses, it was found that clients tended to live in neighborhoods with 
higher NSP foreclosure risk scores (see Figure 11). Similar to Laotians in the national analysis, 
Lao Center clients tend to live in tracts with higher foreclosure risk. Clients lived in 56 tracts and 
on average had a foreclosure risk score that was 13.2. As a point of comparison, the average 
foreclosure risk score for tracts in Minnesota was 11.9 out of a total of 1,303 tracts. On average, 
clients lived in neighborhoods with slightly greater risk of foreclosures. Clients in the outer 
suburbs and northern Hennepin in particular were exposed to higher foreclosure risk. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence of neighborhood spillover effects—tracts with high risk 
scores are surrounded by similarly scored tracts. Consequently, if Lao Center clients live in these 
tracts, the spillover effects may become more pervasive and make it difficult for them to avoid 
multiplicative foreclosure risks.  
Because in-language resources may help to lower foreclosure risk, Lao Center client 
addresses were compared to the location of other HUD organizations. This step helps to 
determine if clients are traveling further to access Lao Center services. The Lao Center is the 
only organization in the area that provides social services in Laotian. If clients are bypassing 
other HUD organizations to attend Lao Center programs, it suggests a demand for Laotian-
language resources that policy makers should support. 
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Figure 11. Lao Assistance Center Foreclosure Risk Score Exposure 
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Figure 12 displays the Lao Center client addresses in relation to all HUD-certified 
organizations. There are 4 clients for whom the Lao Center is the closest HUD CBO, and they 
live within 1 mile of the Lao Center. On the other hand, 19 clients live closest to the Village 
Financial Counseling Service, which is about 8.7 miles away from the Lao Center. There are 17 
clients that also live closest to the Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America, which is 
about 7.8 miles away from the Lao Center. Both CBOs offer services only in English. 
Consequently, many of the Lao Center’s clients live closer to other HUD-certified organizations, 
but are willing to travel further to go to the Lao Center. Clients who live outside of Hennepin 
County have greater difficulty accessing the Lao Center’s resources, which may increase their 
vulnerability to foreclosures. The subsequent steps focus on Hennepin County because this 
county has the majority of the Laotian population and Lao Center clients. It describes where 
clients live in relation to NSP foreclosure risk scores and foreclosed homes in 2012.  
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Figure 12. HUD Certified Organizations and the Lao Center Clients, Minneapolis-St. Paul Region 
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Hennepin County  
 The clients who sought foreclosure prevention assistance were particularly concentrated 
in Brooklyn Park, Brooklyn Center, and Minneapolis (see Figure 13). A handful of clients who 
sought foreclosure assistance lived in some additional suburbs such as Richfield, which has a 
diverse population, and Crystal and Golden Valley. Those who attended home purchase 
programs lived in these municipalities, in addition to predominantly white suburbs, such as 
Plymouth, New Hope, Golden Valley, and St. Louis Park. In addition, Brooklyn Park, Brooklyn 
Center, Corcoran, and northern Minneapolis City are also hubs of the Laotian population (see 
Figure 14; Orfield & Luce, 2013).  
Overall, Hennepin County has a greater concentration of foreclosures, and consequently 
higher average foreclosure risks than the state (or an average score of 12). Similarly, Lao Center 
clients who lived in Hennepin County also had a higher average risk score of 15, which is higher 
than clients outside of the county and the average risk score of the county. Consequently, those 
who live in Hennepin County are at greater risk of exposure to foreclosures. While foreclosure 
risk does help to gauge variables such as home value change and vacancies, this step is limited 
because it does not match client addresses to tracts with actual foreclosure data.   
 
  
 120 
Figure 13. Lao Center Clients and Foreclosures in Hennepin County (2012) 
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Figure 14. Laotian Population, Hennepin County (2012) 
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The next step matched 2012 Sheriff's sale data to client addresses (see previous Figure 
13). The range of foreclosure per tract in Hennepin County was between 0 and 65. On average, 
tracts in the county had 14 homes foreclosed in 2012. Similar to the foreclosure risk score 
analysis, Lao Center clients also live in tracts with a greater number of foreclosures, or 
neighborhoods with an average of 25 foreclosures. Similar to patterns of the Laotian population, 
many foreclosures were concentrated in the Northeastern part of the county.  
These findings demonstrate that Lao Center clients are at greater risk of foreclosures 
based on their neighborhoods. Not only do these areas have higher foreclosure rates, vacancy 
rates, and decreases in home prices, but clients also live in areas that are further away from the 
Lao Center. While they are able to utilize the Lao Center resources, they oftentimes have to 
travel past another HUD-certified organization because they do not have in-language resources. 
Thus, the Lao Center is even more necessary to help educate their clients on foreclosure 
prevention since other organizations may not be able to assist Laotian homeowners. The next 
section describes additional foreclosure risk factors that affected Lao Center clients and builds 
upon the national interviews to analyze how individual homeowners’ experiences compare to 
observations from housing counselors. As with the other layers of risk figure, clients were 
affected by a number of factors that contributed to their default or foreclosure. 
Ethnic Group 
 While the local study helped to examine a specific ethnic group, the focus groups did not 
reveal any factors directly linked to Laotian Americans that would be different from other ethnic 
groups. However, the local study was meant to be exploratory. Additional focus groups and 
comparisons with other ethnic groups are needed to further understand how important ethnic 
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group-specific factors are for foreclosure risk relative to socioeconomic status, employment, 
financial education, geography, and help-seeking behavior.  
Language Difference 
Many of the Lao Center clients do not speak English fluently. Thus, some of the clients 
did not feel comfortable approaching mainstream financial institutions. As Cynthia summarized, 
they face a couple of challenges when buying a home: “One, the language barrier, and two, it’s 
the education that you don’t have on buying a home and can’t just walk into a bank and tell them 
exactly what you want, so you depend on someone else to walk you through it.” Also, Phouninh 
commented, “We cannot speak English. The Lao people speak Lao, we talk with Lao better.” 
Tom added that “usually they had advice from realtor or their children or relative who know 
enough English to read the letter, deed, everything the document and explain to them. Mostly the 
buyer don’t connect directly to the bank.” When asked if there were Laotian staff at bank, 
Cynthia responded, “Even if there is a translator, it’s not someone you know. It’s not someone 
that you have a relationship to so you’re not comfortable with that person. It’s, you’re just scared 
to walk into a bank.” Because they did not approach mainstream banks, some clients then used 
individual brokers or lenders who sometimes took advantage of these language differences.  
These trusted brokers or lenders unfortunately took advantage of a number of clients and 
sold products that make it difficult to pay. As described by one of the Lao Center staff during the 
focus groups: 
Before the market boom, there were lots of loan officers in the Lao community… you can 
have two people make their own office and lend money to everybody. Then, mostly you 
lend to their own people. You give them not good product; you give them bad one 
maybe, because at the same time your own people don’t care. 
 
Because of several policy changes, it was much easier for individual brokers to sell subprime or 
predatory loans. For example, brokers had access to databases of potential homeowners and 
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directly approached them about purchasing a home. A Hmong broker, who used a database to 
find him at his apartment during the early 2000s, similarly targeted Sengthong. As explained by 
the translator, “Sengthong didn’t have anything big saved and wasn’t rich or anything. He [the 
broker] saw that him and his wife were making $18.07 an hour and said, why not try to apply for 
a home.” Sengthong trusted the broker and received money each month for the first year from 
the broker. When the payments stopped and left Sengthong to pay the mortgage with his own 
money, he later discovered that the broker had used his name to obtain a loan and steal the rest of 
the loan, and “that’s when he started to find out they exploited him…Asian people are exploiting 
Asian people and so he believed in the guy and then around the end that’s what he got.” 
However, this type of scamming was tied to clients’ difficulties with English. As 
explained by the Lao Center staff member once again:  
Many many people get scammed by their own group, like Lao fraud by Lao people, 
Hmong by Hmong people, because their own people can go to you easy because they 
speak the same language. Sometimes they hide from you because you don’t know enough 
English and you depend on the person who translates for you, but they don’t translate 
everything clear or hiding something. 
 
Several other clients experienced predation because they trusted brokers and lenders who spoke 
Lao. For example, Seuth “trusted the Laotian people because he was educated, knew the 
language, and then he was able to translate to her what everything was so that was easier for 
them to buy, to trust an Asian person.” However, when Seuth and her spouse were refinancing, 
the “Laotian people who gave them the loan said payment included tax and insurance, but when 
she made the payment, they pay only half, mortgage, then the tax they had to pay separately. She 
didn’t know.” Anousak also was scammed with his mortgage because “the person who gave him 
the loan didn’t tell him everything. He thought the mortgage is going down, amortized, but really 
it’s just interest only.” With his interest-only loan, Anousak relied on the lender and did not fully 
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understand the terms of the agreement. Kenneth had a broker who told him that “you can get 
approved for this private mortgage insurance…and only have to pay for 2 years, but he’s been 
paying it for 8 years.” These are several examples of when clients’ understanding of their loan 
terms were different from the actual loan or mortgage terms, in part because of language barriers 
and dependency on Laotian or Hmong brokers and lenders.  
Because many Lao Center clients have difficulty with English, they are even more 
susceptible to default or foreclosure than clients that may not have these experiences. They have 
learned that they cannot rely on all lenders. As Cynthia said, “Sometimes, everybody is looking 
out for themselves… it doesn’t matter if you can afford it or not as long as I get that extra money 
from your sale, I’m happy.” Sengthong also advised other homeowners that when “trusting 
fellow Asians, just don’t believe what they say. Just be educated because they’re going to say 
you can buy buy buy or sell sell sell but in the end it’s up to you by yourself. They’re going to 
try to get you to do what they want.” However, language barriers and predatory lending also 
interact with clients’ lack of financial education, which contributed to increased risk of 
foreclosing or defaulting.  
Income/Employment 
One of the largest risk factors contributing to foreclosure risk was the lack of wealth or 
loss of income and employment. Several clients were service workers who did not have any 
savings or assets. They were able to purchase homes because of income-based mortgages. As 
described earlier, Asian Americans are more likely to either serve in managerial positions or 
have service jobs with lower wages or more inconsistent pay. Employment opportunities then 
restricted some of the clients’ ability to pay for mortgages, in particular if they were offered a 
more expensive or predatory loan. Other clients mentioned that they were retired and had 
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difficulty paying mortgages on their fixed incomes. Kenneth described how “one of the 
drawbacks of being a homeowner is you know bills…Once you first start you think you can 
afford it [homeownership], but then after time goes by things have to be fixed and stuff has to be 
bought. Income wise, nothing has changed. Just expenses.” By not having enough additional 
sources of wealth apart from income, this client faces challenges that many homeowners 
experience in regard to maintaining their house.  
 However, a number of clients also lost their jobs, which affected their ability to pay their 
mortgage. For Vixay and his wife, “One people laid off. No more payment, no money,” which 
contributed to their challenges in paying their mortgage. Also, Seuth described how she had 
enough income when she decided to buy a home around 1998. However, “the company went 
down and they laid off people. No jobs, unemployment, and now it’s hard to make payments 
later on.” Cynthia also had similar experiences and explained how:  
When your spouse loses a job, then it’s a big factor…He hasn’t had a job for 6 months so 
that’s challenging for us, when you have a mortgage that needs two-income family and 
you’re down to one… You exhaust all your resources, your savings, everything just to 
make those payments and then you have to decide what do you want to do. Do you want 
to foreclose on your home or do you want to keep it? Nowadays it’s hard to find a job.  
 
Cynthia and her spouse did have a number of other sources of wealth such as a savings and 401k 
account. Even with these additional sources of wealth, however, they had difficulty paying their 
mortgage. During the economic recession, these clients then faced experiences similar to other 
homeowners when they lost their jobs and were at risk of defaulting.  
Lending/Housing Market Factors 
In the national analysis, AA CBOs alluded to aspects of the lending and housing market 
that contributed to clients’ risk of foreclosure such as increased predatory lending. However, the 
Lao Center clients emphasized the direct impacts that resulted from the changing landscape and 
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housing market forces that resulted in the recession. For example, Sengthong’s situation was an 
archetypal case of the housing boom and foreclosure crisis. He bought a house when:  
…the market was going up, the money was good… And then when they take out the loan 
and they have to pay it back, things started to go down, mortgage started going up, and 
that’s when the problems started hitting. When things started to get rough, he had no 
choice but to be late [default] and he tried to sell it, but then at the time no one was trying 
to buy his home so he had no choice but to foreclose. 
 
Aside from language and income factors, many of the clients thus suffered like much of the 
general population that ultimately foreclosed because they purchased a house at the wrong time.  
 A number of clients also had agreed to subprime and predatory products. For example, a 
few received income-based loans. Vixay described how “[lenders] just checked for how much 
you’re working, how much money you could buy. Low money was okay.” Although these 
clients did not have additional sources of wealth, these kinds of products made clients 
susceptible to foreclosure since they were still able to get approved for a mortgage. Other 
interviewed clients also had predatory terms in their loans such as interest only and other 
products, which inherently made it more difficult to pay off their mortgage. 
 Other Lao Center clients mentioned other challenges with their lenders. For example, 
Kenneth expressed frustration when “the mortgage is in a different state, because it makes it 
more difficult for me to try and connect with the mortgage lender.” As with other homeowners 
whose mortgages were sold to bigger banks and investment firms, Kenneth found it difficult to 
figure out whom to talk to when trying to connect with his lender. Without knowing who to 
contact, though, Kenneth will have more difficulty refinancing or modifying his loans if he 
encounters problems with paying his mortgage. Several also did not know who to contact 
particularly when scammers targeted them because brokers and lenders approached them first.  
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Finally, as with other AA CBO clients, Lao Center clients oftentimes did not receive 
formal financial or homebuyer education before the Lao Center offered these programs. 
Consequently, some clients did not realize that most mortgages are typically standardized at 30 
years. For example, Kenneth emphasized that for potential homeowners, “One thing they should 
think about is when buying a home is, one house, 30 years…it’s not something to play around 
with.” His then added that:  
…to be educated, to know how the bank works, know how loans, interest, everything 
[works] before you purchase a home…make sure you understand the documents that are 
sent. Lots of documents about the home, and language—it’s very hard.  All of the 
documents from government are in English. 
 
With the combined effects of language barriers and a lack of financial education, the Lao Center 
clients have been more susceptible to scams and exploitation by other Asian Americans. 
Immigration Status 
While clients did not directly mention immigration status as a risk factor, they struggled 
with understanding some aspects of the homeownership process. For example, Kenneth 
expressed his confusion about how “if you sell your house, you still pay 30 year. Another person 
coming and 30 years again.” This confusion may be in part from not understanding U.S. housing 
laws Laos because the financial system is different in Laos. Since 2008, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic has expanded its banking sector, which heavily depends on foreign banks 
(International Monetary Fund, 2013). Also, many have challenges with English because they 
came to the U.S. later in life—these language barriers play a significant role in making the 
process of homeownership and paying for their mortgage difficult.  
Help-Seeking Behavior 
While struggling with the mortgages, Lao Center clients did have a protective layer of 
risk, which depended on how they sought help in the foreclosure process. As explained by a Lao 
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Center staff, some Lao homeowners may have foreclosed because they sought help late in the 
process. In particular: 
Not many people used the Lao Center before, but now it’s okay. About few years ago you 
know people had problem with mortgage payment, but they had to figure out among 
themselves, among their family, and they were kind of embarrassed…That’s why many 
of our people lost their home because they don’t want to let anybody know. When we 
find out about the loss, it’s sometimes too late and we cannot help. 
 
However, those who were able to seek help from the Lao Center after they began their 
foreclosure prevention and homebuyer program were able to remedy some of their situations. 
Sengthong is one client who did foreclose, in part because the Lao Center did not offer 
foreclosure prevention workshops at the time, “so he couldn’t really do anything” or find 
alternatives to help him save his home.  
According to the clients, the Lao Center is a critical asset because “it’s a Lao community, 
it’s well known… a lot of people just come here just to hang out or business, Lao related 
business.”  With its long history in the Minneapolis region, the Lao Center also does a lot of 
outreach about its programming. As explained by a staff member, “With every program we write 
letter, we send out to every people in the community except they decide to come or they decide 
to keep quiet…we have all on our mailing list, we send out everything.” Cynthia echoed their 
outreach with their flyers, and that “with the Lao community, you tell one person, it’s like telling 
ten more. Word spreads, and word of mouth—that’s how we know about the Lao Center.” While 
people may know about the Lao Center’s services, some homeowners are overcoming their 
hesitation to seek help and learning about the importance of their programs.  
 For several interviewed clients, the Lao Center was instrumental in helping them prevent 
foreclosure. For example, “When Kenneth started not paying for his mortgage, that’s when HUD 
started making foreclosure [prevention] programs, and I think he was a little bit late by a couple 
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of months, and then I think he came to us.” As explained by a Lao Center staff member, at the 
time, Kenneth heard about the Lao Center’s workshops on loan scams, “he came to us instead of 
going to pay for a loan modification…He doesn’t just come for homeowner [programs], he 
comes to hang out before he goes to work. He wanted to come and see what we were doing.” 
After, he was able to receive free assistance and not foreclose on his house. Anousak also added 
that “next time he had to find a good realtor, no hiding anything, or come to Lao Center, they 
advise them for free.”  
 The Lao Center also offers homebuyer education, which has helped people to better 
understand how to prevent losing their home. As Neng suggested, “The other factor is with 
people losing their home…they have more education on buying homes, and they don’t either go 
over what they can afford and actually get what they can afford.” Clients are also realizing the 
importance of financial education and homebuyer education. When talking to other potential 
homeowners, Kenneth will “ask them, do you understand what the deed is and they say no, and 
he said why would you sign it? So basic education about home mortgage is a good thing, you 
really need to learn.” While the Lao Center does help to protect clients against foreclosure, it is 
important to examine how it fared during the foreclosure crisis.  
CBO Mediation 
 Interviews with mainstream and AA CBOs on the local level provided an opportunity to 
compare how these CBOs fared after 2007. This insight enables us better understand how 
devolution and segmentation affected relationships among CBOs. If there are significant 
differences in capacity, perhaps strategies from mainstream CBOs can help to strengthen AA 
CBO resources.   
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Devolution 
As mentioned in the national analysis, there is some evidence of facilitated devolution 
among housing counseling CBOs. For example, a staff member at LSS described how, before the 
foreclosure crisis, their foreclosure counselors could assist clients with reverse mortgages and 
other general needs. Since then, there have been changes in the federal program that requires 
their foreclosure counselors to become specialists.  
This trend increases segmentation based on translation services available to clients. While 
all CBOs recognized the challenging process of providing translation services and that it is 
preferable to have a bilingual counselor than use an ineffective translator who is 
unknowledgeable of homeownership issues. This segmentation though has implications for how 
CBOs cooperate and their knowledge of how to work with other groups.  
Some of these mainstream CBOs felt it was in the best interests of clients who do not 
speak English to be referred to a CBO that has that language capacity. However, the level of 
intra-CBO cooperation varies significantly by language. For Spanish-speaking clients, LSS 
works formally with NeDA through conference calls to help with foreclosure counseling, which 
then allows them to eventually transition clients to NeDA. According to an LSS staff member, 
they also have a partnership with NeDA for debt services to help Latinos who have been 
scammed. On the other hand, they do not have any formal ties to organizations serving clients 
with other language needs. Also, HAP mentioned that they do not have much of a network in the 
state because of the dearth of CBOs that have language specific counseling. Lao Center also 
specified that they work mostly with HAP and National CAPACD, or other Asian American-
targeting resources, which represents not only segmentation by CBO, but also by CBO networks.  
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While LSS and TC Habitat mostly work with HAP to refer clients, MNHOC works more 
closely with AA CBOs in the state in their Homeownership Advisors Network. According to a 
staff member, MNHOC became more focused on outreaching to Asian Americans in 2008 
because they received funding to increase their capacity to work with CBOs that focus on 
Southeast Asian Americans and Latinos. However, this collaboration was the result of much 
initiative from several Asian American persons and CBOs. First, National CAPACD organized 
several community meetings and invited MNHOC to participate, which helped MNHOC to 
eventually include more organizations in the Advisors Network and apply for these funding 
sources. Additionally, Senator Mee Moua had approached MNHOC to ask for data on Southeast 
Asian American foreclosures because she was hearing from Asian American constituents about 
their struggles with foreclosures. HAP also approached MNHOC a few years ago to obtain 
assistance with outreach before they become a member of the Advisors Network.  
When asked about future work with AA CBOs, MNHOC is “dependent on future funding 
for a commitment to Southeast Asian Americans.” These relationships are most likely temporary 
and perhaps only began because Asian American entities approached MNHOC.  It is unclear if 
these diverging levels of intra-CBO cooperation are from different language needs in the state 
and/or CBO capacity. However, segmentation increases the gap between these relationships 
because some CBOs with fewer resources may not be able to develop long-term connections 
with larger mainstream CBOs, which would help to increase the language resources in the state.  
With more experience and resources, the interviewed mainstream CBOs are also more 
aware of state policy changes. For example, the foreclosure supervisor at LSS is one of the top 
experts in Minnesota on foreclosures, which allows LSS to have in-house experts who know of 
key foreclosure policy changes before they are officially announced to smaller CBOs. While 
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smaller in capacity and scope, a foreclosure prevention counselor of TC Habitat is also part of a 
state-wide program advisory council that determines a strategic plan and offers central resources 
for homeownership issues. Without these networks, HAP and Lao Center continue to react to 
policy changes unlike the other mainstream organizations. They also face a disadvantage because 
any updates released by the Minnesota state housing agency and Minnesota Homeownership 
Center are in English, which requires AA CBO staff to spend extra time and translate changes to 
their clients.  
Devolution and segmentation also indirectly affect the level of knowledge that 
mainstream CBOs have of other groups they do not serve. These mainstream CBOs are not as 
knowledgeable of the issues confronting Asian American homeowners. For example, when 
asked why their Asian American clients are at risk of foreclosures, a TC Habitat counselor 
mentioned that they “cannot think of anything different with other groups, except maybe larger 
issues like employment.” This oversimplified statement demonstrates the lack of understanding 
that some mainstream CBOs may have about Asian American homeowners.  
Even if they recognize the language barriers, they may not recognize that difficulties with 
English are linked to greater scams and predatory lending. As a Lao Center counselor also noted, 
credit problems have also impacted their clients who need more information on budgeting and 
financial counseling, which would help their clients recover from foreclosures. As other AA 
CBOs have described, HAP and Lao Center have clients who also seek help late in the 
foreclosure process because they are unsure what to do. It is critical for other CBO housing staff 
members to understand these additional barriers so they can better understand how to help Asian 
American clients, including those who are more comfortable speaking English.  
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This lack of knowledge then increases the invisibility of group-specific needs. For 
example, an LSS staff member hypothesized that it is likely that “Asian Americans aren’t getting 
served and would benefit from more services in language or culture,” but was unsure if LSS does 
not see many Asian American clients approaching LSS because they know of AA CBOs or are 
already being serviced by them. However, they do not actively seek to increase their resources 
for Asian languages perhaps because their model has been successful in assisting half of the 
foreclosure cases in the state. While HAP staff members acknowledge that Asian American 
homeowners are unaware of resources available, they also recognize that clients have 
experienced a lot of predatory lending from people who may appear to try to help them. This 
simplification again presents difficulties for other CBOs to help Asian American clients who 
may approach them.  
Finally, another difference between AA CBOs and mainstream CBOs is the importance 
of collecting data by race. As previously discussed, data collection is key to AA CBOs because 
they need the statistics to justify the importance of their work. Both LSS and TC Habitat place 
little importance on collecting information by race. LSS purposely attempts to collect little 
information about clients because they are “philosophically opposed to clients filling out an 
application of documentation in advance,” or their barrier free access approach, although they 
recognize it is harder to build a case for grants without statistics on clients. TC Habitat also does 
not collect data on race of their clients, but instead focuses on location, since their funding 
targets the Minneapolis region. While MNHOC collects data from their Homeownership 
Advisory Council, they do not prioritize any analysis by race, unless a funder specifically 
requests additional data. Otherwise, they report what their affiliated organizations report, but 
aggregated by race. Consequently, even though MNHOC network CBOs focus on specific Asian 
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ethnic groups, the data are not publicly available unless they receive funding for a separate 
project.  
While these organizations are not representative of all mainstream CBOs in the state, it is 
noteworthy that the largest social service provider and state-wide housing network does not 
prioritize collection of race and ethnic data of homeowners.  By not collecting more data on race, 
it is difficult to understand what kinds of homeowners are at risk of foreclosure in the area. As a 
staff member noted at MNHOC, they “want to meet needs of non-English speaking groups and 
people of color, but is proportional to the demand.” It is then unclear if these mainstream CBOs 
do not invest more resources in hiring bilingual staff because they do not see an enormous 
demand for Asian language services. However, if they do not collect data for these other groups, 
they may inadvertently mask the needs of Asian American homeowners and can continue to 
neglect serving other communities.  
Differences in Capacity 
These CBOs differed in capacity, in part because of their history and institutional context. 
For example, LSS traces its roots back to the 19th century and is Minnesota’s largest social 
service provider, with an annual budget that is close to $1 billion (LSS, 2013). While TC Habitat 
was established in 1985 and is not as large as LSS, it has connections to the national Habitat for 
Humanity. While these two organizations are not be representative of all mainstream CBOs in 
the Minneapolis-St. Paul region, they do vary from AA CBOs. While Lao Center and HAP has 
served the Minneapolis-St. Paul area for 30 and 25 years, respectively, they do not have the same 
historical legacy and/or formal connections to a larger organization to help support their services.  
In part because of these different organizational histories, the origins of their foreclosure 
prevention work are also significantly varied, which impacts the capacity of their programs. For 
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example, LSS, TC Habitat, and Lao Center had foreclosure prevention programs before the 
crisis. However, LSS and TC Habitat were more firmly established programs that were funded, 
while Lao Center was unable to secure funding for its work until after the recession began. 
Although TC Habitat and LSS also experienced a sudden demand for foreclosure services during 
the recession, they already had programs available for clients to use. These mainstream CBOs 
not only were then able to serve their clients, but they also had an advantage in obtaining funds. 
For example, although every organization acknowledged fewer funding sources during the crisis, 
LSS was able to increase its staff and “secure funding earlier in the crisis since they had the 
larger numbers, sometimes serving over 300 per month.” TC Habitat was also able to quickly 
obtain funding and double its staff during the peak of the recession.  
Furthermore, without focusing on the specific groups or language needs, mainstream 
CBOs spend fewer resources to provide translation resources. As previously mentioned, LSS 
does not provide services in other languages except English—they instead send clients who 
speak another language to other CBOs. Their staff also acknowledges that Asian American 
homeowners are underserved and that perhaps there is nothing available in their language 
through mailers, which makes it difficult for them to know where to find resources. LSS may not 
provide services in other languages because they may not view it as the most effective use of 
their time and/or resources. For example, their strategy during the financial crisis was to serve 
more efficiently and “spend less time per person since they are philosophically against having 
barriers.” This approach has helped them to assist a large portion of the state’s foreclosure cases.  
However, translation work would hinder their ability to quickly address foreclosure 
cases. For example, because HAP staff members have to invest a significant amount of time per 
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client, they sometimes have to turn clients away. AA CBOs may not have the option to spend 
less time per client because of the greater language needs among their clients.  
Similarly, TC Habitat does not invest many resources to help clients who do not speak 
English. While TC Habitat offers housing counseling in Arabic, their “language capacity is 
dependent on staff capabilities.” For example, while they used to offer counseling in Spanish, 
they no longer have those services because the Spanish-speaking counselor no longer works at 
TC Habitat.  Although they lack resources in other languages, a counselor at TC Habitat 
described that they “prefer to connect to other organizations if a client speaks another language 
because translation services can be a cumbersome process.” Consequently, similar to LSS, they 
also have formal connections to NeDA, where they help Spanish-speaking clients regularly 
because it is “the language need more frequently encountered.” Alternatively, they may find a 
family member to help translate. This strategy could lead to unreliable information if these other 
family members are not financially knowledgeable or have difficulty explaining complicated 
concepts that the family members may also not understand themselves without proper training. 
Strategies  
With differences as a result of devolution and segmentation, AA CBOs and mainstream 
CBOs also differed in capacity. However, how do their strategies to effectively serve clients 
compare if mainstream CBOs have greater capacity? One of the key strategies that both types of 
CBOs used was developing larger networks. As previously described, AA CBOs partnered with 
National CAPACD. In the context of Minnesota, all of the interviewed CBOs are part of 
MNHOC. Consequently, I will explore how each CBO is involved with MNHOC to understand 
if these networks similarly increase CBO effectiveness. Each CBO was also impacted financially 
by the crisis, and utilized various resources to maintain their operations or expand them to fulfill 
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the increased need during the beginning of the recession. These strategies provide additional 
insight of how AA CBOs and mainstream CBOs compare in Minnesota. 
MNHOC was established 20 years ago and is a network of about 50 nonprofit and 
government agencies across the state. It also serves as a liaison between lending and real estate 
industries and has some industry partners who help clients apply for loss mitigation or 
alternatives for delinquency, rather than calling individual mortgage companies. Through these 
industry partners, MNHOC can also advocate for policy changes; for example, they have 
discussed the need for more loan programs that require homebuyer education to help prevent 
further foreclosures. This kind of advocacy is helpful if individual CBOs are unable to work 
between the housing market and lenders and their clients.  
To assist their partner, MNHOC offers a range of housing resources, which includes 
homebuyer consumer curriculum, 1-on-1 counseling, and trainings for foreclosure counselors. 
To help sustain these programs, MNHOC offers funding for partnering governments and 
nonprofits. MNHOC additionally helps organizations with data collection and other technical 
assistance, although much of these data are not available publicly. It also has a call center that 
refers distressed homeowners to local counseling organizations. With a range of services, CBOs 
utilize the MNHOC network in different ways depending on their resources.  
AA CBOs tended to depend on MNHOC for a variety of resources. For example, a 
counselor at HAP said they use MNHOC’s monthly updates to learn about HUD’s frequent 
policy changes, which then helps to update HAP’s programs accordingly. HAP also uses 
MNHOC to learn about best practices and connect with other housing counseling organizations 
about how they approach differs, “aside from the language piece.” A staff member at Lao Center 
is attempting to develop stronger connections with other CBOs within the MNHOC network to 
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strengthen their clients’ financial literacy, credit, and budgeting. These organizations also utilize 
some funding from MNHOC, as previously discussed, because MNHOC has funds that target 
helping Southeast Asian American and Latino CBOs. These AA CBOs consequently utilize 
MNHOC in a number of ways to expand their capacity and resources.  
The interviewed mainstream CBOs, however, depended on MNHOC differently because 
they have greater capacity and resources. For example, LSS does not work as closely with the 
other organizations within the network, except for NeDA to assist Spanish-speaking clients. With 
their in-house experts, they know of policy changes before MNHOC sends out their monthly 
emails. Their staff member mentioned that LSS is not heavily dependent on MNHOC for their 
services, unlike smaller organizations. TC Habitat also mentioned they work mostly with 
MNHOC to connect to other organizations and for assistance with navigating funding resources. 
The TC Habitat staff member viewed MNHOC as a network where organizations can develop 
individual relationships with each other. Since they also have staff members who are part of the 
state-wide housing advisory council, they do not need to rely on MNHOC to learn about updates 
on policies that may affect their work. Consequently, AA CBOs continue to have to work in 
reaction to policy changes as they learn of them through MNHOC rather than mainstream CBOs, 
which impacts their level of effectiveness.  
Finally, each CBO described ways in which the crisis impacted funding and how they 
have adjusted to remain effective. For example, HAP received funding from the Economic 
Recovery Act and National CAPACD to support their foreclosure prevention program. However, 
a staff member explained that HUD funds specific housing programs, so the recession directly 
impacted their foreclosure prevention work. Funding is also an issue for HAP because each case 
is time intensive and they have one and one-half full time staff 
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prevention cases. Lao Center also faced similar issues with sustaining their foreclosure 
prevention work for three years, until National CAPACD provided funding in 2010. However, 
both AA CBOs are under-staffed, considering the length of each case and time necessary for 
translation work. 
LSS and TC Habitat had more resources to help fund their foreclosure prevention 
counseling. A staff member of LSS described how foreclosure funding “lagged as the crisis hit.” 
In part, this lack of funding is a result of local foundations blaming the federal government early 
in the crisis and thought that “funds should come from the federal level.” Despite negotiating 
between varying levels of funding sources, LSS was able to obtain funding early on in the crisis 
because they had a large number of clients, which at times was more than 300 people per month. 
With their large size, LSS was able to hire up to 13 foreclosure prevention counselors at the peak 
of demand from clients.  
TC Habitat also secured funding during the recession with funding from foundations and 
federal and city governments. A staff member also acknowledged that they received temporary 
funding from the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program, but overall there is still 
less funding available today for foreclosure prevention services. Consequently, the counselor 
observed that CBOs now have to be “creative about funding because some have lost funding 
completely.” Through MNHOC, TC Habitat is able to learn of additional funding sources to help 
them. While these CBOs have experienced challenges in funding sources, they are able to utilize 
a variety of networks and strategies to maintain their programming.   
 Conclusion 
These interviews demonstrate how CBOs have worked to address the needs of their 
clients. However, there are disparities between AA CBOs and mainstream CBOs in the 
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Minneapolis-St. Paul region. In part because AA CBOs start with fewer resources and have to 
invest more of that in language resources, they face struggles that differ from mainstream CBOs. 
Mainstream CBOs not only have more connections and in-house resources, but they also are not 
as concerned with collecting race and ethnic-specific data. There is also a greater level of 
segmentation between mainstream and AA CBOs, which leads to several unanticipated 
consequences, including less knowledge of other groups and greater invisibility of group-specific 
needs related to housing. 
The local study provides an important perspective on how the foreclose has impacted 
Asian American homeowners and AA CBOs. It also helps to contextualize how AA CBOs 
compare to mainstream CBOs when addressing housing programs and their client needs. These 
interviews and focus groups provide an exploratory understanding of how to better prepare 
resources for Asian American homeowners who are at risk of foreclosure through their multiple 
layers of risk and the challenges that AA CBOs experience in comparison to mainstream HUD-
certified CBOs.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION 
 This study highlighted the multifaceted impacts of the foreclosure crisis. As demonstrated 
by the national and local studies, Asian Americans have multiple layers of risk that increase their 
vulnerability to foreclosure. As a response, a number of community-based interventions began to 
mediate foreclosure risk. The results of the study suggest the following responses to the research 
questions. 
How did foreclosure risk affect Asian American homeowners during the foreclosure crisis? 
Overall, the findings confirmed most risk factors affected Asian Americans (see Table 
11). Table 11 indicates which findings were confirmed and those that contribute to existing 
literature. A number of these factors were associated with the recession, including 
unemployment, lack of/lost wealth, and lending/market factors. As with many Americans, Asian 
American homeowners who lost their jobs or wealth during the recession had greater foreclosure 
risk, which made it more difficult to pay their mortgage. Some of the clients were also in service 
jobs and did not have additional assets to help them pay for expensive loans and/or pay their 
mortgage if they lost their jobs. Additionally, the growth of subprime loans, broker predation, 
and ease of loan approvals contributed to clients defaulting or foreclosing. The next section 
highlights the main findings for each risk factor.  
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Table 11. Asian American Foreclosure Risk Factors 
 
Note: Compiled by author. 
* indicates confirmation of literature review findings. Bolded text indicates additional risk factors from the study. 
Language Differences 
For language differences, most of the original four relationships to foreclosure risk were 
confirmed, except for incidences of discrimination. While it is possible for Asian Americans to 
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have experienced these challenges, it was not explicitly discussed by the interviews or focus 
groups. The government and mainstream CBOs may then be discriminating by failing to provide 
language assistance and by devolving services to AA CBOs.  
The study also found that there were inadequate translated materials and translators 
outside of AA CBOs. For example, LSS and TC Habitat recognized that translation services 
were and are oftentimes unsatisfactory. Consequently, they referred Asian American clients to 
CBOs where they would receive bilingual assistance from housing counselors, but not serve 
homeowners. However, language barriers were directly linked to exploitation by lenders and 
brokers, who would take advantage of homeowners. These results highlight the importance of 
AA CBOs and other community resources that offer services in multiple languages. 
Income/Employment 
 Income and employment factors were particularly tied to the foreclosure crisis. As a 
result of the crisis and economic recession, many clients unexpectedly lost wealth and their jobs. 
The recession then emphasized the impacts of other foreclosure risk factors such as a lack of 
assets and credit history. If homeowners were able to obtain a mortgage based on their income 
and did not have additional forms of wealth, it was challenging for them to continue paying their 
mortgage if they lost their job. Cynthia and her spouse did have other sources of savings, but had 
to deplete these accounts to help pay for their house while her spouse was unemployed. Also, 
CBOs such as AAHC mentioned that clients who owned a small business were particularly 
susceptible to the economic downturn, which made their income more inconsistent. 
However, the study was unable to confirm if Asian American homeowners did not 
qualify for prime loans at the time of purchase because I did not include questions about 
individual loan terms. Based on the experiences of many of the Lao Center clients, however, a 
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number of homeowners did not originally plan to buy a home at the time of purchase, but 
decided to after predatory brokers approached them. It is unclear if these homeowners would 
have qualified for a prime loan because they did not originally approach an institution that offers 
these types of loans.  
Geographic Concentration and Ethnic Group Differences 
 As demonstrated by the NSP foreclosure risk analysis, many Asian Americans live in 
neighborhoods with high foreclosure risk scores. Consequently, these homeowners are more 
susceptible to spillover effects from other foreclosures, including drops in home prices, which 
can lead to more underwater borrowers. While Asian Americans on average may not live in 
neighborhoods with high foreclosure risk scores, there is variation based on geography and 
ethnic group. For example, several counties in California have large concentrations of Asian 
Americans and high risk scores, which puts these areas at greater risk of foreclosure.  
 There was also some evidence of subprime lending predation, particularly in the 
Minneapolis study. Most of the Lao Center clients live in three areas of Hennepin County, which 
is known for higher subprime lending. Based on the experiences of the focus group participants, 
many of these homeowners also were targeted for subprime loans. While I am unable to directly 
connect each homeowner with their address, it is likely that some of the participants lived in 
areas with higher predation. Much of this predation was also related to changes in lending and 
the housing market. 
Additionally, there were some ethnic group differences. For example, concentrations of 
some Southeast and newer Asian American populations have higher risk scores, which may 
reflect greater socioeconomic disparities among these groups. Some of these differences 
interacted with geography. Some groups that comprised a majority of a neighborhood, such as 
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Chinese and Japanese, lived in areas with lower risk scores as the concentration of the group 
increased. The focus groups raised additional questions about the importance of ethnic group 
factors in comparison to other risk factors such as income, the housing market, financial 
education, and others. As the focus group did not find any ethnic group specific factors, it is 
difficult to establish which factors are more relevant for foreclosure risk.  
Lending/Housing Market Factors 
 As it is documented in existing literature, a number of predatory practices became widely 
used leading up to 2007. In addition to subprime and predatory loans, brokers and lenders who 
provided incomplete information scammed many homeowners. These factors, combined with 
homeowners’ lack of financial education, particularly about exotic loans, made Asian Americans 
at greater risk of foreclosure. As previously mentioned, the proliferation of brokers added to the 
number of loans sold with exotic terms.  
The Lao Center clients helped clarify additional factors that contributed to foreclosure 
risk, including the popularity of refinancing before the crisis, the challenges with selling homes 
after the housing bubble, and out of state lenders or mortgage servicers. The first factor increased 
homeowner debt and made Asian American homeowners, such as Seuth, even more susceptible 
to default when the recession occurred. For those caught paying a mortgage they could not 
afford, homeowners like Sengthong were unable to sell their house after 2007. In other 
circumstances, refinancing and selling a house may not contribute to foreclosure risk. However, 
because of the recession, these homeowners were left in difficult circumstances. Furthermore, if 
homeowners such as Jeffrey had a lender or mortgage servicer that was not locally based, it may 
be even more challenging to modify a mortgage. All of these national trends had tangible 
impacts on Asian Americans in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region.  
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Immigration Status 
 A number of interconnected factors related to immigration status, such as language 
barriers, lack of financial education, and how the client entered the U.S. Because many of the 
clients were foreign-born, they were unfamiliar with American financial institutions and 
experienced difficulty when signing their mortgages. With their unfamiliarity, clients may not 
have received financial education before becoming a homebuyer or modifying a loan, which 
contributed to their foreclosure risk. The interviewees and focus group participants explained 
how Asian American homeowners were unfamiliar with U.S. banking and mainstream financial 
institutions. Many of these homeowners had less financial knowledge, not only about mortgages, 
but also related to credit scores and debt.  
The findings found that some homeowners consequently heavily relied on their 
community networks to learn about lending. However, some of these networks were informal, 
including family members who did not always provide accurate information. Similar to language 
differences, some of the AA CBO staff members talked about homeowners becoming frustrated 
with having to rely on family, which led them to turn to brokers who knew how to speak the 
same language.  
 Another factor related to immigration status included lack of credit history according to 
the literature. However, the study did not find evidence of this factor as related to immigration 
status in part because I did not ask detailed questions about individual’s credit history. However, 
it is likely that those who were foreign-born did lack credit history, and in turn affected their 
ability to build assets and credit after initially immigrating. 
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Help-Seeking Behavior 
In addition to these factors, clients sought help in different ways, which impacted their 
vulnerability to foreclosures. As the literature suggested, many Asian American clients 
approached AA CBOs late in their foreclosure process, which restricted AA CBOs’ abilities to 
prevent foreclosure. At the same time, other clients were able to modify their loans or seek help 
if they did have to undergo foreclosure through AA CBOs because other CBOs did not provide 
in-language resources. This layer of risk can serve either as a barrier or buffer against foreclosure 
if clients are able to utilize community resources when available.  
How have AA CBOs mediated these foreclosure risks for their clients? 
 Interviews with AA CBOs and mainstream CBOs in Minnesota helped clarify how CBOs 
can intervene on behalf of clients. However, these interviews also revealed challenges that AA 
CBOs have experienced in providing foreclosure prevention assistance when working with Asian 
American homeowners. Table 12 summarizes how AA CBOs and mainstream CBOs fared 
comparatively in helping their clients during the recession. Many of these differences with AA 
CBOs reflect their lesser capacity to help clients who depend on their services.  The following 
section compares the themes between all interviewed mainstream and AA CBOs. 
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Table 12. Comparative Experiences of AA CBOs and Mainstream CBOs 
 
Note: Compiled by author. 
 
Devolution and Segmentation 
 Devolution of services has extended beyond the government to CBOs—within 
institutional networks, CBOs are also becoming more segmented and have devolved to smaller 
CBOs in service delivery. There is a growing gap between mainstream and larger CBOs and 
smaller CBOs that target specific groups, including Asian Americans. As a result, Asian 
American homeowners had to turn to AA CBOs because mainstream CBOs do not provide in-
language resources. As a consequence of these growing trends in the nonprofit sector, AA CBOs 
and Minnesota mainstream CBOs have experienced the foreclosure crisis differently. 
 Much of the differences experienced are a result of disproportionate resources. While 
mainstream CBOs were ready for the foreclosure crisis, AA CBOs had to react to the increasing 
number of Asian American homeowners in trouble. They also did not have as much public 
funding at the beginning of the crisis nor did they have as much knowledge about foreclosures 
and housing policies. On the other hand, mainstream CBOs participated in networks that 
prepared them and provided them with direct links to changes in state policies. While they did 
!"#$# %&'()*&+,--,./0 1%,1&(*2'3#&$,./02
!"!#$%&!'()*+%!,-./(,%-.!0/!$11,-..!
2/,-%*/.(,-.
!"!3+4-,5+65!*-4-*.!/2!+60,$"789!%//'-,$0+/6!
$61!%/66-%0+/6.!0/!.0$0-!'/*+%:!%;$65-.
!"!#$%&!/2!&6/<*-15-!$)/(0!2/,-%*/.(,-=!
;/(.+65!'/*+%+-.
!"!#$%&!/2!&6/<*-15-!/2!/0;-,!5,/('.
!"!>6%,-$.+65!4+.+)+*+0:!/2!?.+$6!?@-,+%$6!
;/@-/<6-,!6--1.
!"!>6%,-$.+65!+64+.+)+*+0:!/2!5,/('".'-%+2+%!
6--1.
!"!#$%&!/2!1$0$!2/,!2(61+65 !"!3+22-,-1!+@'/,0$6%-!/2!1$0$!%/**-%0+/6!):!
,$%-!$61!-0;6+%+0:
!"!A+@-!+60-6.+4-!</,&!2/,!2/,-%*/.(,-!
',-4-60+/6
!"!B22+%+-60!5/$*!/2!.-,4+%-!1-*+4-,:
!"!7;$**-65-.!<+0;!0,$6.*$0+/6!</,& !"!C$,:+65!+@'/,0$6%-!/2!0,$6.*$0+/6!</,&
!"!7*+-60.D!@(*0+'*-!*$:-,.!/2!,+.& !"!7*+-60.!-E'-,+-6%-!2-<-,!*$:-,.!/2!,+.&
!"!??!789.!)(+*1!0;-+,!/<6!.(''/,0!
6-0</,&.
!"!C$,:+65!1-'-61-6%-!/6!FGH97!6-0</,&
!"!8-%/@-!HI3!%-,0+2+-1 !"!J-%-+4-!@/,-!2(61+65!<+0;!*$,5-,!%$'$%+0:
!"!922-,!,$65-!/2!./%+$*!.-,4+%-. !"!BE'-,0+.-!<+0;!2/,-%*/.(,-!',-4-60+/6
3-4/*(0+/6!$61!
K-5@-60$0+/6
#+@+0$0+/6.!+6!
%$'$%+0:
K0,$0-5+-.!0/!)-!
-22-%0+4-
 150 
have the knowledge of foreclosure policies, mainstream CBOs continued to know less of other 
groups they were not working with, which included groups with additional language needs. 
Segmentation also contributed to invisibility of group-specific needs for mainstream CBOs 
because of this gap in knowledge, where they did little to understand the additional layers of risk 
that clients experience aside from speaking a different language.  
Because mainstream CBOs do not prioritize data collection by race or ethnicity, they had 
less information available on additional layers of risk that affect minority and immigrant 
homeowners. With their limited capacity and smaller target of clients, AA CBOs experienced 
challenges in justifying their work with less data on Asian American homeowners. Segmentation 
among the nonprofit sector marginalized CBOs that focus on specific groups because they have 
fewer resources from the government and larger mainstream CBOs. While it is likely that 
mainstream CBOs believe they are helping Asian American homeowners receive the best care by 
referring them to AA CBOs, segmentation is also a political decision. DeFilippis, Fisher, and 
Shragge (2010) explained: 
Most community-based service providers since the early twentieth century do not see 
their work as political, because ‘political’ in the American context means tied to elections 
and political parties. Nevertheless, all of these groups are political in that they form to 
address a problem, or meet a neglected need, or help a specific group, all of which 
require power. They are usually extra-political, that is, outside of the political mainstream 
and formal structures, but they are still much involved with influencing public and private 
decisions of who gets what, how, and why, especially why some groups and classes 
benefit at the expense of others.” (p. 58)  
 
Consequently, mainstream CBOs were inadvertently excluding non-English speakers from their 
expertise and resources by investing few resources to provide translated resources and services.  
Limitations in capacity 
 AA CBOs limitations in capacity also varied from mainstream CBOs. As previously 
explained, foreclosure prevention work is time intensive because of the designated time period of 
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a foreclosure process; during this entire process, AA CBOs had to translate for clients. On the 
other hand, mainstream CBOs were able to more efficiently help clients to preserve their 
resources since clients do not need to be micromanaged. However, by translating for clients, AA 
CBOs had to turn away clients and are counselors who face extra work. On the other hand, AA 
CBO staff members better understood the multiple layers of risk that Asian American 
homeowners experience because they worked closely with clients, including those who utilized 
other services provided by the CBO (e.g., employment assistance).  
Similar to the lack of data, mainstream CBOs understand less about the multiple layers of 
risk that homeowners may experience because they do not invest time in translating for their 
clients—they then did not learn as much about how translation processes may be complicated if 
dialects use different terminologies. They also may not have learned how immigration histories 
can dramatically impact a homeowners’ vulnerability to foreclosures. By serving clients with 
fewer layers of risk, they served clients more efficiently, and may have discouraged these CBOs 
from investing in translation services in the future.  
However, AA CBOs were placed in a precarious situation. As described by Fontan et al. 
(2009), while these CBOs received some resources to respond to their clients’ foreclosure risk, 
“it does not mean that they have enough resources to solve these problems…[but] they receive 
just enough resources to mitigate certain negative effects on the population without having the 
capacity to act on the causes of the problems” (p. 853). Furthermore, it is potentially challenging 
for AA CBOs to gather more resources if they appear to meet their clients’ needs, who may not 
search for housing programs outside of AA CBOs, which may be perceived by others as a lack of 
demand. Without further understanding these communities, segmentation and devolution will 
continue, perhaps to the detriment of underserved groups.   
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Strategies to be effective 
 AA CBOs and mainstream CBOs utilized different strategies to remain effective. Both 
used broader networks to remain updated on housing policies and connect to similar CBOs. 
However, AA CBOs were much more dependent on these networks such as National CAPACD, 
which helped them to become HUD-certified and receive funding. Of the interviewed 
mainstream CBOs, they were less dependent and may have used MNHOC for funding—
however, they already knew of policies before implementation because they had greater 
expertise and were connected to policy networks. They were also less dependent on MNHOC 
because these mainstream CBOs were already HUD-certified for foreclosure counseling, which 
made them eligible for additional funding opportunities before AA CBOs were certified.  
To help increase their effectiveness, AA CBOs also offered other social services to help 
clients address multiple issues; however, they had fewer opportunities for funding, except for the 
existing AA CBO networks. By primarily using Asian American networks, the nonprofit sector 
was increasing the segmentation between AA CBOs and mainstream CBOs. With growing 
segmentation, these CBO networks were increasing the lack of knowledge spillover about 
clients’ layers of risk beyond those homeowners that the CBOs serve, which over time will 
increase the invisibility of Asian American homeowners and implicitly encourage mainstream 
CBOs to continue collecting few data on clients. These themes are consequently cyclical and 
may create more difficulties for future collaborations and larger strategic frameworks. 
Future Areas of Study 
The current study shed light on the research questions, but many more future areas of 
study are needed. First, while multiple risk factors have affected Asian Americans during the 
foreclosure crisis, it is difficult to prioritize which of the seven risk factors affected them the 
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most. Because the current study was exploratory, it will prove useful to collect data and 
understand which factors are more significant than others.  
Also, more work is needed to calculate foreclosure rates. While a few studies have shown 
that they were not as impacted as other minority groups, it is unclear the reason for these 
potentially lower impacts. For example, if Asian Americans oftentimes have larger families 
living together, does doubling up help to protect against foreclosures? Alternatively, are these 
variances in foreclosure rates dependent on geography? It is unclear how Asian Americans are 
faring in other parts of the country, as many studies focus on California. Are there differences in 
foreclosure rates based on neighborhood characteristics or local foreclosure policies? Also, if 
they tend to live in metropolitan areas, in what kinds of neighborhoods are Asian Americans 
choosing to purchase homes in? Are these more likely to be targeted by subprime lenders?  
While the current study provides evidence that some Asian Americans were significantly 
impacted by foreclosures because of multiple risk factors, the findings are difficult to generalize 
because of the smaller sample size. Similar studies are necessary to understand how foreclosures 
tangibly affect other Asian American populations on a local level. By examining various ethnic 
groups, future studies would provide insight into how smaller and underserved groups have fared 
as a result of their risk factors and the context of the foreclosure crisis.  
 The study also demonstrated that more studies are needed to understand AA CBOs. If 
they are becoming more marginalized in foreclosure prevention work, do they disproportionately 
receive less government funding for their work? If not government funds, where are they more 
likely to seek funding? Additionally, in the current study, AA CBOs focused less on a 
geographic area and instead targeted ethnic and racial groups. Unlike other CBOs that are 
neighborhood focused, it is unclear how these dynamics may impact their ability to fund their 
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services. With devolution and segmentation, it is more important that CBOs study and work in 
research endeavors for as Marwell (2007) described, “community-based organizations continue 
working to enhance social integration and social order by creating opportunities for poor 
people’s material inclusion in contemporary society…[but] routinely find themselves the least 
powerful players” (p. 234).  
 Another important area of research is the future of foreclosure prevention assistance. The 
current study is a cross section analysis and only captures foreclosure risk data in 2007 and 2008. 
However, more studies need to examine foreclosure trends over time. The foreclosure crisis is 
not over, nor are its individual, neighborhood, and community impacts ended. Although 
foreclosure rates may be decreasing to rates that existed before 2007 for some states, it is 
important for researchers to continue studying its impacts. Unemployment, household wealth, 
and business lending rates have not yet reached the rates that existed in 2006 (Irwin, 2013).  
In addition, individual homeowners are still experiencing a number of devastating and 
troubling aftereffects of the crisis. Khimm (2014) described a number of prolonged effects, such 
as homeowners stuck in foreclosure proceedings that can last several years—while at the same 
time they are unable to improve their credit score until the foreclosure is completed—and during 
which time they are targeted by unscrupulous practices of mortgage services that have bought up 
defaulted mortgages from major banks. Other lenders are suing previous homeowners after they 
foreclosed for mortgage deficiency, or the difference between the mortgage debt and sale price 
of a house; some states can pursue homeowners from the time of the foreclosure (Kansas) to 30 
years (Alabama and North Carolina) or an unlimited time (Pennsylvania; Kelly, 2013). In 
January 2014, 732,000 foreclosure settlement checks did not reach qualified homeowners, which 
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on average provided homeowners $865, which oftentimes does not help homeowners keep their 
homes (Hallman, 2014).  
In addition to homeowners, renters were affected. For example, Pfeiffer (2014) found that 
a number of Section 8 renters were forced to move because their landlord foreclosed, particularly 
in lower-income neighborhoods. A number of investment firms are now purchasing foreclosed 
properties, repairing them, and then renting them at higher prices because of the growing demand 
for rental properties. For example, investors are able to buy foreclosed properties with cash and 
are renting to fewer low-income tenants who receive government assistance, which allows them 
to capitalize on the increasing home prices as the country recovers from the recession (Perlberg 
& Gittelsohn, 2013). 
With these lingering effects of foreclosures, how will Asian Americans and other groups 
fare in the future? If there are fewer CBOs and government resources engaging with these 
groups, however, is their foreclosure risk still high? Alternatively, if the government or 
organizations start cutting funding for foreclosure prevention because it is deemed no longer 
necessary, would this impact AA CBO vulnerability and sustainability when Asian Americans 
are still struggling with foreclosures? These areas of research would not only decrease 
homebuyers’ risk of foreclosure, but would simultaneously result in a better understanding of 
how to build community stability and economic recovery. 
Implications 
As the country continues to recover from the 2007 foreclosure crisis, the U.S. has a lot of 
work to do to reform its housing policies and prevent another crisis. Many of the current policies 
are set to perpetuate the status quo. For example, many mortgage servicers are still deregulated 
and targeting vulnerable homeowners. Even though the new Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act 
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rules began January 2014, federal regulators are continuing the same routine examinations they 
had previously conducted (Khimm, 2014). Also, some federal departments are attempting to 
overstate the recovery process. For example, while the Treasury Department reported that 
employment and wealth increased since 2007, Irwin (2013) compared these percentages to 2000 
to show that they are still relatively lower than the previous decade.  
While though the U.S. has recovered from the worst of the crisis, the government needs 
to be realistic about the current economy and design more effective interventions and policies, 
especially for populations that are disproportionately affected. Otherwise, the state will continue 
to perpetuate disparities in homeownership and foreclosure, which subsequently will deter the 
national economic recovery process for all Americans. O’Connor (2012) critiqued federal 
policies in its community development strategies:  
Thus, having encouraged the trends that impoverish communities in the first place, the 
federal government steps in with modest and inadequate interventions to deal with the 
consequences—job loss, poverty, crumbling infrastructure, neighborhood institutional 
decline, racial and economic polarization—and then wonders why community 
development so often “fails.” In its attempts to reverse the effects of community 
economic and political decline, federal policy has been working against itself (p. 12). 
 
These observations are applicable to the foreclosure crisis, where many groups still do not have 
adequate resources to address foreclosures. Additionally, there are few concerted efforts to truly 
understand how various groups fared as a result of the foreclosure crisis, which makes it difficult 
to predict the future of housing in the country. One way to increase interventions for 
homeowners is to work together with CBOs. However, CBOs have a complicated relationship 
with the government, which is at times collaborative and contentious. 
How Effective is Devolution in Foreclosure Prevention Work? 
 There is oftentimes tension in how resources are allocated to various community 
interventions. While it is becoming popular for governments to expect CBOs to fulfill social 
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services in exchange for resources, devolution may lead to ineffectiveness, especially for CBOs 
that serve vulnerable populations. It remains unclear if AA CBOs are designed to mediate on 
behalf of all Asian American homeowners and foreclosure risks.  
Devolution is theoretically meant to increase vertical collaboration between CBOs and 
the government in addition to strengthen horizontal collaboration among CBOs to overcome 
scarce resources (Fontan et al., 2009). AA CBOs certainly are the main institution that is 
responsive to Asian American homeowners. There is less evidence of either kind of 
collaboration, except within existing Asian American networks. Consequently, AA CBOs 
develop resources within their own established networks. However, mainstream funders and 
governments may misinterpret these trends to signify AA CBOs do not need assistance, which 
perpetuates the misperception that Asian Americans can fix their own problems. Vo (2004) 
summarized this lingering racialization of Asian Americans, in which: 
Despite their long history in the United States, Asian Americans’ status as U.S. citizens 
by birth or by naturalization does not prevent them from being treated as “foreigners.” 
Asian Americans, native- and foreign-born, may feel ambivalent about the racial 
category, yet regardless of whether or not they acknowledge the dominating impact of 
race, they live racially structured lives.” (p. 233)  
 
It is clear from the study, though, that AA CBOs are less connected to policy changes and 
have to invest a lot of resources to help prevent foreclosures through HUD certification. It is 
inefficient for each group to develop resources for its own housing programming, in particular 
when many still need to rely on HUD for training and funding. While this strategy may benefit a 
few mainstream CBOs, it ultimately is less economical and efficient for the broader community. 
By continuing to exclude Asian American homeowners and AA CBOs, mainstream institutions 
are perpetuating the model minority myth to justify why they are neglecting these communities.  
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 Based on the study, it also does not appear that AA CBOs are overall prepared to prevent 
their clients from foreclosure on a large scale. They were already mediating foreclosure risk 
through a more comprehensive range of services targeting employment, asset accumulation, and 
English-language learning. However, several AA CBOs mentioned the significant cost of 
becoming HUD-certified, especially with high staff turnover. While AA CBOs have had success 
in helping individual homeowners, such as the Lao Center, they are doing so by investing a 
disproportionate amount of resources per client, which is unsustainable.  
It is then unclear if some CBOs are placed in situations of mediation that they are not 
fully capable of addressing, which would leave Asian American foreclosure risk unaddressed. By 
understanding how AA CBOs have or have not successfully mediated their clients’ foreclosure 
risk, we can better understand how generalized housing policies tangibly affect the community 
level. If AA CBOs are unable to effectively mediate their clients’ foreclosure risk, it is important 
to explore what are potential roles for AA CBOs in foreclosure prevention work. If they are not 
equipped to prevent foreclosures for their target population, are CBOs more effective in affecting 
policy changes that would help decrease client foreclosure risk?  
What is the Role of CBOs in Affecting Policy? 
As previously mentioned, CBOs are not only mediating on behalf of their clients, but 
they are working in between the private housing market and the government. These relationships 
form a triangle, which affects foreclosure risk (see Figure 15). For example, CBOs work in 
between Asian Americans and policy by working with local governments to learn of foreclosure 
policy changes. In their housing education and foreclosure prevention counseling, AA CBOs 
then convey these changes to their clients. These dyadic relationships in the model also impact 
their ability to affect policy.  
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Figure 15. CBO Relationships Affecting Foreclosure Risk Model 
 
Note: Figure by author.  “Asian Americans” includes self-identification and racialization by others outside of the 
Asian American community. Housing/foreclosure policy also includes government efforts and elected officials who 
set and affect policy changes. Housing market includes the overall market and private sector lenders, including 
mainstream banks.  
 
It is clear how AA CBOs mediate on behalf of their clients and the housing market. There 
are a number of examples where CBO staff members help with loan modifications and 
translating between their clients and lenders. Mainstream CBOs have gained much success in 
addressing these gaps, such as a coalition of nonprofits in Cleveland that negotiated loan 
modifications with a number of major mortgage servicers (Immergluck, 2008).  
The relationships between CBOs and the government are more complicated, in particular 
the conflicting role they have in housing services. While they may be able to sort confusing and 
inconsistent housing policies, this creates a hierarchical relationship—the government will fund 
and dictate what policies CBOs will implement without CBOs providing much feedback. As 
previously described, CBOs are often the entities with the least amount of power in dictating 
what changes affect their neighborhoods and clients.  
Hypothetically, CBOs would work in between the private market and housing policies. 
One way they may mediate is advocating for housing policy changes that would in turn make the 
housing market fairer for their clients. However, even mainstream CBOs may not engage 
between this third side of the triangle for a number of reasons. They may not see policy 
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engagement as a core part of their work, may not have staff with skills and the capacity to 
strategize for larger social policy changes, and/or may not have opportunities to discuss impacts 
of policy with policy makers (Ebrahim, 2010). 
Additionally, as previously discussed, CBOs are oftentimes restricted in their advocacy 
work due to their funding sources—those that receive funding from HUD may be hesitant to 
raise concerns about housing policies. To mediate between the market and public sector, AA 
CBOs would have to become involved in long-term efforts that identify policy loopholes and 
market failures, which may be outside of the scope of AA CBOs. They then become indirectly 
complicit in the government providing fewer social services for their populations. As DeFilippis 
et al. (2010) described: 
The community organization cannot target the state, not only because of conflicts of 
interest with its funding source, but also because the state poses as no longer responsible 
for—no longer in the business of—meeting social need…Democracy is doubly 
undermined, at the local and national level, and the market and community reign 
supreme.” (p. 93) 
 
It is unclear then whose role it is to fulfill this third side of the triangle, which would ideally 
identify problems with the lending market that caused the foreclosure crisis and help create 
policies to prevent a future crisis.  
Some intermediary institutions are working to mediate in limited ways between the 
private and public sector and advocating for stronger regulations. For example, National 
CAPACD has participated with other groups on the National Loan Scam Campaign, which raises 
awareness of predatory scams in multiple Asian languages. They received funds from 
NeighborWorks America for this campaign to help prevent more homeowners from becoming 
victims of loan scams. However, education campaigns are not the same as directly advocating 
HUD or other government agencies to strengthen regulation against scammers.  
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AA CBOs are also in a complicated relationship with housing policies because they are 
encouraging homeownership, which puts their clients at risk of foreclosure. CBOs are awarded 
funding from HUD to not only prevent foreclosures, but also to promote homebuyer education 
for clients who may not have the assets and savings to financially sustain themselves. Devolution 
restricts AA CBO in their ability to advocate against policies that put their clients at risk of 
foreclosure. Also as a result, Asian American homeowners become less visible within federal 
policy, advocacy coalitions, and local mainstream CBOs.  
Is it the role of the local government to then reform its own policies? Some local 
governments have attempted to regulate lenders. For example, the City of Louisville set higher 
taxes on vacant homes that violate building codes than other properties, and the City of 
Minneapolis increased their vacant property registration fees to discourage negligent lenders 
after foreclosure and prevent negative spillover effects from foreclosed properties (Immergluck, 
2008). The federal government also implemented several programs to intervene on behalf of 
homeowners. For example, the Home Affordable Modification Program seeks to keep families in 
their homes by giving loan servicers incentives to lower the monthly mortgage payment through 
a loan modification (National Association of Consumer Advocates, 2014). However, HAMP’s 
success depends on the flexibility of each servicer and has had mixed results. While the public 
sector has attempted to mediate on behalf of homeowners who are vulnerable to foreclosing, they 
do not have as much knowledge of how other populations were affected by foreclosures.  
On the other hand, AA CBOs work more directly with Asian American homeowners and 
better understand their foreclosure risk factors. If AA CBOs were mediating all three sides of the 
triangle, they would significantly decrease Asian Americans’ foreclosure risk. AA CBOs would 
not only work to educate clients on policies and assist their interactions with lenders, but they 
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would also advocate for policy and market changes that would help prevent Asian Americans 
from foreclosing on a large scale. If AA CBOs do not fulfill this role, who then is helping to 
inform the government and lenders about how Asian Americans were affected by the foreclosure 
crisis?  If local governments fulfill this gap, are they including Asian Americans in their planning 
efforts? It is critical to understand these nuances to help better create interventions that can help 
lower foreclosure risk and strengthen neighborhood stability.  
As a note, the figure oversimplifies the complexities of these relationships that are 
characterized by both conflict and collaboration. While they are oftentimes in tension, 
Immergluck (2008) identified a number of collaborations among CBOs, lenders, and local 
governments.15 Also, Figure 15 only includes CBOs mediating between the dyadic relationships 
because it includes multiple types of CBOs. AA CBOs may be working with mainstream CBOs 
in some instances, but may also become more segmented in some aspects of foreclosure 
prevention. Understanding these relationships will contextualize what factors impact Asian 
American homeowners’ foreclosure risk.  
The study also raises a number of questions that are particularly pertinent for planners 
and policy makers. As described, a number of AA CBOs face difficulties with meeting the gap of 
serving their clients because of the lack of communication between these organizations and the 
rapidly changing foreclosure policies, especially right after the crisis began. These challenges 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Chicago’s Homeownership Preservation Initiative includes financial institutions, Neighborhood Housing Services, 
the Chicago Department of Housing, and the Federal Reserve Bank to link citizens with foreclosure prevention 
counseling through a nonemergency telephone number. The city also brought together mortgage services and 
housing counselors for “Borrower Outreach Days,” which educated 2,000 borrowers (Immergluck, 2008). Chicago 
also mails postcards with information about counseling services to homeowners who are starting the foreclosure 
process. Additional coalitions have been created in other cities, such as Baltimore and Atlanta (Kingsley, Smith, & 
Price, 2009). The Baltimore Homeownership Preservation Coalition includes organizations, government agencies, 
legal services, and housing counseling organizations, which helps these groups track foreclosures and strategize on 
expanding outreach for services. Similarly, the Atlanta Regional Commission collects foreclosure data and 
collaborates with local governments, universities, and other partners to help stop the neighborhood spillover impacts 
from foreclosures.   
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multiply when they are working with a number of ethnic groups with different immigration 
histories and needs.  
Additionally, planners should consider how their policies encourage foreclosures. For 
example, if cities encourage larger plot sizes or houses, it may lead homeowners to buy larger 
houses beyond their financial means. If planners can devise interventions that encourage a range 
of housing options, homeowners may then accumulate less debt. If policy makers and planners 
are meant to plan for larger public good and underserved communities, they need to consider 
these differences in CBO networks with service provision and the implications of underserving 
certain groups.  
Are future community-based mediations expected to become incremental and segmented, 
particular for smaller populations? If so, the public sector needs to work more closely with 
CBOs, which would assist CBOs become prepared for policy changes. Otherwise, smaller CBOs 
may continue to become marginalized, in particular because the funding structure tends to 
reward CBOs that have a greater capacity and serve more clients. While CBOs should 
complement the government’s actions, they also need to balance how the government can help 
homeowners who may not have access to CBOs. With stronger relationships between the 
government and CBOs, AA CBOs would become prepared before another crisis occurs and 
strengthen their effectiveness.  
There are several other policy recommendations that would improve these collaborations 
with CBOs: 
• Conduct more research on minority and immigrant populations: Planners and policy makers 
do not know enough about these groups, let alone how they were affected by foreclosures. 
Without understanding how policies affect a wider population, the government will not know 
 164 
how to intervene. As demonstrated, many of these groups experience multiple foreclosure 
risk factors that may not impact the general population as frequently. Specifically for Asian 
Americans, it is imperative for studies to disaggregate by ethnic group. Asian Americans are 
extremely diverse and are likely to have different foreclosure risk factors. While I found that 
there are some ethnic differences, there are not enough studies to understand why they may 
live in areas with varying foreclosure risk scores.  
• Increase partnerships between mainstream CBOs and AA CBOs: LSS and NeDA have 
developed a model that could be applied to AA CBOs. NeDA benefits from this relationship 
because they can help their clients, who have access to bilingual staff. NeDA staff also 
benefit because they can use the foreclosure expertise that LSS staff members have and can 
keep NeDA updated on policy changes. These relationships in turn help mainstream CBOs 
learn about foreclosure risk factors that affect non-English speaking clients. Also, if state 
policy makers recognize LSS staff members as foreclosure experts, LSS staff could help 
relay concerns that Spanish-speaking or other clients have related to disproportionate impacts 
of foreclosure policies. AA CBOs and Asian American homeowners would similarly gain 
from similar relationships rather than simply connecting to Asian American networks.  
•  Provide funding for staff development and salaries: National CAPACD members obtain 
grants to attend trainings and help with HUD certification. If HUD or other government 
agencies helped to provide grants for AA CBOs and other smaller organizations, AA CBOs 
would not need to solely depend on National CAPACD. While networking with National 
CAPACD is beneficial for multiple reasons, National CAPACD may not have reliable 
sources of funding for their member organizations, and consequently additional funding for 
certification and staff training could benefit far more AA CBOs.  
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Another way that the government can strengthen foreclosure prevention work at AA CBOs 
would be to provide grants that increased salaries. In addition to working at underfunded 
organizations, several AA CBOs mentioned the quick turnover of foreclosure prevention 
counselors. With the complexity of housing policies and length of time a foreclosure process 
may take to resolve, it is even more imperative for counselors to stay at their jobs.  By 
compensating counselors adequately, these AA CBOs can attract staff members for which 
the cost of HUD certification would be well invested.  
• Initiate opportunities for CBO feedback: Because CBOs are implementing local policies, it is 
critical that local governments and policy makers ask CBOs for feedback. While policy 
makers may have good intentions with policies they devise, counselors can help them 
understand how HUD trainings and policies impact their work. For example, if counselors 
are taught only a handful of ways to prevent clients from foreclosure, it is in the best interest 
for HUD and governments to hear this feedback. The government not only knows of more 
programs that counselors can utilize, but it also may be able to offer advice on how to resolve 
specific cases. Additionally, CBOs could then work with the government and change specific 
housing policies to accommodate the diverse needs of minorities and immigrants.  
Not only have mainstream interventions ignored how housing policies have disparately affected 
minority and immigrant groups, but it has also perpetuated their invisibility by underfunding 
CBOs that target these groups. Also, planners are called to address issues of inequality—these 
efforts would provide equal access to social services and allow other groups to meet their 
financial goals. Finally, planners and policy makers will benefit greatly from learning how to 
work with immigrant and minority communities. If these groups are financially strong, it will 
help the country to strengthen its economic resources and viability for the future.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 While I have known that policies disproportionately impact certain groups, this study 
helped me to learn first-hand of how policies oftentimes have issues in implementation. In 
particular, when the U.S. has a strong rhetoric that pushes homeownership opportunities, it is 
challenging to develop policies that counter this approach, especially for those who may not be 
ready to become homeowners or are recovering after foreclosure. Even CBOs are pushed to 
promote homeownership through funding that rewards broader governmental goals; they may 
not be able to innovate for their target communities and groups. However, by following larger 
government programs, they are penalized if the policies make their work more challenging based 
on their target groups.   
This study raises larger questions about how to plan inclusively and equitably. Given the 
difficulty in devising policies with political gridlock, how do planners help integrate other groups 
when their policies are simultaneously making it difficult for groups to become integrated with 
their communities? Also, as the United States is becoming a minority-majority country, scholars 
should be prioritizing racial and ethnic-specific studies. The fate of Asian Americans can help to 
understand how other groups will become integrated or segmented in policies.  
Although they are a smaller percentage of the population in many geographic areas, 
Asian Americans nevertheless are the fastest growing group in the U.S. Thus, how they fared in 
the foreclosure crisis has implications about the service provision and housing resources for 
other groups that are less understood by the public and private sector. These other groups include 
those who speak another language, are foreign-born (including refugees and voluntary 
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immigrants), and those who may have differing cultural beliefs than those understood by 
mainstream service providers.  
To address these broader implications, I included multiple geographic scales, ethnic 
group differences, and various forms of data. This approach was intentional and meant to 
highlight the diversity of Asian Americans while addressing data constraints. When exploring 
the overall impacts of a phenomenon, it is easier to quantify the impacts on a national scale 
because studies can speak to a broader group of readers. Consequently, I included the national 
level of analysis to provide an overview of Asian American communities in the country. 
However, I was unable to comprehensively document foreclosure risk for all Asian American 
groups due to data suppression. If national data sources do include demographic data, they do not 
always include Asian Americans as a racial category; if they do include Asian Americans, they 
oftentimes do not include Asian American ethnic groups. Consequently, much of my project had 
to find alternatives to the gaps in national data, such as the study in Minneapolis-St. Paul.  
While they live in areas with different foreclosure risk, it will also take a series of studies 
to begin and understand the complexities of ethnic groups and how much variation is a result of 
an intersection of identities (e.g., immigration status and gender). Examining any ethnic group is 
more time-consuming, with fewer available data and more difficulty in justifying the need for 
these kinds of data. However, it is a rewarding process to produce new data that contributes to a 
larger body of literature.   
In addition to the challenges with studying smaller populations, I also chose to prioritize 
Asian Americans and AA CBOs, who are oftentimes the least powerful in national policy 
discourse. At the same time, this endeavor does require creativity in how to overcome data and 
methodological challenges. By focusing on CBOs, I am going against the trend of deregulation 
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and marketization. These kinds of projects generate knowledge from the bottom-up, rather than 
allowing national data trends dictate the lived experiences of Asian Americans. By using 
multiple research methods, I also hope to strengthen the importance of research projects that 
examine overlooked populations.  
It is deleterious for planners and policymakers to assume that the fate of smaller groups 
does not impact larger groups, particularly when foreclosures have significant implications for 
the neighborhood and municipal financial stability. These projects are thus necessary to highlight 
the significance of underserved community stakeholders, who oftentimes reveal how policies 
may disproportionately impact these groups. It is clear that many housing and foreclosure 
policies affect minority and immigrant homeowners, who have higher foreclosure risk. By 
understanding areas these populations, we can design improved policies or better reinforcement 
to help fewer groups fall through the cracks.   
Notes 
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate 
Research Fellowship Program under Grant Number DGE-1144245. Any opinion, findings, and 
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. The UIUC Department of 
Asian American Studies Jeffrey S. Tanaka Graduate Student Research Grant provided additional 
support for the project. 
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• 60$(*3&%47*)8*0)27&%#*;")#"$:7*4)*1)2*)88,"*=9/$77,7>*&%4&+&42$/*9)2%7,/&%#>*-)"370);7?5**
• 60$(*();&97*)"*7($#,*)8*0):,)-%,"70&;*4)*1)2"*;")#"$:7*$44",77*=0):,A21,"*$77&7($%9,>*
;)7(B0):,)-%,"70&;>*8)",9/)72",*;",+,%(&)%?5*
• .)-*4)*1)2*($&/)"*1)2"*7,"+&9,7*()*:,,(*(0,*%,,47*)8*1)2"*9/&,%(75*
• C8*1)2*$",*2%$A/,*()*7,"+,*1)2"*9/&,%(7>*-0$(*)"#$%&'$(&)%*)"*",7)2"9,*",8,""$/7*4)*1)2*;")+&4,5*
• .)-*$",*1)2"*0)27&%#*;")#"$:7*82%4,45*
*
D)",9/)72",*E)%(,F(*
• G&4*1)2"*)"#$%&'$(&)%*)88,"*0):,)-%,"70&;*;")#"$:7*A,8)",*(0,*9"&7&75**
o C8*7)>*-0$(*3&%47*)8*7,"+&9,7*4&4*1)2*;")+&4,5**
o C8*%)(>*-015*6$7*(0,",*$*%,,4*A,8)",*HIIJ5*
• 60$(*90$%#,7*&%*7,"+&9,*;")+&7&)%*)"*$",$*$%4*;);2/$(&)%*7,"+,4*0$7*(0,*)"#$%&'$(&)%*
,F;,"&,%9,4*42"&%#*(0,*0)27&%#*4)-%()-%>*&8*$%15**
• K&%9,*(0,*8)",9/)72",*9"&7&7>*0)-*0$7*1)2"*;")#"$:7<*82%4&%#*A,,%*$88,9(,45**
• 6&(0*-0$(*)(0,"*)"#$%&'$(&)%7*$%4*;2A/&9*$#,%9&,7*4),7*1)2"*)"#$%&'$(&)%*&%(,"$9(*)"*;$"(%,"*
-&(05*6,",*$%1*)8*(0,7,*",/$(&)%70&;7*4,+,/);,4*$8(,"*(0,*8)",9/)72",*9"&7&75*
• 60$(*90$//,%#,7*4)*1)2*8$9,*&%*;")+&4&%#*0,/;*()*7("2##/&%#*0):,)-%,"75**
o C8*(0,7,*90$//,%#,7*-,",*$44",77,4>*0)-*-,",*(0,1*)+,"9):,5*C8*%)(>*-01*%)(5*
• 60$(*(1;,7*)8*;")#"$:7*)"*$9(&)%7*0$+,*A,,%*,88,9(&+,*)"*&%,88,9(&+,5*
• 60$(*0$+,*A,,%*(0,*A$""&,"7*()*4,+,/);&%#*$%*,88,9(&+,*",7;)%7,>*$%4*-0$(*0$7*8$9&/&($(,4*1)2"*
$A&/&(1*()*",7;)%45*
*
E/&,%(*E0$"$9(,"&7(&97*
• L(*-0$(*7($#,*)8*0):,)-%,"70&;*$",*1)2"*9/&,%(7*$(*-0,%*(0,1*$;;")$90*1)2*8)"*0,/;5*
• 60$(*)(0,"*8&%$%9&$/*A2"4,%7*9)%("&A2(,4*()*(0,*4,8$2/(*)"*8)",9/)72",5*
• 6,",*$%1*/)$%7*(0$(*1)2"*9/&,%(7*())3*)2"*72A;"&:,*/)$%75**
o C8*7)>*4&4*(0,1*3%)-*$(*(0,*(&:,*&8*(0,1*M2$/&8&,4*8)"*$*;"&:,*/)$%5*601*4&4*(0,1*($3,*)2(*
$*72A;"&:,*/)$%5*.)-*4&4*(0,1*;/$%*()*:,,(*(0,*;$1:,%(7*)%*(0,*/)$%5*
• 60,",*4)*;,);/,*/&+,*$8(,"*(0,1*/,8(*(0,&"*0):,75*C8*(0,1*N)&%,4*$%)(0,"*0)27,0)/4>*0)-*/)%#*
4&4*(0,1*7($1*-&(0*(0,:*A,8)",*#,((&%#*$*;/$9,*)8*(0,&"*)-%5*
• G&4*(0,1*A,9):,*0):,/,77*$(*$%1*;)&%(*$8(,"*/)7&%#*(0,&"*0):,75*
• 60$(*",7)2"9,7*4&4*;,);/,*0$+,*/,8(*$8(,"*8)",9/)72",5*
• G)*;,);/,*-0)*/)7(*(0,&"*0):,7*;/$%*()*;2"90$7,*$%)(0,"*0):,*&%*(0,*82(2",5**
o C8*7)>*-0$(*$",*(0,&"*;/$%7*8)"*8&%$%9&%#*(0,*0):,*;2"90$7,5*
*
*
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!"#$%&'(%)*+,-).,/0(0.1,2&(%3%(%1+,
• 45'(,*16,+(.'(17%1+,'.1,*11818,(),51$#,2+%'*,2"1.%&'*+,#.1+1.31,(51%.,5)0+%*7,'*8,'++1(+9,
• 45'(,:%*8+,)-,#.)7.'"+,).,.1+)0.&1+,&)0$8,51$#,1;#'*8,<)0.,#.)7.'"+9,
,
!"#$"%&$'()*&+)!",(-&.)/'".'*#)01-$&2()
)
=)"1)6*1.+5%#,>;#1.%1*&1+,'*8,=)"1,?0.&5'+1,
• 45'(,'.1,(51,"'%*,@1*1-%(+,)-,@1%*7,',5)"1)6*1.9,45'(,'.1,(51,"'%*,8.'6@'&:+9,
• 451*,8%8,<)0,#0.&5'+1,<)0.,5)"19,45<,8%8,<)0,81&%81,(),@1&)"1,',5)"1)6*1.9,
o !-,#0.&5'+18,@1(611*,ABBC,(),ABBDE,8%8,<)0,(5%*:,5)"1,#.%&1+,6)0$8,&)*(%*01,(),7),
8)6*F,.1"'%*,(51,+'"1F,).,7),0#,%*,+0@+1G01*(,<1'.+9,
• ?.%).,(),#0.&5'+%*7,<)0.,5)"1F,8%8,<)0,.1&1%31,'*<,180&'(%)*,).,'83%&1,'@)0(,(51,5)"1,@0<%*7,
#0.&5'+19,,
o !-,+)F,65),#.)3%818,<)0,6%(5,(5%+,%*-)."'(%)*9,
• =)6,6)0$8,<)0,71*1.'$$<,81+&.%@1,<)0.,-%*'*&%'$,+%(0'(%)*,'(,(51,(%"1,<)0,#0.&5'+18,',5)"19,
• 45'(,%+,<)0.,1;#1.%1*&1,6%(5,$)'*+9,45'(,$1*81.+,8%8,<)0,+#1':,6%(5F,'*8,5)6,8%8,<)0,$1'.*,
'@)0(,(51"9,45<,8%8,<)0,&5))+1,(51,)*1,(5'(,<)0,8%89,
• ='31,<)0,1;#1.%1*&18,'*<,&5'$$1*71+,%*,(51,#.)&1++,)-,@1&)"%*7,',5)"1)6*1.9,
o !-,+)F,%+,(51.1,'*<(5%*7,<)0,6)0$8,5'31,8)*1,8%--1.1*($<9,
• 45'(,'83%&1,6)0$8,<)0,7%31,(),-'"%$%1+,$%:1,<)0.+,'@)0(,@1&)"%*7,',5)"1)6*1.9,
,
H11:%*7,=1$#,
• 45'(,-'&().+,&)*(.%@0(18,(),<)0.,8%--%&0$(<,%*,"':%*7,").(7'71,#'<"1*(+9,45'(,+(.'(17%1+,8%8,
<)0,0+1,(),#'<,<)0.,").(7'719,
• I'..%1.+,@1-).1,7)%*7,(),).79,
• J%8,<)0,+11:,'++%+('*&1,-.)",',5)0+%*7,&)0*+1$).,).,)(51.,).7'*%K'(%)*9,,
o !-,+)F,65%&5,)*1+,'*8,65<9,45'(,6'+,<)0.,%*(1.'&(%)*,$%:1,'*8,65'(,:%*8,)-,'++%+('*&1,
8%8,(51<,#.)3%819,=)6,5'+,<)0.,-%*'*&%'$,'*8,5)0+%*7,+%(0'(%)*,&5'*718,'-(1.,+11:%*7,
.1+)0.&1+9,
o !-,*)(F,65<,8%8,<)0,*)(,+11:,51$#,-.)",(51+1,.1+)0.&1+9,
• 45'(,)(51.,(<#1+,)-,.1+)0.&1+,6)0$8,5'31,51$#18,<)0F,@0(,61.1,0*'3'%$'@$19,45'(,'83%&1,
6)0$8,<)0,7%31,(),&)""0*%(<,).7'*%K'(%)*+,(5'(,'.1,(.<%*7,(),51$#,5)"1)6*1.+,$%:1,<)0.+1$-9,
,
/).1&$)+0.1,>;#1.%1*&1,
• !-,'##$%&'@$1F,65'(,6'+,5'##1*%*7,'(,(51,(%"1,651*,<)0,.1'$%K18,<)0,&)0$8,*),$)*71.,:11#,<)0.,
5)"19!
• 45'(,5'+,&5'*718,%*,<)0.,+%(0'(%)*,+%*&1,$1'3%*7,<)0.,5)"19!
• J),<)0,#$'*,)*,@1&)"%*7,',5)"1)6*1.,'7'%*9,45<,).,65<,*)(9!
• 2.1,(51.1,)(51.,6'<+,(5'(,<)0.,1;#1.%1*&1+,5'31,'--1&(18,<)0,(5'(,61,5'31*L(,8%+&0++189,
,
, ,
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APPENDIX B 
!"#$%#&'&"'()*&+!+()&%'+#'*%$%)*!,'$&-./'
!"#$%&'()*+$,-$*"#$.,/#)0,+1/#$2/3+3+$,4$5+3(4$5&#/3)(4+$(46$*"#$$
73*38(*348$9--#)*+$,-$2,&&143*:;<(+#6$=/8(43>(*3,4+$
 
012'34'+'56789'3:;6<='
?,1$(/#$@#348$(+A#6$*,$'(/*3)3'(*#$34$($+*16:$,4$*"#$3&'()*+$,-$-,/#)0,+1/#+$,4$5+3(4$5&#/3)(4$
",&#,B4#/+$(46$",B$),&&143*:$,/8(43>(*3,4+$"(C#$'/,C36#6$",1+348$'/,8/(&+$34$*"#$7344#(',03+;D*E$
F(10$/#83,4E$5++3+*(4*$F/,-#++,/$546/#B$G/##40##$(46$2"/3+*34($51H#(4$I##J$($7(+*#/K+$'/,8/(&$+*16#4*$
/#+#(/)"#/J$,-$*"#$L#'(/*&#4*$,-$M/@(4$(46$N#83,4(0$F0(44348$(*$*"#$M43C#/+3*:$,-$%0034,3+$(*$M/@(4(;
2"(&'(384$(/#$),461)*348$*"#$+*16:E$$
$
?,1$"(C#$@##4$(+A#6$*,$'(/*3)3'(*#$@#)(1+#$:,1$(/#$(4$5+3(4$5&#/3)(4$",&#,B4#/$*"(*$3+$($)03#4*$,-$(4$
5+3(4$5&#/3)(4;+#/C348$,/8(43>(*3,4$(46$'(/*3)3'(*#$34$($-,/#)0,+1/#$'/#C#4*3,4$'/,8/(&$,/$(/#$($
",&#,B4#/$(*$/3+A$,-$-,/#)0,+1/#$,/$"(C#$(0/#(6:$#O'#/3#4)#6$($-,/#)0,+1/#E$?,1/$'(/*3)3'(*3,4$34$*"3+$
/#+#(/)"$+*16:$3+$C,014*(/:E$%-$:,1$6,$'(/*3)3'(*#J$:,1$(/#$-/##$*,$B3*"6/(B$(*$(4:$*3&#$B3*",1*$(4:$
'#4(0*:E$!"#$6#)3+3,4$*,$'(/*3)3'(*#J$6#)034#J$,/$B3*"6/(B$-/,&$'(/*3)3'(*3,4$B300$"(C#$4,$#--#)*$,4$*"#$
+1@H#)*P+$-1*1/#$/#0(*3,4+$B3*"$*"#$M43C#/+3*:$,-$%0034,3+$,/$*"#$I(,$5++3+*(4)#$2#4*#/$,-$7344#+,*(E$
$
012'7:'>17:':>?<2'56789'<@86=$
!"#$'1/',+#$,-$*"3+$/#+#(/)"$3+$*,$"(C#$($),4C#/+(*3,4$B3*"$5+3(4$5&#/3)(4$",&#,B4#/+$B",$(/#$(*$/3+A$
,-$-,/#)0,+1/#$,/$"(C#$#O'#/3#4)#6$($-,/#)0,+1/#E$!"/,18"$*"3+$34*#/C3#BJ$:,1$B300$"(C#$(4$,'',/*143*:$
*,$*#00$1+$(@,1*$:,1/$#O'#/3#4)#+$B3*"$*"#$-,/#)0,+1/#$)/3+3+$*,$"#0'$146#/+*(46$,/8(43>(*3,4$(46$
3463C361(0$/#+',4+#+E$!"3+$),4-36#4*3(0$/#+#(/)"$'/,H#)*$B300$(0+,$0#(/4$(@,1*$",B$",1+348$+#/C3)#+$)(4$
@#**#/$)(*#/$*,$Q&,48$(46$,*"#/$5+3(4$5&#/3)(4$8/,1'+E$54:$34-,/&(*3,4$83C#4$B300$,40:$@#$1+#6$-,/$
/#+#(/)"$'1/',+#+E$$
'
013>'AB@C6<?B6:'3B6'78D@ED6<='
5''/,O3&(*#0:$RS$'(/*3)3'(4*+$&(:$@#$34C,0C#6$34$*"3+$'/,H#)*E$%-$:,1$C,014*##/$*,$'(/*3)3'(*#$34$*"3+$
+*16:J$:,1$B300$@#$(+A#6$*,$'(/*3)3'(*#$34$#3*"#/$(4$34;'#/+,4$34*#/C3#B$,/$-,)1+$8/,1'T$
• %4$34*#/C3#B+$B3*"$5+3(4$5&#/3)(4$",&#,B4#/+$(46$",1+348$'/,8/(&$)03#4*+J$'(/*3)3'(4*+$B300$@#$
(+A#6$U1#+*3,4+$(@,1*$*"#3/$",&#,B4#/+"3'$#O'#/3#4)#J$-,/#)0,+1/#$'/,)#++J$(46$34*#/()*3,4$B3*"$
,/8(43>(*3,4+$,/$34+*3*1*3,4(0$+*(A#",06#/+E$$
• %4*#/C3#B+$B300$0(+*$(@,1*$RS$&341*#+$B"30#$-,)1+$8/,1'+$B300$0(+*$VS$&341*#+$(46$:,1$B300$@#$(+A#6$
'#/&3++3,4$*,$(163,$/#),/6$*"#$),4C#/+(*3,4$-,/$*/(4+)/3'*3,4$'1/',+#+E$%-$:,1$6,$4,*$-##0$
),&-,/*(@0#$*,$@#$/#),/6#6$-,/$34*#/C3#B+J$:,1$B300$"(C#$*"#$,'*3,4$*,$'(/*3)3'(*#$B3*"$*"#$
/#+#(/)"#/$*(A348$4,*#+E$%-$:,1$6,$4,*$-##0$),&-,/*(@0#$@#348$(163,$/#),/6#6$34$($-,)1+$8/,1'J$:,1$
B300$"(C#$*"#$,'*3,4$*,$'(/*3)3'(*#$34$(4$3463C361(0$34*#/C3#BE$
• !"#$34*#/C3#B$B300$*(A#$'0()#$(*$#3*"#/$($'(/*3)3'(*3,4$,/8(43>(*3,4K+$,--3)#$,/$($'1@03)$'0()#$+1)"$(+$($
03@/(/:$,/$/#+*(1/(4*E$
• <(+#6$:,1/$0(481(8#$'/#-#/#4)#J$*"#$34*#/C3#B$&(:$@#$),461)*#6$34$94803+"$,/$B3*"$($*/(4+0(*,/E$$
• %4*#/C3#B+$(46$-,)1+$8/,1'+$B300$@#$(163,$/#),/6#6$-,/$4,*#$*(A348$'1/',+#+E$!"#+#$/#),/6348+$B300$
4,*$@#$),44#)*#6$*,$(4:$'#/+,4(0$34-,/&(*3,4$(@,1*$:,1/+#0-E$
• ?,1$B300$4,*$@#$(+A#6$*,$'/,C36#$(4:$34-,/&(*3,4$*"(*$B,106$),44#)*$:,1$*,$:,1/$34*#/C3#B$,/$
'(/*3)3'(*3,4$34$($-,)1+$8/,1'E$Q,B#C#/J$:,1$"(C#$*"#$,'*3,4$*,$'/,C36#$:,1/$&(30348$(66/#++$*,$"#0'$
*"#$/#+#(/)"#/+$)/#(*#$($&('$*"(*$+",B+$B"(*$(/#(+$),&&143*:$,/8(43>(*3,4+$(/#$+#/C3)348E$$$
$
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!"#$%#&'%$"'%()$'*$+#,%&+-.-%#*/%/+-0)12)&$-%$"#$%3%0#*%'4('0$%2&)1%$"+-%-$5/67%
!"#$"%&$'()*'+,-,)*&+.(#*/($0)$',$&-$(1,.+'$..(1,.-2..,&3(4"#$"%&$'.4,)(*&1(5,&*&-,*6(,..2$.7(85(/"2(
5$$6(2&-"#5"'+*96$("'(%,.4(+"($&1(/"2'()*'+,-,)*+,"&(*+(*&/(+,#$(12',&3(+4$(,&+$':,$%;(/"2(#*/(1"(."7(
<*'+,-,)*+,"&(,.(-"#)6$+$6/(:"62&+*'/7(8&+$':,$%.(%,66(9$('$-"'1$1;(92+(*66(*21,"(+'*&.-',)+.(5'"#(+4$(
,&+$':,$%(%,66('$#*,&(-"&5,1$&+,*67(="'(5"-2.(3'"2).;(*9."62+$(-"&5,1$&+,*6,+/(-*&&"+(9$(32*'*&+$$17(8+(,.(
$:$&(#"'$(,#)"'+*&+(5"'(5"-2.(3'"2)(#$#9$'.(+"('$.)$-+(+4$()',:*-/("5(+4$(.$..,"&7(
%
8&'%$"'&'%#*6%()$'*$+#,%9'*'2+$-%+2%3%(#&$+0+(#$'7%
>6+4"234(/"2(%,66(&"+(1,'$-+6/(9$&$5,+(5'"#(/"2'()*'+,-,)*+,"&(,&(+4,.('$.$*'-4;(/"2'(,&)2+(%,66(*..,.+("+4$'(
)$'."&.(5*-,&3(5"'$-6".2'$.7(?4,.('$.$*'-4(.+21/(%,66(*6."($0*#,&$(+4$('"6$("5(-"##2&,+/("'3*&,@*+,"&.(
*&1(,&.+,+2+,"&.(,&(4$6),&3(2&1$'.$':$1(>.,*&(>#$',-*&(4"#$"%&$'.7(?4$('$.26+.(%,66(,&5"'#(
'$.$*'-4$'.;()"6,-/(#*A$'.;(*&1(4"2.,&3(.+*55(+4*+(%*&+(+"(,#)'":$(4"%(+4$/(*11'$..(5"'$-6".2'$.(,&(
*11,+,"&(+"(*1:*&-,&3(A&"%6$13$(,&(4"%(5"'$-6".2'$.(,#)*-+(>.,*&(>#$',-*&(4"#$"%&$'.7((
(
!+,,%+*2)&1#$+)*%#9)5$%16%(#&$+0+(#$+)*%#*/%1'%9'%.'($%0)*2+/'*$+#,7(
>&/(,&5"'#*+,"&(+4*+(,.("9+*,&$1(*&1(+4*+(-*&(,1$&+,5/(/"2(%,66(9$(A$)+(-"&5,1$&+,*6(9/(+4$('$.$*'-4(
+$*#7(B4$&('$.26+.("5(+4$('$.$*'-4(*'$()296,.4$1("'(1,.-2..$1(,&(-"&5$'$&-$.;(&"(,&5"'#*+,"&(%,66(9$(
,&-621$1(+4*+(%"261('$:$*6(/"2'(,1$&+,+/7(C*+*(%,66(9$(A$)+(,&(*(.$-2'$;()*..%"'1D)'"+$-+$1(-"#)2+$'(
./.+$#(+4*+(,.("&6/(*--$..,96$(+"(+4$('$.$*'-4$'.(*&1(,1$&+,5,$1(9/(*(-"1$(&2#9$'7((
(
!"#$%#&'%$"'%0)-$-%2)&%(#&$+0+(#$+)*%+*%$"+-%&'-'#&0"7%!+,,%3%9'%&'+195&-'/%2)&%#*6%)2%16%'4('*-'-%)&%
(#+/%2)&%16%(#&$+0+(#$+)*%+*%$"+-%&'-'#&0"7%
?4$'$(*'$(&"(*&+,-,)*+$1(-".+.(*.."-,*+$1(%,+4(+4$('$.$*'-4(*.,1$(5'"#(+4$(+'*&.)"'+*+,"&(-".+.(
*.."-,*+$1(%,+4(3$++,&3(+"(+4$(,&+$':,$%(6"-*+,"&7(8&(3'*+,+21$(5"'(/"2'()*'+,-,)*+,"&;(/"2(%,66('$-$,:$(*(
EFG(?*'3$+(3,5+(-*'1(*+(+4$($&1("5(+4$(,&+$':,$%("'(5"-2.(3'"2)7(85(/"2(-4"".$(+"(6$*:$(9$5"'$(+4$(
,&+$':,$%("'(5"-2.(3'"2)(,.(":$';(/"2(%,66(.+,66('$-$,:$(+4$(3,5+(-*'17(((
%
:);%;+,,%+*2)&1#$+)*%2&)1%$"'%&'-'#&0"%9'%/+--'1+*#$'/7%
C,..$#,&*+$1('$.26+.(%,66(&$:$'(,&-621$(,1$&+,5/,&3(,&5"'#*+,"&7(?4$/(%,66()',#*',6/(.2##*',@$(3'"2)(
,&5"'#*+,"&(,&(*-*1$#,-()296,-*+,"&.("'($0$-2+,:$(.2##*',$.(+4*+(*'$(#*1$(*:*,6*96$(5"'(+4$(
)*'+,-,)*+,&3(-"##2&,+/("'3*&,@*+,"&.(*&1()*'+,-,)*&+.7(85("+4$'(,&5"'#*+,"&(,.(1$.-',9$1;(&"(,1$&+,5/,&3(
,&5"'#*+,"&(%,66(9$(,&-621$17((
(
<#*%3%;+$"/&#;%)&%9'%&'1)='/%2&)1%$"+-%-$5/67%
H"2(-*&(-4"".$(%4$+4$'(+"(9$(,&(+4,.(.+21/("'(&"+7((85(/"2(:"62&+$$'(+"(9$(,&(+4,.(.+21/;(/"2(#*/(
%,+41'*%(*+(*&/(+,#$(%,+4"2+(-"&.$I2$&-$.("5(*&/(A,&17((H"2(#*/(*6."('$52.$(+"(*&.%$'(*&/(I2$.+,"&.(
/"2(1"&J+(%*&+(+"(*&.%$'(*&1(.+,66('$#*,&(,&(+4$(.+21/7(?4$(,&:$.+,3*+"'(#*/(%,+41'*%(/"2(5'"#(+4,.(
'$.$*'-4(,5(-,'-2#.+*&-$.(*',.$(%4,-4(%*''*&+(1",&3(."7(((
(
!")%0#*%3%0)*$#0$%+2%3%"#='%>5'-$+)*-%#9)5$%$"+-%-$5/67%
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